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Abstract 
Emergency Department Management:  
Data Analytics for Improving Productivity and Patient Experience 
 
Krista M. Foster, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
 
 
 
The onset of big data, typically defined by its volume, velocity, and variety, is transforming the 
healthcare industry. This research utilizes data corresponding to over 23 million emergency 
department (ED) visits between January 2010 and December 2017 which were treated by 
physicians and advanced practice providers from a large national emergency physician group. This 
group has provided ED services to health systems for several years, and each essay aims to address 
operational challenges faced by this group’s management team.  
The first essay focuses on physician performance. We question how to evaluate performance 
across multiple sites and work to understand the relationships between patient flow, patient 
complexity, and patient experience. Specifically, an evaluation system to assess physician 
performance across multiple facilities is proposed, the relationship between productivity and 
patient experience scores is explored, and the drivers of patient flow and complexity are 
simultaneously identified.  
The second essay explores the relationship between physician performance and malpractice 
claims as we investigate whether physicians’ practice patterns change after they are named in a 
malpractice lawsuit. Overall, the results of this analysis indicate that the likelihood of being named 
in a malpractice claim is largely a function of how long a physician has practiced. Furthermore, 
physician practice patterns remain consistent after a physician is sued, but patient experience 
  v 
scores increase among sued physicians after the lawsuit is filed. Such insights are beneficial for 
management as they address the issue of medical malpractice claims.  
The final essay takes a closer look at the relationship between advanced practice providers 
(APPs) and physicians. Can EDs better utilize APPs to reduce waiting times and improve patient 
flow? A systematic data-driven approach which incorporates descriptive, predictive, and 
prescriptive analyses is employed to provide recommendations for ED provider staffing practices.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The onset of big data, typically defined by its volume, velocity, and variety, is transforming the 
healthcare industry. Massive investments in electronic health records and advances in technology 
such as smartphones and wearable medical devices have given rise to both structured and 
unstructured healthcare data, which are continuously changing. Such innovations have created 
numerous opportunities for both researchers and practitioners, and rich data is being collected and 
utilized by healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies, and insurance companies. For 
instance, several organizations have launched big data initiatives in healthcare, ranging from 
efforts to improve medical treatments to personalized medicine (Nambiar et al. 2013). In many 
cases, the goal is patient-centric healthcare (Sonnati 2015). Rising healthcare costs have motivated 
other projects as well. Improvements in record-keeping have helped to reduce healthcare costs due 
to fraud, abuse, waste, and erroneous insurance claims (Srinivasan & Arunasalam 2013). As 
healthcare systems aim to balance the patient experience (or patient satisfaction) with costs and 
revenues, data from electronic health records and RFID tags have become invaluable. The 
increasing availability of data relating to both patients and physicians provides an opportunity to 
reevaluate the methods used to measure and assess physician performance and practice patterns.  
This research was motivated by the common dilemmas facing executives in managing 
consolidated multi-facility emergency physician management networks (EPMNs). This group of 
emergency physicians (EPs) has provided emergency department (ED) services to both single- and 
multi-hospital health systems for several years.  The increasing consolidation in staffing 
emergency departments is both an adaptation to the changing healthcare landscape and a 
mechanism to remain competitive in an era of shrinking profit margins in providing patient care. 
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Previously, single hospitals would either employ directly or contract with a small group of 
emergency physicians to provide patient care services in their ED. Natural growth might lead this 
hospital to partner with one or more local hospitals and therefore hire more emergency physicians 
or ask their contracting local group to do the same.   
With rapid consolidation of hospitals into healthcare networks to achieve economies of scale, 
the nature of staffing EDs has changed (see Fig. 1). These changes have resulted in horizontal 
integration in terms of staffing as well as risk-pooling. Many healthcare systems today have 
multiple hospitals dispersed geographically (similar to a distributed supply chain), have varying 
profit margins, and are of different appeal to an already undersized (short supply) emergency 
physician workforce (Reiter et al. 2016). To address these challenges, healthcare systems often 
seek large EPMNs to manage their ED providers and assume the financial responsibility of their 
emergency physicians’ compensation.  
 
Figure 1 Comparison of ED Staffing Models 
Multi-hospital ED consolidation through EPMNs helps aggregate resources and provides 
adequate capacity to meet this need. However, as the demand for physician services is growing 
faster than supply, EPMNs are constantly under pressure to maintain physician supply to meet 
patient demand. The data used for this research was collected by a physician-owned EPMN that 
served about six million patients per year at over 170 sites in 21 states as of 2017 and continues to 
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grow. The EPMN under study has surveyed and documented emergency medicine (EM) trends 
and observed noticeable increases in the number of EDs managed by physician networks. 
Specifically, nearly 40% of all EDs in the US are currently managed by EPMNs. These complex 
networks constantly strive to balance the demands of three key stakeholders: the company, the 
facilities and their patients, and the physicians. While the company aims to acquire new contracts 
with facilities and attract physicians, every facility must be staffed, and physicians desire to be 
paid competitively. As EPMNs normally contract with multi-facility healthcare systems, 
management constantly faces challenges when staffing EDs in hospitals of various performance 
levels (e.g., productivity and patient experience), while under the pressure to ensure all physicians 
are evaluated and compensated fairly. With continuing healthcare reform efforts and the current 
shortage of EPs, the EPMN under study is constantly seeking methods to incentivize and retain 
current physicians, attract new physicians, and engage in continuous improvement to enhance ED 
performance.  
Each of the essays herein rely on data from this large physician-owned EPMN which is 
described in detail in Section 2. Section 3 addresses physician performance as we ask how to 
evaluate performance across multiple sites and work to understand the relationships between 
patient flow, patient complexity, and patient experience (Foster et al. 2018). Specifically, an 
evaluation system to assess physician performance across multiple facilities is proposed, the 
relationship between productivity and patient experience scores is explored, and the drivers of 
patient flow and complexity are simultaneously identified. A secondary result of this analysis 
reveals that the support of advanced practice providers (APPs) such as physician assistants has a 
direct positive impact on patient flow.  
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Section 4 focuses on the relationship between physician performance and malpractice claims 
(Carlson et al. 2018) and investigates whether physicians’ practice patterns change after they are 
named in a malpractice lawsuit (Carlson et al. 2020). Overall, the results of this analysis indicate 
that the likelihood of being named in a malpractice claim is largely a function of how long a 
physician has practiced. Furthermore, physician practice patterns remain consistent after a 
physician is sued, but patient experience scores increase among sued physicians after the lawsuit 
is filed. Such insights are beneficial for management as they address the issue of medical 
malpractice claims.  
Section 5 takes a closer look at the relationship between APPs and physicians. Can EDs better 
utilize APPs to reduce waiting times and improve patient flow? A systematic data-driven approach 
which incorporates descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive analyses is employed to provide 
recommendations for ED provider staffing practices. Finally, we discuss directions for future 
research. 
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2.0 Data Description 
The data used for all analyses are proprietary data maintained by an EPMN with which we 
have collaborated. This company contracts with hospitals and healthcare systems across the United 
States to manage emergency departments and staff emergency medicine providers. They maintain 
data corresponding to ED visits, physicians’ demographics, physicians’ clinical hours, patient 
experience surveys, and malpractice lawsuits. Visit characteristics, including Current Procedural 
Terminology Evaluation and Management (CPT E & M) codes and relative value units (RVUs) 
generated, were abstracted by trained billing specialists. During this period, billing specialists were 
required to have or acquire relevant certification(s) between their second and third employment 
year, with ongoing training, auditing, and external evaluation. The group also maintains a 
demographic and credentialing database of all physicians. Physicians’ clinical hours were tracked 
electronically (Tangier; Sparks, MD), while patient experience data (Press Ganey Associates Inc., 
South Bend, IN) were linked to physicians monthly. This physician group also maintained its own 
risk-retention program that recorded all malpractice claims during the study period. Because 
hospital contracts can change over time, the number of facilities, and thus the number of 
physicians, varied from month to month.  Tables 1 – 3 provide characteristics of these data between 
January 2010 and December 2017. The complete database contains detailed data corresponding to 
over 23 million ED visits between January 2010 and December 2017. In each of the essays herein, 
we define a subset of the available data to use for the analysis. 
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Table 1 Facility Characteristics by Year 
    Year 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Yearly Facility Counts 59 63 59 65 73 80 123 151 
Full Year 54 51 52 48 53 61 73 115 
Partial Year  5  12 7  17  20 19 50 36 
by Annual 
Visits (Full 
Year Only) 
<20,000  9 5 6 6 8 12 18 39 
20,000-39,999 17 18 18 17 18 22 26 40 
40,000-59,999 19 17 17 12 14 14 16 19 
60,000-79,999 6 8 5 7 9 10 10 13 
80,0000+  3  3 6 6 4 3 3 4 
by Facility 
Type 
Hospital ED 
Not recorded prior to 2014 
60 63 87 100 
Other 13 17 36 51 
by EM 
Residency 
Yes 9 9 10 10 9 9 9 9 
No 50 54 49 55 64 71 114 142 
by Teaching 
Hospital 
Yes 12 12 13 13 14 14 14 14 
No 47 51 46 52 59 66 109 137 
by Trauma 
Level 
1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 
2 7 8 9 9 10 10 12 16 
3 7 7 7 7 4 2 4 5 
4 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
None 41 44 40 46 55 63 102 124 
by State 
AZ 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 0 
CA 10 10 7 4 4 4 2 2 
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 18 
CT 3 5 5 5 5 5 6 8 
FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 
HI 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
IL 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 8 
KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
KY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 18 
MI 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
NC 11 11 11 10 11 10 14 14 
NH 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 
NV 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 7 
NY 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 5 
OH 9 8 7 11 11 18 17 23 
OK 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 
PA 4 5 5 7 16 16 19 22 
RI 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
WV 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Table 2 Provider Characteristics by Year 
    Year 
    2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Physician 
Physicians 775 865 874 863 897 1,001 1,412 1,752 
Clinical Shifts 99,018 105,794 110,668 105,195 111,455 114,683 145,811 178,398 
Gender Male 
(%) 
542 
(69.9%) 
606 
(70.1%) 
601 
(68.8%) 
582 
(67.4%) 
597 
(66.6%) 
674 
(67.3%) 
948 
(67.1%) 
1,159 
(66.1%) 
Race White 
(%) 
609 
(78.6%) 
674 
(77.9%) 
689 
(78.8%) 
681 
(78.9%) 
705 
(78.6%) 
779 
(77.8%) 
944 
(66.9%) 
1,053 
(60.1%) 
APP 
APPs 263 316 342 376 421 521 841 1,077 
Clinical Shifts 24,651 29,213 33,039 35,803 48,577 50,333 82,374 112,646 
Gender Male 
(%) 
APP demographics not recorded prior to 2014 
146 
(34.7%) 
172 
(33.0%) 
290 
(34.5%) 
369 
(34.3%) 
Race White 
(%) 
353 
(83.8%) 
436 
(83.7%) 
623 
(74.1%) 
724 
(67.2%) 
Physician Assistants 
(%) 
336 
(79.8%) 
405 
(77.7%) 
636 
(75.6%) 
799 
(74.2%) 
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Table 3 Visit Characteristics by Year 
    Year 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of Visits 2,266,635 2,480,776 2,580,737 2,438,166 2,626,216 2,765,378 3,446,818 4,459,566 
% of Visits by 
Gender 
Male 1,002,799 1,099,066 1,140,692 1,080,927 1,165,190  1,230,730  1,527,758  1,985,573  
Female 1,263,823 1,381,703 1,440,021 1,357,228 1,460,859  1,534,481  1,918,106  2,472,684  
Other 13 7 24 11 167  167  954  1,309  
% of Visits by 
Disposition 
Admitted 378,266 417,356 453,757 426,729 454,535  475,077  584,500  776,402  
Discharged 1,740,160 1,904,561 1,982,728 1,881,429 2,027,765  2,142,421  2,650,452  3,402,832  
Against Medical 
Advice 
21,557 24,783 29,595 24,586 24,820  24,295  34,303  49,067  
Left Without 
Treatment 
51,898 56,906 54,183 46,248 52,745  58,465  70,530  80,353  
Transferred 27,633 31,077 31,337 33,249 38,052  39,428  45,765  62,609  
ED Death/ DOA 3,465 3,572 3,742 3,511 3,671  3,699  4,826  6,009  
Other/ Unknown 43,656 42,521 25,395 22,414 24,628  21,993  56,442  82,294  
% of Visits by 
Provider Type 
Physician  
Not recorded prior to 2014 
2,166,356  2,214,064  2,660,844  3,199,941  
APP 406,237  505,025  741,258  1,136,434  
Both 46,815  46,263  44,270  43,942  
None 6,808  26  446  79,249  
Median Patient Age 35 36 36 37 37 37 38 40 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(hours) 
2.60 2.70 2.75 2.77 2.77 2.72 2.78 2.92 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(Admitted) 
4.67 4.87 4.95 5.05 4.97 4.87 4.80 4.90 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(Discharged) 
2.32 2.40 2.40 2.42 2.42 2.38 2.47 2.57 
Median Patient RVUs 3.21 3.40 3.37 3.37 3.30 3.33 3.32 3.32 
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3.0 Understanding Variability in Physician Practice Patterns: Key Performance Indicators 
in Emergency Physician Management Networks 
3.1 Motivation 
“The director of an emergency medicine group is struggling. The group of emergency 
physicians has provided emergency department (ED) services to a five-hospital health system 
for the past ten years. Given new legislation, the health system is seeking opportunities to 
maximize ED productivity and minimize costs. Simultaneously, the emergency physicians in 
the group are in revolt. They feel that based on the particular hospitals in which they work, 
their productivity-based compensation varies drastically – driven by factors out of their 
control such as location, services available at each hospital, and the scheduling idiosyncrasies 
of each hospital. The emergency physicians also feel that the health system is imposing 
unrealistic productivity and patient experience goals upon the group without any objective 
basis for measuring their performance against peers. The director must address the demands 
from the health system to show where productivity can be improved and from the physicians 
to measure their productivity objectively. Now the director is at risk for seeing physicians 
leave, losing the contract with the health system or both. Is there a better way?” 
EPMNs often contract with multi-facility healthcare systems, and the need to staff EDs in 
hospitals of various performance levels (e.g., productivity and patient experience) introduces 
challenges for management. Despite varying levels of profitability under different hospitals, the 
administrators need to hire quality physicians to work, especially in less appealing ED facilities 
and locations. They also need to ensure physicians are fairly assessed and compensated. Herein 
lies a typical value chain challenge of maintaining a sufficient level of resources (quality 
physicians) and efficiently managing the ED’s operations where care must be available at all times 
to meet patient demand under budget constraints. There is an earnest need to explore this evolving 
industry and identify effective ways to deliver care effectively and efficiently. 
In order to maintain contracts with healthcare systems, efficiently manage EDs, and ensure 
physicians’ continued dedication to their practice, EPMNs must focus on both clinical and 
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operational performance. Clinical performance (e.g. clinical outcomes, unexpected return visits, 
medico-legal risk) depends heavily on the quality of the physicians hired and available risk 
management and clinical education programs. Therefore, clinical outcomes are largely subsumed 
by hiring practices, which are beyond the scope of this research. However, operational metrics are 
important to maintaining health system contracts and physician investment in the EPMN, and this 
is an area that is largely unexplored in the emergency medicine and related operations literature. 
How to fairly and effectively evaluate and incentivize EPs while improving productivity and 
patient experience has become a pressing issue for the executives. Thus, management is in search 
of a method that would equitably assess physicians within the EPMN based on their productivity 
(objective score) and patient experience (subjective score) in order to balance performance and 
customer satisfaction, both of which are key to maintaining health system contracts for ED 
services. Their relative standings among physicians in the network will help management to make 
justifiable decisions on performance-based compensation and training requirements. 
As variation in productivity has implications on ED patient flow and waiting times, objective 
measurement of EP performance is important, particularly when it comes to its consequent impact 
on ED performance. Researchers studying EP productivity, however, have mostly focused on a 
single facility. In this research, we address the emerging trend that emergency physicians work in 
multiple facilities. We conduct a multi-center, multi-year and multi-physician study to investigate 
EP operational performance in the EPMN setting to draw lessons on how to measure and enhance 
physician productivity and patient experience. For such a study, we make use of EP profiles, daily 
schedules, monthly patient experience surveys, patients’ visit details, and patients’ insurance 
information to better understand the performance of physicians in this network using big data 
analytics. 
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EPs encounter a number of work conditions that affect their performances. These circumstances 
make the revenue generated by an EP less relevant in performance evaluation. For instance, if 
patients are uninsured, they cannot pay for treatment, and different insurances pay different 
amounts for similar services, completely out of the treating physician’s control. Moreover, an EP’s 
output flow rate (Patients/hr) is highly dependent on patient acuity and chronic medical conditions, 
the patient arrival rate, and the ED’s capacity. As an example, an elderly adult patient with chest 
pain and several comorbidities will likely take longer to treat than a young adult with an ankle 
injury who is otherwise healthy, as the former is much more serious and complex. It would be 
unfair to penalize physicians who treat complex patients for their resultant lower patient flow rates, 
or equivalently, to reward physicians who are assigned to simpler cases by relying solely upon the 
volume-based Patients/hr measure. Relative value units (RVUs) are thus often used to assess 
emergency physician performance as they mirror the time and supplies/devices needed from the 
healthcare workers/facility to care for the patient as well as the cognitive expertise and potential 
medico-legal risk (Venkat et al, 2015, Appendix A.1).  RVUs reflect the revenue potential for a 
particular visit, while the actual revenue generated depends on the specific insurance, location and 
type of hospital. Conventionally, RVUs/hr is a marker for revenue potential and is a proxy for 
physician productivity, capturing the yield from both volume and complexity of a physician’s 
efforts. However, one should note that RVUs/hr is not a pure measure of productivity nor is it an 
absolute measure of revenue.  
To date, comparison of EP performance within such a large network has not been available due 
to the technical difficulties involved (e.g., demand heterogeneity in different facilities, shift 
variation, and varying availability of diagnostic equipment). RVUs/hr is driven by complexity 
(RVUs/Patient) and patient flow (Patients/hr) at the facility level, both of which affect an EP’s 
  12 
performance. Thus, significant disparity may be found in terms of facility and physician 
performance. The variation across facilities thereby limits the efficacy of the conventional 
RVUs/hr measure, making it necessary to take into account these differences while developing fair 
performance metrics to assess physicians within the EPMN.  
In order to overcome the aforementioned difficulties when evaluating EP productivity, we 
propose four new indices for assessing physician performance relative to peers: revenue potential 
index, patient volume index, patient complexity index, and patient experience index. We employ 
the revenue potential index and patient experience index within a large EPMN to differentiate the 
high performers from those physicians lagging behind on each metric, resulting in a 2-by-2 graph.  
Then, we segment physicians into clusters to uncover possible physician characteristics affecting 
their performance. We empirically verify that physician productivity is a function of the proposed 
complexity and volume indices and subsequently identify drivers of the two proposed indices such 
that management can help physicians target improvements in both dimensions. Our study 
highlights that the use of big data analytics to manage complex and large-scale physician groups 
has major potential for developing and deploying new metrics that are sophisticated, yet relatively 
straightforward to implement, and offers operational insights for volume and complexity. The 
proposed metrics are transparent and take into account facility-specific differences. These metrics 
can be linked to performance-based pay, making them attractive to physicians and therefore 
mitigating the obstacles management faces in recruiting and assigning physicians to facilities. 
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3.2 Related Literature 
Service outputs can be classified into two components: quantity-oriented (volume) and quality-
oriented (process and outcome) (Grönroos and Ojasalo, 2004). In EDs, patients (heterogeneous 
customers) arrive unannounced and expect high quality care (output) within a short time. The idea 
of service systems with heterogeneous customers is not new (Armony & Ward 2010; Ward & 
Armony 2013); and most of these systems focus on throughput (volume). Similarly, in EDs, 
operational efficiency and patient experience are important to all stakeholders (e.g., patients, 
physicians, and administrators). Facilities and physicians are judged on patient experience via 
survey data, such as those from the Press Ganey© (PG) survey (see Appendix A.1). While patient 
experience has become a focal point of healthcare providers, physician productivity remains 
crucial from a resource management perspective. Management’s ultimate goal is to concurrently 
achieve high productivity and excellent patient experience.  In this research, we aim to address 
these two aspects of performance while making use of the recent explosion of big data in the 
healthcare sector.  
The impact of big data and analytics within the healthcare industry has been widely recognized 
by healthcare professionals and beyond. Murdoch and Detsky (2013) outlined ways in which big 
data may be used to improve the quality and efficiency of healthcare delivery, from better 
knowledge dissemination to personalized patient care. Raghupathi and Raghupathi (2014) cited 
specific examples in their review of big data in healthcare, including earlier predictions of sudden 
increases in flu-related emergency room visits. McKinsey & Company also weighed in on big 
data’s place in the healthcare sector (Kayyali et al. 2013). Both Ellaway et al. (2014) and 
Moskowitz et al. (2015) discuss the impact of big data on education and training for clinicians and 
other healthcare professionals. Furthermore, Obermeyer and Emanuel (2016) recommend the 
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development of algorithms to make the best use of healthcare data. Most recently, Ba and Nault 
(2017) identified healthcare IT that incorporates OM methods as an emerging research area. All 
of these researchers agree that the availability of big data, including physician work histories and 
patient records, is changing the management of facilities, physicians, and patients. EDs and 
physician management networks are no exception. For example, the American College of 
Emergency Physicians (ACEP) has introduced the Clinical Emergency Data Registry (CEDR), 
which is designed to collect data from emergency physicians across the US to measure healthcare 
quality and to identify practice patterns, trends and outcomes in emergency care (ACEP 2016). 
The ultimate goal of CEDR is to inform emergency physicians and eventually improve the overall 
quality of emergency care, suggesting that emergency medicine clinicians are embracing data-
driven knowledge and decision-making. 
Several operations management researchers have also focused on problems in the healthcare 
sector, leveraging data to motivate research questions and validate models and theories. The single-
facility healthcare operations literature abounds, and EDs have been the center of several studies 
(Powell et al. 2012, Kc 2013; Song et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2015). For instance, Venkat et al. (2015) 
used ED data to gain insights into its management and revenue generation. However, operations 
researchers who have studied multiple facilities mainly focus on differences in hospitals and 
compare their efficiencies (Theokary and Ren 2011; Bhargava & Mishra, 2014; Blank & Eggink, 
2014; Büchner et al. 2016). Angst et al. (2011) studied how U.S. hospitals convert existing medical 
technologies into integrated information technology. No research hitherto has examined the 
dynamics between physicians and patients, and compared individual practitioners’ performances 
across the multiple EDs each physician serves. Also, no researchers to our knowledge have 
explored the implications of multi-facility physician management networks.  
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Different from the emergency medicine literature’s physician studies (e.g. Brennan et al. 2007; 
Johnson et al. 2008; Clinkscales et al. 2016), we look into physician performance with the aim to 
efficiently manage and incentivize physicians within an EPMN that must staff many EDs and 
attract large numbers of practicing EPs. Our research differs significantly from both the operations 
and EM literatures as we consider two key dimensions of physician performance: patient 
experience and productivity (the latter comprising volume and complexity). Through big data, we 
are able to offer practice-based evidence to develop insights for multi-facility physician 
management networks instead of the conventional approach. The proposed metrics take into 
account physician efforts and peer effects. Our setting is unique as the physicians under study work 
at multiple sites under the management of an organization, whose goal is to ensure appropriate 
staffing across multiple facilities under contract for emergency services. 
Our research benefits EPMNs, an increasingly prevalent EM practice model. Unlike the 
frequently used data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), all of the 
physicians in our data are managed by an EPMN, and the proprietary data uniquely links patient, 
physician, hospital, revenue, and insurance information. To our knowledge, this is the first research 
to study physician productivity on this scale and with this level of detail. We contribute to the 
literature by addressing the trend in which physician work assignments include varying hours 
across multiple sites and shifts.   
By developing relative physician performance indices, we help management understand the 
impact of multiple-facility employee assignments on both relative productivity and patient 
experience.  The visual display of each physician’s two-dimensional scores is conducive to 
employee development, as it allows management to readily assess physician performance.  
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
Our research framework is motivated by management’s need to explicitly and equitably 
differentiate strong and weak performers within the network, so as to provide justifiable bonuses 
or prescribe remedial actions. Through identifying driving forces contributing to physician 
performance differences, we offer the EPMN management implications for continuous 
improvement.  
We match the 10,615,879 patient visits to physicians and facilities to develop indices that assess 
physicians within the network (Fig. 2). Although physicians may treat many patients across 
multiple facilities, the indices quantify performance within the network using a single value. Such 
metrics allow management to easily identify the best performers to reward with performance-based 
bonuses, whereas the poor performers would require intervention in the form of training. To gain 
managerial insights for effective network resource management, we conduct cluster analysis to 
sort physicians into distinctive groups.  
Justification for the proposed indices, including a stylized example to illustrate their benefits, 
is detailed in §3.4. We then use the indices to develop statistical models and benchmark physician 
performance (Fig. 3). Our research relates Physician’s Revenue Generation Potential with Patient 
Volume and Patient Complexity, while controlling for patients’ medical and demographic 
information as well as physician and facility characteristics.  
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Figure 2 Developing Network Metrics for Physician Performance 
 
Figure 3 Research Outline 
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Using the performance indices, we develop a two-stage least squares model to simultaneously 
reveal the underlying drivers of the volume and complexity indices. Subsequently, we link 
Physician’s Revenue Generation Potential to Patient Experience to better understand how different 
aspects of performance interact and to empirically test if tradeoffs exist for physicians at the 
network level. By using these metrics and statistical models, we gain managerial insights for an 
EPMN. 
3.3.1 Factors Impacting Physician Performance 
We develop integrated relative performance indices to assess the EPMN’s physicians in §3.4, 
addressing management’s need for a fair and coherent network performance metric. In this section, 
we develop models that relate these indices to physician, patient, and facility traits to better 
understand the underlying drivers.  
3.3.1.1 Identifying the Drivers of Performance Indices and Linking the Indices 
In order to identify factors driving physician performance, we employ two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression to simultaneously model the proposed relative performance metrics, 
RVUs/Patient Index and Patients/hr Index, by Eqs. (1) – (2). The model is estimated using log-
transformed values of RVUs/Patient Index and Patients/hr Index to address the nonlinear 
relationship characterized by diminishing returns.  
ln(𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁄ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) =  𝛼11  +  𝛽11 ln(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) 
+ 𝜸𝟏
𝑻𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀1 
(1) 
ln(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) =  𝛼21  +  𝛽21 ln(𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁄ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) (2) 
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+ 𝜸𝟐
𝑻𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀2 
While patient complexity and patient flow are related (RVUs/Patient  Patients/hr = RVUs/hr) on 
a system-wide level, these have not been studied at the physician-level. For example, Eitel et al 
(2010) found that at the ED-level, the criticality of patients is associated with flow. This 
relationship may also hold at the physician-level. Based on management’s desire to measure 
physician operational performance on two dimensions (patient satisfaction and productivity), it is 
important to fully understand both metrics and their drivers (patient complexity and patient flow). 
As patients with high complexity require more physician time to treat, we posit that an inverse 
relationship exists between RVUs/Patient Index and Patients/hr Index (see the left-side of Fig. 3). 
Hypothesis 1 tests such a relationship. 
H1. There exists a negative relationship between the number of patients that a physician treats 
per hour relative to peers (Patients/hr Index) and the relative number of RVUs the physician 
generates per patient (RVUs/Patient Index). That is, 𝛽11 < 0 and 𝛽21 < 0. 
Although H1 seems intuitive, the unpredictable circumstances of emergency care may counter-
intuitively disrupt the presumed inverse relationship between complexity and volume. In 
emergency medicine, there are numerous examples where high RVU patients are treated quite 
efficiently in the ED. The ensuing examples justify the importance of testing H1. Consider a patient 
with a severe allergic reaction. The patient will be rapidly treated, observed, and commonly 
discharged, but the visit will likely result in high RVUs due to the critical consequences if this 
condition is not treated appropriately. In other cases, an EP may be constrained by the environment, 
such as the specific number and type of arriving patients or the availability of beds for admitted 
patients. For instance, there may be a high number of patients requiring admission to the hospital 
during flu season, but most of these patients do not require the resources of an intensive care unit 
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(ICU). In this case, high RVU, critically ill patients may rapidly be placed in ICUs, while less 
complex patients requiring admission may wait hours for an inpatient bed. Such circumstances 
make the exploration of H1 highly relevant to the study of productivity in the emergency 
department.  
3.3.1.2 Linking RVUs/hr Index to Patient Experience Index in the Network 
After identifying the drivers of physician performance in Eqs. (1)–(2), we now explore the 
extent to which physician performance is related to patient experience as measured by the Press 
Ganey© (PG) patient experience index. We present an OLS model to describe the relationship 
between RVUs/hr Index and PG Index while controlling for patient and physician level differences 
in Eq.(3). 
𝑃𝐺 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  𝛼31  +  𝛽31 (𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝜸𝟑
𝑻𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀3 (3) 
As RVUs/hr consists of two components, Patients/hr and RVUs/Patient, which are presumed to 
be the primary drivers of RVUs/hr Index, we study how each of these components influence patient 
experience. First, we consider Patients/hr, which reflects the logistics of providing patient services. 
If an ED visit is extended due to a long wait time or prolonged service, the patient may blame the 
physician, leading to dissatisfaction. This frustration would be reflected in physician PG survey 
responses. Such phenomena have been studied in the EM literature. For example, Handel et al 
(2014) observed that patients with low door-to-room times gave higher experience scores, and 
Pines et al (2008) found a negative relationship between overcrowding (longer wait times, 
prolonged treatment times) and patient experience assessment. Furthermore, Hwang et al. (2015) 
found that implementation of a fast track significantly increased patient experience. Thus, we 
expect Patients/hr to be positively associated with patient experience.  
  21 
Alternatively, Boudreaux et al. (2004) found that the strongest predictor of ED patient 
satisfaction is how satisfied the patient is with interpersonal interactions with the ED staff. We 
conjecture that patients may view visits with higher RVUs (more tests and resources) as a sign that 
physicians care and are sincere (positive interactions). Patients may perceive increased numbers 
of examinations, procedures, or therapeutic interventions, leading to higher RVUs, as signs that 
they have been taken seriously, and thus RVUs/Patient may reflect a physician’s individualized 
focus toward patients. Thus, RVUs/Patient will also be positively correlated with patient 
satisfaction, even though RVUs/Patient and Patients/hr are inversely related. 
Together, we anticipate that as a physician’s productivity 
(RVUs/hr=RVUs/PatientsPatients/Hr) increases, patients will perceive that the physician is both 
highly skilled and focused, leading to higher PG percentile rank scores (hereafter abbreviated as 
PG scores), resulting in a higher PG Index.  Boudreaux et al (2006) further provided the theoretical 
foundation that patient satisfaction is dependent on physician performance. Therefore, as a 
physician’s ability to speed up processing or handle more complex patients is associated with high 
RVUs/hr Index, we posit that physicians with high RVUs/hr Index will exhibit better PG scores 
relative to their peers (see the right-side of Fig. 3).  
H2. There exists a positive relationship between the number of RVUs that a physician 
generates per hour relative to peers (RVUs/hr Index) and the relative patient experience score 
(PG Index). That is, 𝛽31 > 0. 
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3.4 Data and Variables 
The data under study were collected from one of the largest EM providers in the US. These data 
are unique as they are from a large private EPMN, which includes numerous physicians across 84 
facilities in 14 US states from 2010-2014. The percentage of facilities in each state is shown in 
Fig. 4. Our data initially contained 90 EM facilities, 1,434 physicians, 622,716 clinical shifts, and 
11,060,222 patient visits, comprising visit records, physician profiles, healthcare provider 
schedule logs, and facility profiles from January 2010 to June 2014. Visit characteristics, including 
Current Procedural Terminology Evaluation and Management (CPT E/M) codes and relative value 
units (RVUs) generated, were abstracted by trained coders. The coders need to acquire relevant 
certification(s) between their second and third employment year, with ongoing training, auditing, 
and external evaluation. The EPMN also maintains a demographic and credentialing database of 
all physicians. Physicians’ clinical hours were tracked electronically using physician scheduling 
software (e.g. Tangier; Sparks, MD). Patient experience data (Press Ganey Associates Inc., South 
Bend, IN) were linked to physicians monthly.  
These data are stored in various large databases, four of which are used in this research. The 
digitally recorded databases include a variety of data types (numeric, factors, strings, dates), and 
as might be expected, not all data are initially stored in the correct format (e.g. numeric displayed 
as string). Similarly, date-time information for visits and shifts do not follow a standard format 
and required careful conversion. In addition, several measures (e.g., patient length of stay and 
physician shift length) need to be computed from the database, and missing data needed to be 
removed. During each stage of the analysis, we applied inclusion/exclusion criteria and verified 
the real-world validity of descriptive values by consulting with our clinical collaborator. 
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Figure 4 Locations of included EDs 
In the initial stages, we ensure that these four databases are correctly linked using common 
fields. We then use the matched data to construct shift-level and month-level data, which are 
combined to obtain a record for each physician in each facility. This procedure involves the 
calculation of several aggregate variables, such as the proportion of hours worked during each shift 
and the Advanced Practice Provider (APP) (e.g., physician assistant or nurse practitioner) support 
ratio. These two measures present challenges as physician and APP schedules constantly change, 
and each shift needed to be broken down into hourly segments to determine these ratios. The initial 
task was demanding, but we are able to automate the procedure for future use by developing user-
defined functions. The final step was to use the derived data to compute the indices and 
independent variables for each physician. The resulting dataset was used for statistical analyses 
herein. 
Six newly acquired facilities and 355 physicians with short work histories (<500 patient visits) 
in the dataset were excluded. Thus, the final data for this study include 84 EM facilities, 1,079 
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physicians, and 10,615,879 patient visits with a total of 54 attributes. The facilities, which vary in 
yearly volume and capabilities (e.g., trauma designation or academic), are primarily located in 
urban and suburban regions, with only five EDs (6%) serving rural communities. Due to the range 
of locations and facility types, some EDs are profit-centers, while others are cost-centers, but the 
EPMN is still responsible for maintaining physician staffing levels at all facilities. Table 4 includes 
summary statistics for the final attributes we compiled for each physician and used for our analysis, 
including facility characteristics, patient visit records, the merged information from physicians’ 
and patients’ interactions, and physician’s demographic and professional attributes. The data used 
for the analyses herein were aggregated over the entire study period, resulting in one record per 
physician (n = 1,079). However, the same methodology could be applied using monthly data. 
The patient visit records include the hospital, the date and time of patient arrival at and departure 
from the ED, age, gender, the attending physician, disease codes (ICD-9), and the discharge 
disposition (admitted, discharged, transferred, elopement, left without being seen, or died) for each 
patient visit. Additionally, information regarding the proportion of patients with each payment 
source (Commercial Insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or Self-Pay) and the RVUs associated with 
the visit are provided. We grouped ICD-9 codes into three categories (Group 1: Circulatory, 
Respiratory, Digestive, and Genitourinary; Group 2: Symptoms, Signs & Ill-Defined Conditions; 
and Group 3: Injury & Poisoning) that reflect the most prominent diagnostic groups attributed to 
ED patients. The patient level variable definitions are detailed in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics (10,615,879 patient visits of n=1,079 physicians at 84 facilities) 
Level Categorical Variable Count (%) 
Facility 
Characteristics 
≤20000 Yearly Visits 23 (27.4%) 
20000-40000 Yearly Visits 27 (32.1%) 
40000-60000 Yearly Visits 22 (26.2 %) 
60000-80000 Yearly Visits 8 (9.5%) 
80000-10000 Yearly Visits 3 (3.6%) 
>100000 Yearly Visits 1 (1.2%) 
Teaching Facility 15 (17.9%) 
EM Residency Training Site 12 (14.3%) 
 
Level Continuous Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Visits  
 Average Patient Age 40.406 9.060 
 % Male Patients 44.274 3.130 
 % ICD9 Group 1 36.620 5.515 
 % ICD9 Group 2 36.539 8.801 
 % ICD9 Group 3 23.404 5.300 
 % Admitted 17.673 9.980 
Commercial Index 1.004 0.063 
Medicaid Index 0.992 0.184 
Medicare Index 1.018 0.312 
Self-Insurance Index 0.991 0.109 
Physician 
Physician Age 45.870 9.994 
# Facilities Worked 2.456 2.294 
% 6AM-3PM Hours 36.434 14.337 
% 3PM-12AM Hours 47.467 11.609 
% 12AM-6AM Hours 16.086 14.998 
Coding Com/ Patient 0.507 0.484 
Physician PG Scores 54.241 24.773 
Physician PG Index 0.986 0.443 
APP Support Ratio (%) 22.772 10.515 
RVUs/hr 9.623 2.198 
RVUs/Patient Index 1.005 0.089 
Patients/hr Index 0.995 0.235 
RVUs/hr Index 0.991 0.188 
    
Level Categorical Variable  Percent 
Physician 
Characteristics 
Male  69.045 
White  78.221 
Primary Pediatric Practice  4.912 
Efficiency Training  29.935 
Patient Satisfaction Training 34.198 
Notes: See Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1 for detailed variable definitions. 
Indexed measures are computed by Eqs. (7)-(10) and (A1.1).  
Each attending physician has a profile, which denotes demographic information, date of 
residency completion, and if explicitly trained on efficiency and patient experience by the EPMN. 
In addition, the healthcare provider work logs contain data corresponding to physicians and APPs. 
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For each shift worked, these include start and end times, the facility, whether a physician or APP, 
the provider’s monthly PG patient experience percentile rank score, and the facility’s monthly PG 
percentile rank score. Note that PG scores for physicians are reported on a monthly basis for each 
facility, so we use weighted averages to compute one physician PG score per physician at each 
facility, weighting by the number of hours worked during each month (Eq.(4)). Within each facility 
𝑗, the total number of months that physician 𝑖 has worked is 𝑆𝑖,𝑗. The total number of hours 
physician 𝑖 worked during month 𝑙 at facility 𝑗 is denoted as 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑙, and the corresponding 
physician PG score is 𝑃𝐺𝑖,𝑗,𝑙. See Appendix Table 2 for definitions of all physician-level variables.  
𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝐺 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 =
∑ 𝑃𝐺𝑖,𝑗,𝑙 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑙 
𝑆𝑖,𝑗
𝑙=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑙 
𝑆𝑖,𝑗
𝑙=1
 (4) 
3.4.1 Physician Performance Measures & Indices Development 
The EPMN seeks to explicably and impartially assess all physicians within the network. 
Management wants to reward the strongest performers, while improving the performance of the 
weakest performers. Physician performance is based on two dimensions: patient experience and 
physician productivity. The EPMN administers patient experience surveys (Press Ganey 
Associates, Inc.) and reports each physician’s monthly percentile score for each facility worked. 
The EPMN then uses these PG scores to assess patient satisfaction.  
RVUs/hr are currently used by the EPMN to measure physician productivity at each facility the 
physician works. However, the goal of the network management is not to simply compare 
physicians in a single facility, but how to motivate physicians to accept the assignments deemed 
necessary by the EPMN. Thus, both metrics must be modified to reflect each physician’s 
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performance within the entire network. Such metrics should objectively reflect a physician’s 
relative standing in the EPMN, regardless of the number and location of the facilities at which the 
physician works or other facility characteristics. In the following, we discuss why the conventional 
simple averages of RVUs/hr and PG scores would be unfair to physicians working in multiple 
facilities and the need to propose an alternative.  
3.4.1.1 Absolute Measure of Physician Performance  
Let 𝐹𝑖 denote the total number of facilities in which physician 𝑖 has worked. Within each facility 
𝑗, the total number of patients visiting physician 𝑖 is 𝑉𝑖,𝑗 and the total number of hours physician 𝑖 
worked is 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗. The RVUs incurred by physician 𝑖’s patient 𝑘 in facility 𝑗 is denoted as 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘. Thus, the total number of RVUs generated by physician 𝑖 in facility 𝑗 during the 54-
month period are given by 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑖,𝑗 = ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1 . The RVU/hr performance measure for 
physician 𝑖 in facility 𝑗 can be expressed as 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑖,𝑗  =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
 (5) 
Patients/hr and RVUs/Patient can be computed for physician 𝑖 in facility 𝑗 similarly. 
For a physician working at multiple facilities within the EPMN, RVUs/hr = (sum of RVUs in 
the network)/(sum of hours worked in the network); network Patients/hr and RVUs/Patient can be 
obtained similarly. Yet, these measures are facility-dependent. Facility demand affects service 
times, which directly influences the number of patients a physician cares for hourly (Kc and 
Terwiesch, 2009). Thus, comparing physicians across facilities using these metrics would be 
unfair, but RVUs/hr performance targets set by individual facilities are inadequate for evaluating 
EP productivity in network settings. Our data indicate the average EP within the EPMN works at 
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2.46 facilities, and EP groups often contract with healthcare systems with multiple EDs. These 
EDs have varying capabilities, patient catchment areas and staffing models. Moreover, EPs do not 
control patient arrivals and work various clinical schedules to cover facilities 24/7. The high degree 
of variability in patient volume and acuity leads to fluctuations in RVUs/hr, making the 
conventional approach invalid and necessitating more sophisticated methods to measure EP 
productivity.  
3.4.1.2 Proposed Relative Indices for Physicians in Network 
The new performance indices proposed here are better suited for concurrently evaluating all 
physicians working in a large EPMN, where a physician may be assigned to multiple facilities. 
Eq.(5) quantifies physician i’s performance in facility j. We define facility j’s average performance 
as:  
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗  =
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (6) 
Taking the ratio Eq.(5)/Eq.(6), i.e., 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗
 , we know how the physician performs 
relative to peers in the specific facility, 𝑗. Next, we weight the ratio by the hours worked in each 
facility to derive a composite rating across all facilities (Eq.(7)). Indexing this metric 
acknowledges the inability of EPs to control for demand, capacity, and competencies in the 
facilities worked.  
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖  =
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗
× 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (7) 
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We define the volume index (Eq.(8)) and the complexity index (Eq.(9)) similarly, using hours 
in a facility and number of patients treated in a facility, respectively, as the weights: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖  =
∑ [
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗
× 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (8) 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖  =
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗
× 𝑉𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (9) 
The patient experience index (Eq.(10)) is also computed using hours worked in a facility as the 
weights: 
𝑃𝐺 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖  =
∑ [
𝑃𝐺 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝐺 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
× 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (10) 
Note that an index of 100% indicates that a physician is performing on par with peers in the 
network; 110% implies 10% better performance than peers; while 85% suggests that performance 
is 15% inferior to peers.  
Advantages of the proposed indices are discussed in Appendix A.3, where we compare Eqs. 
(7)–(9) with alternate metrics. Appendix A.3 also details the mathematical rationale for supporting 
the indices we proposed. 
3.4.1.3 The Need for the New Physician Network Performance Indices   
Normalizing by the facility averages removes the effects of scale (facility average) and 
addresses the effects of relative hours worked at various facilities in the EPMN. Such a method is 
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fair since facility assignment is often beyond physicians’ control, given the need of the EPMN to 
staff all contracted facilities and the competitive nature of obtaining more healthcare facilities to 
contract with the EPMN. Table 5 gives a stylized example, which resembles information found in 
the data, to highlight the need and advantage of using the proposed indices (Eq.(7)). Physician A 
worked in two facilities (Facilities 1 and 2), while Physician B only worked in Facility 2. Facility 
1 has higher average RVUs/hr (14 vs. 4).  
Table 5 The Need of Using Performance Indices – An Example 
         RVUs/hr     
Phys. Fac. RVUs Patients Hours Fac. Phys. 
RVUs/ 
hr Ratio 
RVUs/hr RVUs/hr Index 
A 1 9000 3600 1200 14.0 7.5 0.54 6.0 69.6% 
 2 3000 900 800 4.0 3.8 0.94   
          
B 2 9000 2500 2200 4.0 4.1 1.02 4.1 102.3% 
 
 
Since Physician B only works at one facility, calculating RVUs/hr is straightforward, but 
facility differences complicate the calculation for Physician A. First, we examine the absolute 
measures, which is the ratio of Total RVUs to Total Hours. In that case, Physician A 
[6.0=(9000+3000)/(1200+800)] generates more RVUs/hr than Physician B [4.1=9000/2200] as 
shown in Table 5. Based on the absolute RVU/hr measure, Physician A is more productive (6.0) 
than Physician B (4.1). We then compare physicians on the relative indices, detail their derivations 
below, and contrast this with the absolute measures.  
We first calculate the ratios for each facility where the physician works. Physician A’s RVUs/hr 
in Facility 1 is 7.5 (=9000/1200), while Facility 1’s average RVU/hr is 14. Thus, Physician A is a 
below average performer in Facility 1, with a ratio of 0.54 (=7.5/14) indicating that performance 
is 46% below peers. Physician A also appears to be slightly below average at Facility 2 (0.94). 
Using Eq. (7), the index is: 
RVUs/hr Index:     69.6% = (0.54*1200+0.94*800)/(1200+800) 
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The indices in Table 5 show that Physician A is below average with regard to RVUs/hr (69.6%) 
and Physician B is above average with regard to RVUs/hr (102.3%). The absolute measure and 
the indexed measure give different conclusions about Physicians A and B’s performances. By 
reflecting the relative performance at facilities in which a physician works and weighing 
performance on the time spent in each facility, the index proposed in Eq.(7) neutralizes the scale 
(facility size) bias. Thus, the proposed index better reflects the true performance when the network 
administrators assign facilities. This demonstrates the importance of adopting the relative index 
for assessing physician performance within large networks where physicians work at multiple 
facilities.  
3.4.1.4 Comparing Network Physician Performance Using Proposed Index 
We find a strong positive correlation between RVU/hr Index and absolute RVUs/hr (r=0.7687, 
p-value < 0.001), confirming that a substantial portion of revenue potential (RVUs/hr) can be 
explained by the proposed index. It captures the “intrinsic” ability of a physician to potentially 
generate revenue across facilities since it weights relative performance by hours at the various 
facilities. The unexplained portion may be driven by patient characteristics. Thus, the index is an 
equitable measure of physician performance.  
To provide a more comprehensive view and offer appropriate “carrots and sticks” for reward 
and remedy, we jointly consider both productivity and patient satisfaction by plotting the new 
RVU/hr Index (x-axis) and PG Index (y-axis) on the xy-plane. Depending on which quadrant a 
physician falls, management can easily identify the need for improvement with regard to 
productivity, patient satisfaction, or both, or if the physician should be rewarded for outstanding 
performance on both dimensions (Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5 displays physicians’ performances, where each dot represents one physician. The 
horizontal and vertical lines signify average performance on each dimension, and thus divide 
physicians into four groups (quadrants). Management may choose cutoff values within each 
quadrant to further differentiate physicians within each group, e.g., awarding those who perform 
one standard deviation above the mean (center point) on both dimensions. Additionally, they may 
choose to weight the two measures differently depending on specific performance goals. The 
“best” physicians (26%) who deliver above average performance in both productivity and patient 
satisfaction, i.e., RVUs/hr Index ≥ 1 and  PG Index ≥ 1, are located in Quadrant I and may be used 
for benchmarking. Physicians who fall in Quadrant III (30%) are below average performers on 
productivity and patient experience, and require immediate attention from management. Quadrant 
II (26%) shows those short on productivity, while Quadrant IV (18%) depicts those with low 
patient experience; both II and IV are candidates for remedial training depending on the specific 
threshold set by management. It may be necessary to further address ways to balance patient 
experience and productivity in Quadrants II and IV.  
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Figure 5 Integrating Productivity and Patient Experience: Insights for Rewards and Improvement Training 
 
3.5 Cluster Analysis to Manage Physician Segments 
We have proposed a fairer, systematic, logical and comprehensible performance metric to 
objectively evaluate physicians working in an EPMN in §3.4. To identify individual traits that may 
affect physician performance, we group physicians based on non-performance attributes and 
examine the disparities among clusters. Such information can be used to guide and reward different 
groups of physicians; and more efficiently and effectively allocate physicians to facilities to meet 
the needs of the EPMN.  
Due to known differences between pediatric and general EDs, we treat pediatric physicians as 
a separate group. Since pediatric physicians only account for 5% of the physicians in our data, we 
have excluded physicians from the cluster analysis if the average age of their patients was less than 
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18. Using the variables in Table 6, we group the 1,026 non-pediatric EPs into five fundamentally 
different clusters using K-means.  
Table 6 Summary Statistics of Variables used in Cluster Analysis 
 Average Patient Age ≥ 18 (N=1026) 
Variable Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Physician Age 45.749 9.967 
 # Facilities Worked  2.518 2.334 
% 6AM-3PM Hours 36.724 14.257 
% 3PM-12PM Hours 47.139 11.342 
% 12PM-6AM Hours 16.126 15.176 
% Admitted 18.052 10.018 
APP Support Ratio (%) 23.268 10.226 
   
Variable Count Percent 
Male 715 69.688 
White 812 79.142 
  
We have colloquially named clusters based on dominant characteristics (e.g., Night Owl, 
Veteran, etc.) Figs. 6(a) – (b) graphically display differences among the five clusters. The dashed 
line represents the overall average, while each boxplot shows the distribution of the variable on 
the y-axis. The plot provides the (1) minimum, (2) 1st quartile (25th percentile), (3) median (50th 
percentile), (4) 3rd quartile (75th percentile), and (5) maximum. Figs. 6(a) – (b) shows that Veteran 
physicians are older and tend to work fewer nights, while Night Owls work a disproportionately 
high number of night shifts relative to others. Minority and Female physicians are generally 
younger, consistent with medical school trends.  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 6 Distributions of age and night-shift by clusters 
By zooming in on Fig. 5 and examining the five clusters separately, we can link the cluster 
membership with performance relative to the entire physician population. Fig. 7(a) shows a 
relatively even distribution of Veterans across the four quadrants, while Fig. 7(b) suggests that the 
majority of Night Owls have low RVUs/hr indices, with many also earning lower PG scores. One-
way ANOVA has confirmed that the cluster differences in PG scores and RVUs/hr Index are 
statistically significant.  
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(a)  25% of Veterans (Quadrant I) achieve above average performance on both dimensions 
 
(b) 75% (Quadrants II & III) of Night Owls earn below average RVUs/hr Index 
Figure 7 RVUs/hr Index (Productivity) versus PG Index (Patient Experience) by Cluster 
Thus far, we have provided a structural, evidence-based approach to segment EPs within the 
network. The clusters suggest that EPs may have different priorities at different stages in their 
personal and professional lives. For instance, younger physicians (i.e., many female and minority 
physicians) may have different family and financial concerns than veteran doctors (Darcy et al. 
2012; Dyrbye et al. 2013). Like most professions, the composition of EPs encompasses varying 
career ambitions and personal responsibilities. It is thus vital to understand such distinctions when 
matching physicians with divergent priorities to different shifts and multiple facilities. 
Specifically, given the need to maintain continuous and universal availability of EDs, managers 
should consider physician characteristics when pursuing operational productivity and greater 
patient experience. There are legal reasons why we do not recommend linking compensations with 
these clusters. By law, employers cannot compensate based on age, gender, or race. Unfortunately, 
the cluster analysis reveals that physicians are naturally grouped by these factors. Thus, these 
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clusters only help to develop insights for our study, instead of serving as the basis for 
compensation.  
The clustering results lead us to reflect on current practices. Namely, management must 
appreciate the dynamics of doctors’ professional and personal development and recognize that 
physicians will respond distinctively to incentives. Measuring performance collectively for all 
clusters or offering identical incentives to all physicians may not be effective. For example, 
comparing Night Owls with Veterans who work fewer night shifts could be unfair due to 
differences in patient composition. In the following section, we use the cluster differences to 
motivate our selection of control variables.  
3.6 Empirical Results 
The indices in Eqs. (7) – (10) neutralize the impact of exogenous patient demand and allow for 
fairer comparisons among physicians operating in an EPMN. In this section, we first model 
RVUs/hr Index to demonstrate how the four indices are linked. Then, we identify the drivers of 
these indices, i.e., to understand how patient, physician, and facility factors impact physicians’ 
relative indices. Finally, we analyze the relationship between the revenue potential index and PG 
patient experience index to discern if physicians with high revenue potential sacrifice patient 
experience scores.  
3.6.1 Drivers of Relative Indices: A Simultaneous Equations Model 
Through a log-log model (not presented here), we empirically show that the product of the 
volume and complexity indices explains 99.86% of the variability in RVUs/hr Index. Namely, 
ln(RVUs/hr Index) = 1.00*ln(Patients/hr Index) + 0.99*ln(RVUs/Patient Index). While this 
product does not necessarily result in the RVUs/hr Index mathematically, the strength of this 
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empirical relationship led us to further examine the indices’ relationships. Appendix A.4 proves 
that the multiplicative equivalence holds when the average flow rates among facilities are equal. 
As the facility flow rates in our dataset are quite comparable for a given physician, this explains 
the strong empirical result. Specifically, the average facility flow rate deviation for a physician is 
0.3, corresponding to a mean absolute percentage difference (MAPD) of 8.6%. Note that Physician 
i’s MAPD is computed by𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐷𝑖 =
∑ |𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗–𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
|
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟
𝐹𝑖
, with 𝐹𝑖 denoting the total 
number of facilities in which physician 𝑖 has worked.  
The coefficients for the volume and complexity indices are both approximately equal to positive 
one and highly significant, and these effects are synergistic. As both indices strongly influence the 
RVUs/hr Index, physicians can enhance their RVUs/hr Index through improving volume or 
complexity performance (or both). Subsequently, we explore how exogenous factors affect 
complexity and volume indices, and thus indirectly drive revenue potential, using a system of 
simultaneous equations. In addition to the control variables identified through clustering, we chose 
to include physician characteristics and variables that change shift-by-shift, e.g. patient population, 
type of shift (day, afternoon, or night). While geographic location, demographics around the 
facility, the number of beds, etc. are important factors, these are facility related variables, which 
are indirectly accounted for in our indices.   
The first and second stage estimates from the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model (Eqs.(1)–
(2)) are summarized in Tables 7(a) and 7(b), respectively, and we have confirmed the robustness 
of these results using bootstrap standard errors (see Appendix A.5). We utilize the 2SLS regression 
procedure to simultaneously estimate the two equations because it accounts for correlations 
between endogenous variables (volume and complexity indices); and between endogenous 
variables and the 2nd-stage errors. We confirm that this system is identified based on the rank 
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condition, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for identification. More specifically, each 
of the control variables excluded from one equation appears in the other equation. Eq.(1) in Table 
7(b) corresponds to the complexity index and comprises patient characteristics (e.g., Patient Age, 
% Male Patients, % Admitted, and ICD-9 Code groups). These controls are not included in Eq.(2) 
for the volume index because physicians do not schedule or select their patients. In contrast, 
physician characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and race) and coding communications per patient are 
only included in Eq.(2). Other exogenous variables (insurance types, shifts worked, and the APP 
support ratio) overlap between the two equations, signifying both their direct and indirect effects 
on the volume and complexity indices. 
The coefficient for ln(Patients/hr Index) in Eq.(1) is significant and positive (β=0.1841), which 
is inconsistent with our first hypothesis (H1). Conversely, the coefficient for ln(RVUs/Patient 
Index) in Eq.(2) is significant and negative (β=-0.8224), suggesting an inverse relationship and 
providing support for H1. Thus, the simultaneous equations model partially supports H1. Tables 
7(a) – (b) indicate that many factors influence the volume and complexity indices, and the 
relationships between the exogenous variables and the indices involve both direct and indirect 
effects. This demonstrates the extent to which the volume and complexity indices are intertwined 
with each other and with exogenous factors.  
We have thus far analyzed the factors influencing the volume and complexity indices and how 
these two indices drive RVUs/hr Index, but does the need to increase physician productivity in the 
EPMN result in reduced patient experience? We next examine how revenue potential (efficiency) 
affects patient experience. 
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Table 7 2SLS Model: Relationship between Volume and Complexity Indices (N=1,079) 
(a) First Stage Regression Estimates (Exogenous Variables Only) 
   Y=ln(RVUs/Patient Index) Y=ln(Patients/hr Index) 
First Stage Regression 
Level Variable Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
 (Constant) -0.4735  [0.1040] 0.4202  [0.3025] 
Physician 
ln(RVUs/Patient Index)       
ln(Patients/hr Index)       
Peds Indicator 0.4418 *** [0.0610] -0.4752 ** [0.1775] 
(0 = General, 1 = Peds)       
Physician Age -0.0001  [0.0004] 0.0008  [0.0012] 
Physician Male  -0.0022  [0.0038] 0.0365 ** [0.0112] 
(0 = Female, 1 = Male)       
Physician White  0.0031  [0.0042] 0.0303 * [0.0123] 
(0 = Non-white, 1 = White)       
% 12AM - 6AM Hours 0.0701 *** [0.0180] -0.1119 * [0.0523] 
% 6AM - 3PM Hours -0.0322  [0.0176] 0.2241 *** [0.0512] 
Coding Com/Patient -0.0097 ** [0.0037] -0.0402 *** [0.0107] 
APP Support Ratio 0.1468  [0.0748] 0.4859 * [0.2174] 
APP Support Ratio*Physician Age -0.0025  [0.0016] -0.0090 * [0.0046] 
        
Patient 
Average Patient Age 0.0289 *** [0.0039] -0.0257 * [0.0113] 
(Average Patient Age)2 -0.0003 *** [0.0000] 0.0003 * [0.0001] 
% Male Patients -0.0232  [0.0863] 0.1888  [0.2510] 
Commercial Index 0.0032  [0.0294] -0.2592 ** [0.0855] 
Medicaid Index -0.1902 *** [0.0129] 0.1274 ** [0.0375] 
Medicare Index 0.0371 *** [0.0066] -0.1053 *** [0.0193] 
Self-Pay Index -0.2229 *** [0.0202] 0.3605 *** [0.0589] 
% ICD9 Group 1 0.3313 *** [0.0394] -0.2913 * [0.1147] 
% ICD9 Group 2 0.2155 *** [0.0306] -0.1530  [0.0890] 
% ICD9 Group 3 0.0582  [0.0495] -0.2163  [0.1440] 
% Admitted Patients 0.1255 *** [0.0233] -0.1552 * [0.0678] 
        
Adjusted R2 64.64% 27.51% 
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(b) Second Stage Regression Estimates 
 
  
Eq. (1):  
ln(RVUs/Patient Index) 
Eq. (2):  
ln(Patients/hr Index) 
Second Stage Regression 
Level Variable Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
 (Constant) -0.5648  [0.1258] 0.0351  [0.1626] 
Physician 
ln(RVUs/Patient Index)    -0.8224 *** [0.1391] 
ln(Patients/hr Index) 0.1841 ** [0.0659]    
Peds Indicator 0.5384 *** [0.0809]    
(0 = General, 1 = Peds)       
Physician Age    0.0002  [0.0012] 
Physician Male     0.0367 ** [0.0109] 
(0 = Female, 1 = Male)       
Physician White     0.0337 ** [0.0120] 
(0 = Non-white, 1 = White)       
% 12AM - 6AM Hours 0.0839 *** [0.0228] -0.0191  [0.0504] 
% 6AM - 3PM Hours -0.0811 ** [0.0268] 0.2205 *** [0.0488] 
Coding Com/Patient    -0.0457 *** [0.0104] 
APP Support Ratio 0.0170  [0.0232] 0.5794 ** [0.2132] 
APP Support Ratio*Physician Age    -0.0098 * [0.0044] 
        
Patient 
Average Patient Age 0.0345 *** [0.0050]    
(Average Patient Age)2 -0.0004 *** [0.0001]    
% Male Patients -0.0768  [0.1064]    
Commercial Index 0.0476  [0.0395] -0.2756 ** [0.0824] 
Medicaid Index -0.2124 *** [0.0183] -0.0485  [0.0497] 
Medicare Index 0.0564 *** [0.0107] -0.0650 ** [0.0202] 
Self-Pay Index -0.2929 *** [0.0357] 0.1876 ** [0.0720] 
% ICD9 Group 1 0.3697 *** [0.0519]    
% ICD9 Group 2 0.2598 *** [0.0368]    
% ICD9 Group 3 0.0865  [0.0598]    
% Admitted Patients 0.1629 *** [0.0302]       
Independent variables defined in Tables A1 & A2  
3.6.2 Drivers of PG Score 
CMS (2015) has recently introduced Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) programs. These quality 
initiatives financially motivate hospitals to improve upon current operations, as reimbursement 
now depends on patient outcomes and patient experience. The PG survey is a widely employed 
tool for gauging perceptions among discharged patients. The survey includes questions related to 
the individual physician and the facility, and both physician and facility PG scores (percentiles) 
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are reported monthly. In this section, we examine the linkage between the proposed revenue 
potential index and patient experience scores. Specifically, we consider whether physicians trade 
off the RVUs/hr Index for the PG Index. For this, we employ OLS regression and model the 
physician PG Index as a function of the RVUs/hr Index and exogenous control variables (Table 
8). The specific variables chosen for the model are based on the recommendations of the clinicians 
and administrative staff of the EPMN under study.  
Table 8 PG Index Model Results 
Dependent Variable: PG Index1 
Level Variable Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
 (Constant) 0.8027  [0.2200] 
Physician 
RVUs/hr Index 0.3234 *** [0.0719] 
Physician Age -0.0062 *** [0.0014] 
Physician Male  
(0 = Female, 1 = Male) 
0.0480  [0.0291] 
Physician White 
 (0 = Non-white, 1 = White) 
0.1421 *** [0.0323] 
% 12AM - 6AM Hours -0.5652 *** [0.1027] 
% 3PM - 12AM Hours -0.3506 ** [0.1308] 
Efficiency Flag  
(0 = Not Complete, 1 = Complete) 
0.0651 * [0.0303] 
Patient Satisfaction Flag  
(0 = Not Complete, 1 = Complete) 
-0.0772 ** [0.0292] 
     
Patient 
Average Patient Age -0.0052 *** [0.0015] 
% ICD9 Group 1 -0.1543  [0.2867] 
% ICD9 Group 2 0.7095 ** [0.2150] 
% ICD9 Group 3 1.1821 *** [0.3447] 
     
 R2 10.87% 
 Adjusted R2   9.85% 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; two-tailed tests 
1Refer to Eq. (10) to derive the PG Index 
Independent variables defined in Tables A1 & A2 
 
 
The results in Table 8 show that almost 10% of the variability in the PG Index is explained by 
our model, and most predictors are statistically significant. Specifically, we observe a positive and 
significant coefficient for RVUs/hr Index (β=0.3234) that supports our second hypothesis (H2).  
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Other significant factors in Table 8 suggest that PG Index is further influenced by physician-specific 
characteristics, such as work schedules as well as the average patient age. For example, physicians who 
work more night shifts receive significantly lower scores relative to their peers, possibly due to the 
acuteness of patients’ conditions, stress experienced during night visits, and lower staffing levels at night. 
Working more hours between 3pm and 12am is also associated with lower relative scores. Furthermore, 
physicians seeing older patients receive lower scores relative to their peers on average. As physicians with 
lower PG scores are often required to complete the Patient Satisfaction training, we find a negative 
relationship between training completion and PG Index. Due to this bias and because training completion 
dates are not reported, we must be cautious when interpreting such results. We recommend that future data 
collection in the EPMN include the dates and reasons for training. 
Table 8 suggests that a significant relationship exists between the RVUs/hr Index and PG Index. 
However, we speculate that unobserved factors play important roles in explaining relative PG 
scores and hence the relatively low explanatory power of the model. 
The results of these hypotheses are important because this is how physicians get paid and how 
they are evaluated. It also helps to have objective metrics to compare healthcare providers so 
management can make better provider evaluation and incentive decisions. The primary driver of 
RVUs/hour is better training in multi-tasking to manage multiple patients. The primary driver of 
PG scores is to reduce length of stay for discharged patients (see Pines et al. 2017), and there are 
clearly proven techniques for improving communication to increase PG. Thus, the proposed 
metrics allow for such evaluations while taking into account factors largely outside of an individual 
physician’s control. The indices provide insight into what is fixed and what needs to be adjusted. 
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3.7 Managerial Insights, Limitations, and Conclusions 
3.7.1 Managerial Insights 
3.7.1.1 Benchmarking Physician Performance and Continuous Improvement 
Our findings have practical implications for EDs. Indexing physician metrics such as 
Patients/hr, RVUs/Patient, RVUs/hr, and PG Scores to facility-based averages mitigates the 
exogenous factors that affect physician performance. The proposed indices provide simple and 
intuitive benchmarks for objective evaluation of physicians. These indices facilitate physician 
segmentation into high and low performers, which initiates new management processes to 
incentivize and train physicians. Management may opt to customize the evaluation and ranking 
process by providing weights for each dimension of performance. Moreover, resulting clusters 
highlight distinct differences among physicians and provide further managerial insights. 
Healthcare administrators are constantly looking for best practices to benchmark performance 
and improve processes. EDs are no exception, as evidenced by the Emergency Department 
Benchmarking Alliance (Wiler et al. 2015). However, benchmarking practices typically occur at 
the facility-level. With our study, benchmarking at the physician level both within a facility and 
across facilities is possible. That is, by identifying characteristics of the highest performing 
physicians in terms of RVUs/hr Index, other physicians can recognize factors under their control 
and strive for first-rate performance. Furthermore, the proposed indices provide objective 
measures of the network performance of physicians given that demand is beyond their control. The 
new indices capture physician performance relative to their peers and are highly correlated with 
the revenue potential of the physician in the EPMN. These indices neutralize the exogenous 
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demand effects while capturing relative effort compared to peers. From the perspective of the 
administrators, the index approach is fair, simple, intuitive, and effective.  
Our statistical models acknowledge that the same productivity level may not be attainable for 
all physicians at all facilities. We recommend that managers incorporate relative indices and 
provide adjustment factors when evaluating physicians. Exogenous demand and other facility-
level factors impact the indices, and thus our 2SLS regression model (Table 7) can be used to 
adjust for various physician-specific and patient-specific factors to support more equitable 
comparisons of physicians’ RVUs/hr performance. At a minimum, our facility-adjusted indices 
reduce the exogenous variability inherent to the respective absolute measures, and ED 
management could use our model to set performance standards. These results are helpful in 
tracking continuous improvement of physicians over time as well. Recognizing these results could 
lead to the development of new training programs or instituting mandatory completion of existing 
training for certain physicians. The clustering results reinforce our case for defining performance 
objectives (and incentives) pertaining to distinct physician segments. The clusters provide 
guidance for management to set physician-specific targets, schedule and allocate EPs, and 
implement differential physician “care and recruitment” strategies.  
3.7.1.2 Management and Physician Benefits  
While EDs typically cannot control the type or number of patients arriving for treatment during 
a given shift, they should recognize that patient experience scores are generally lower for 
physicians working mostly night shifts. In addition, physicians with more APP support tend to 
achieve higher volume indices, demonstrating that they treat more patients per hour. The proposed 
indexing approach is valuable for accurate assessment of physician productivity and could lead to 
more equitable compensation across physicians as the proposed performance indices are 
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generalizable and applicable to various compensation models, such as fee-for-service, capitated, 
or value-based reimbursement. While physicians may favor daytime shifts for physiological 
reasons, our results indicate that performance differs significantly between day and night shifts. 
Physicians who work more night hours are somewhat penalized in both PG scores and RVUs/hr. 
Thus, management should take note of physicians willing to work nights in their facility 
assignment and in their compensation decisions as our empirical results provide compelling 
evidence and rationale for differentiating recompense. This information may even translate into 
scheduling decisions. For instance, a facility might stipulate a minimum proportion of night hours 
for all physicians in order to address the night shift effect. As physicians age, working nights 
becomes physically more demanding; compensation adjustments may need to follow to allow for 
fewer night shifts. 
EPs may also gain from understanding our results. Since RVUs/hr is used to evaluate the 
physicians, they can benefit from recognizing the factors that affect productivity, especially those 
factors within their control (e.g., shift preference). This knowledge may help physicians to improve 
their productivity by controlling its drivers. It may also aid them in employment decisions. 
Physician involvement in shift choices offers them the ability to take into account both personal 
and financial concerns to make educated decisions that best fit their needs. All stakeholders benefit 
from physician productivity improvements, and understanding and tracking productivity is a 
critical step toward improving ED operations.   
We have had discussions with the organization in question on piloting the use of these indices 
in particular health systems to prospectively assess their values. Currently, EPMN management 
employs arbitrary benchmarking that does not adjust for facility capabilities, physicians’ career 
stages, and patient differences across EDs and shifts. Testing and subsequent implementation of 
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these the transparent and easy to implement indices with follow-up assessment is our planned next 
step. 
3.7.2 Limitations 
We have taken into account several control variables in our study of EPs, but other factors could 
also affect physician performance. Capacity variables such as the number of ED beds, nursing 
support, and the availability of diagnostic tools in a facility can influence processing rates as well. 
One limitation of our study is the inability to account for these effects. Moreover, we did not 
consider the impact of information technology. For example, some facilities have recently 
implemented electronic health record systems, which temporarily slow down operations and 
negatively impact ED performance (Ward et al. 2014a; Ward et al. 2014b). While we examined 
productivity, providers and hospitals use several other clinical metrics to assess physician 
performance, such as patient outcomes and benchmark goals put forth by national organizations 
such as CMS. We focused on the operational performance metrics and have yet to link them to 
these other markers.  
From a modeling perspective, we aggregated data over the entire study period (54 months) to 
analyze overall EP performance. However, this data may be modeled at a monthly level. 
Performing a cross-sectional analysis limits our ability to explore learning effects over time. 
Studying the data longitudinally would allow us to examine the influence of exogenous shocks on 
demand. For instance, outbreaks of Zika virus, Ebola virus, and various influenzas impact ED 
demand in prominent facilities, but we do not view the effects of these exogenous shocks when 
data is aggregated over many months. Future research could study EP performance on a more 
granular level, including quasi-experiments to expose causal relationships.  
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Furthermore, the way in which PG scores are reported raises some concerns about their usage. 
A physician’s scores at any time are based on the PG surveys completed by previous patients at a 
given facility. Therefore, PG scores are not reported until a number of patients from that facility 
submit their surveys (possibly requiring several weeks’ worth of data to reach an adequate sample). 
As with any survey, there may also be response bias, and PG percentile scores could fluctuate 
significantly from month to month.  
Finally, implementation of the proposed indices for benchmarking may not be easy. Our 
discussions with physicians indicate some opposition to management by numbers alone. Thus, 
physician resistance, actionable items resulting from benchmarking, and understanding the 
meaning of these indices by a healthcare audience will likely present some challenges.  
3.7.3 Conclusions 
Our study is unique in several ways. First, we use big data to conduct a multi-facility, multi-
year study of physician performance within a large EPMN, which is highly relevant as these 
physician networks continue to expand, especially in emergency medicine. We develop 
performance metrics that adjust for facility-level differences and allow for objectively comparing 
physicians who work at multiple facilities across a large and diverse EPMN. Our proposed indices 
overcome the deficiencies of existing physician performance measures that are only appropriate 
in the single-facility case and make equitable comparisons of physicians within the network 
possible.  
We empirically demonstrate the value of the proposed indices in evaluating physicians within 
this large network. We subsequently use cluster analysis to identify physician segments with 
similar characteristics, which helps management to recognize physicians’ priorities and to better 
understand which factors are driving physician performance. We verify that the proposed volume 
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and complexity indices explain a substantial portion of variation in revenue potential productivity 
across physicians. The 2SLS model (Table 7) simultaneously examines the linkage between the 
volume and complexity indices and their drivers. Finally, we explore the relationship between 
physician productivity and patient experience (Table 8).  
The 24/7 nature of EDs, the high incidence of burnout and the overall shortage of EPs relative 
to patient need make it necessary to effectively manage EPs across their entire careers. This 
research is highly relevant to the EM field as large physician management groups attempt to 
balance professional career satisfaction and the needs of large health systems for ED services. As 
consolidation occurs throughout healthcare in general and EM in particular, more physician 
management networks are emerging. The need for more robust data-driven measurements of 
network physicians persists, as these performance metrics are crucial for maintaining market 
position and bargaining power. Refined tools to measure and evaluate productivity carry lessons 
for assessing and managing the operational efficiency of the healthcare system where the ED 
stands at an important nexus. 
While we have focused on ED-specific issues and problems associated with management of 
large EPMNs, the research framework in Fig. 2 – 3 may be adapted for application to other settings. 
For example, regional managers of retail stores or restaurant chains overseeing various facilities 
may face disparities in performance across different sites due to site-specific attributes. By 
identifying dimensions on which performance will be judged and indexing those measures relative 
to site averages, organizations can develop an equitable method to assess an employee’s relative 
performance across sites. Thus, the proposed research framework (Fig. 2 – 3), comprising the 
indexing system, performance matrix (quadrants), clustering, and driver identification, is 
generalizable and can be broadly applied after making industry-specific or company-specific 
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adaptations. Our model is thus valuable for performance enhancement and employee development 
in data-intensive business settings. 
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4.0 Emergency Physician Practice Patterns and Malpractice Claims 
4.1 Background and Motivation 
Emergency medicine is a specialty with high malpractice risk because of the undifferentiated 
patient population and limited time and resources to manage acutely ill and injured individuals. 
Emergency physicians are likely to be involved in malpractice claims; more than 75% of 
emergency physicians will be named in a malpractice claim at some point in their career (Jena et 
al. 2011). On average, physicians spend 50.7 months of their career involved in litigation (Seabury 
et al. 2013). To help reduce risk, roughly 9 in 10 physicians report overusing or over-ordering tests 
or procedures, termed defensive medicine (Bishop et al. 2010, Mello et al. 2010).  
A malpractice claim can negatively affect a provider through anxiety, depression, and even 
thoughts of suicide, referred to as medical malpractice stress syndrome (Sanbar & Firestone 
2007). Additionally, being sued may affect how physicians practice, for example, by leading them 
to order more tests and treatments for the purpose of avoiding future litigation or changing care 
patterns in other ways. However, no study outside of obstetrics has evaluated how being named in 
a malpractice claim changes physicians’ practice patterns, including whether they practice more 
defensively.  
Defensive medicine and the price of the system to administer the medical liability process costs 
an estimated $56 billion per year in the United States (Mello et al. 2010). These estimates are 
derived indirectly from studies of how physicians perceive they may order tests differently due to 
malpractice fear. High costs of defensive medicine are used to justify tort reforms: the changing 
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of rules around how and when physicians can be named in a claim and how claims are adjudicated.  
Yet, the literature on practice changes after tort reform is mixed (Gandhi et al. 2006, Karcz et al. 
1990, Brown et al. 2010, Pines et al. 2009, Pines et al. 2010, Studdert et al. 2016). Some studies 
find a degree of practice change at the community-level after tort reform while others find no such 
effect (Waxman et al. 2014, Farmer et al. 2018, Gimm 2010, Currie & MacLeod 2006, Moghtaderi 
et al. 2019).   
Emergency physicians are ideal subjects for the study of this question. They perceive 
themselves at high risk for malpractice claims because they care for an undifferentiated patient 
population, lack a previous relationship with patients, and have both limited time and resources 
(Carrier et al. 2010). In addition, there are few barriers for emergency physicians to practice 
defensively compared with those commonly encountered in other specialties: there is no insurance 
preauthorization, and emergency physicians have a high degree of autonomy in clinical decisions. 
Finally, they treat large numbers of diverse patients, which could allow the assessment of moderate 
changes in clinical practice patterns. 
We study how commonly measured markers of provider practice were affected after physicians 
were named in a malpractice lawsuit. For example, if they order more tests after being sued, this 
should affect relative value units (RVUs) per visit; if they are more likely to admit marginal 
patients (those where the decision of whether or not to admit is a function of physician judgement 
rather than obvious physiologic criteria) to the hospital, this should affect hospital admission rates; 
and if they spend more time with each patient, this should affect RVUs per hour, discharge length 
of stay, and assessed patient experience. Our objective is to evaluate whether emergency 
physicians’ clinical practice patterns change after being named in a malpractice claim—and if so, 
how—focusing on common, aggregate markers of emergency physician practice, including care 
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intensity (RVUs per visit and hospital admission rate), care speed (length of stay and RVUs per 
hour), and how patients assess their experiences with their emergency physician (Press Ganey 
percentile rank). Since previous research showed that these practice patterns are not associated 
with the probability of being named in a malpractice claim (Carlson et al. 2018), it is important to 
understand if physicians perceive that changing practice patterns may mitigate the risk of a lawsuit. 
Such perceptions could have widespread financial implications and may warrant interventions by 
management. 
4.2 Data and Variables 
In order to assess changes in physician practice patterns after being named in a malpractice 
claim, we conduct a retrospective study using data from a national emergency physician 
management network (EPMN), with data from 59 emergency departments (EDs) in 11 states 
between January 2010 and December 2015. The EPMN under study provided the data, but did not 
control the research question, analyses, or decision to publish results. This group maintained its 
own risk-retention program (a privately owned entity in which policyholders are also owners) 
during the study period and captured all malpractice claims against physicians. We use a 
difference-in-differences approach to compare physicians who were named in a malpractice claim 
during the study period to matched controls who were not named in malpractice claims between 
2010 and 2015. Difference-in-differences methods are commonly used to estimate causal effects 
of external shocks (Lechner 2011): here, the shock from being named in malpractice claim. A 
“malpractice claim” was defined as any filed malpractice lawsuit during the study period 
regardless of case disposition. Because simply being named in a malpractice claim induces 
significant stress for the provider, we elected to examine behavior change after being named in a 
claim rather than after the verdict (Sanbar & Firestone 2007). Also, because claim duration can 
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vary substantially and named physicians may acquire information about claims at various points 
in the lawsuit in ways we could not observe, we examined changes in clinical practice patterns 
relative to the claim filing date. 
Fig. 8 provides a flowchart for how the sample for the main analysis and sensitivity analyses 
were determined. Our initial sample included ED data from 105 facilities which were staffed by 
the EPMN and corresponded to 1,558 emergency physicians, 14,671,102 ED visits, and 628,942 
ED clinical shifts from January 2010 through December 2015. Ninety-nine of these emergency 
physicians were named in 107 lawsuits.  Physicians named in a malpractice suit were identified 
from a database of malpractice claims maintained by the ED group from June 2010 through May 
2014.   
Next, we exclude outlying or extreme visits/shifts and shifts that are likely to be administrative 
in nature as follows.  We exclude visits resulting in greater than 20 relative value units (RVUs), 
clinical shifts ≤ 4 hours (likely administrative based on typical ED staffing patterns), clinical shifts 
with average RVUs/hour ≥ 30, and clinical shifts with average patients/hour ≥ 10. This excludes 
2.1% of visits and 6.3% of clinical shifts.  
We require at least 4 months of data within this ED group for each named and control physician 
preceding the lawsuit date for inclusion in this study, based on prior research indicating that this 
is a reasonable period of time during which an emergency physician adapts to the local ED 
environment and the physician’s practice pattern stabilizes (Carlson et al. 2018). This minimum 
pre-lawsuit period also provides a minimum period in which we can assess whether pre-treatment 
trends are parallel for named and control physicians, a core assumption of the difference-in-
differences methodology.  
  55 
 
All Data: January 2010 – December 2015 
1,558 Emergency Physicians 
(99 Named, 107 Claims) 
14,671,102 Emergency 
Department (ED) Visits 
628,942 ED Clinical Shifts 
 
Exclusion Criteria: 
Criteria (applied sequentially) Physicians Removed Visits Removed Shifts Removed 
1. Visits with > 20 RVUs 0 8,496 0 
2. Shifts ≤ 4 hours 25 (0 Named) 
219,481 
38,433 
3. Shifts with RVUs/Hour ≥ 30 
0 66,094 743 
4. Shifts with Visits/Hour ≥ 10 
0 13,318 141 
Total Removed 
25 Physicians 
(0 Named, 0 Claims) 
307,389 Visits 
(2.1%) 
39,317 Shifts 
(6.3%) 
 
Data for All Visits Study Analysis, January 2010 – December 2015 
205 Physicians 
(65 Named, 69 Claims) 
1,674,734 Visits 75,464 Shifts 
 
Data for Body System/Clinical Issue, Failure to Diagnose, and Non-Failure to Diagnose Study 
Analyses, January 2010-December 2015 
Visits Within Same Body 
System/Clinical Issue of 
Malpractice Claim 
198 Physicians 
(63 Named, 67 Claims) 
1,611,852 Visits 72,863 Shifts 
Claim Allegation - Failure to 
Diagnose 
140 Physicians 
(42 Named, 46 Claims) 
1,130,544 Visits 51,278 Shifts 
Claim Allegation – Non-
Failure to Diagnose 
75 Physicians 
(23 Named, 23 Claims) 
574,212 Visits 25,982 Shifts 
Figure 8 Flow Diagram for Sample Definition 
We also require at least four months of data following the lawsuit date for named and control 
physicians; thus, a minimum total of eight months of continuous data for each named physician. 
The minimum post-lawsuit period provides a minimum period during which we can assess whether 
Match Named Physicians to Controls in Same Facility-Month using Propensity-Matching, 
≥ 4 Months Data Both Pre- and Post-Claim Date for Inclusion of Named and Control Physicians 
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any post-lawsuit effects appear gradually over time. These requirements for minimum observation 
time and suitable controls limit the named physician sample to 65 physicians, named in 69 
lawsuits, and the potential control physician sample to 387. 
4.2.1 Propensity Score Matching 
We then match the remaining named (treated) physicians to at most three control physicians 
who practiced in the same facility in the same month using propensity-score matching on the pre-
treatment period. Two-month averages were computed for practice variables (RVUs per hour, 
RVUs per visit, visit length for discharged patients, admit rate, total monthly patients, and Press 
Ganey (PG) percentile ranks) in Months -1 and -2 and in Months -3 and -4 for each physician. 
Variables used in matching include these two-month averages and physician demographics 
(physician age, physician race, physician gender, emergency medicine board certification, and 
years since residency completion). Since two of the named physicians did not have PG percentile 
ranks in Months -4 through -1, the matches for those two physicians were based on physician 
demographics and the two-month averages of RVUs per hour, RVUs per visit, visit length for 
discharged patients, admit rate, and total monthly patients. R’s optmatch package was used to 
match treated physicians to controls working in the same facility. Matching was done with 
replacement, and we specified a caliper width of 2, resulting in 140 control physicians after 
propensity matching. Table 9 summarizes the differences between the treatment and the control 
physicians to which they were matched. 
Since treated physicians often worked at more than one facility in the same month, with greater 
than 20% of clinical hours at a second ED in 22.2% of physician-months, we included data from 
all facilities in which a treated physician worked. In the case of multiple facilities worked at in a 
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month, we matched the named physician’s visits and shifts at facility 1 to control physicians’ shifts 
and visits at facility 1 and matched the named physician’s visits and shifts at facility 2 to control 
physicians’ shifts and visits at facility 2, etc.  If control physicians worked at more than one facility 
in a given month, we used only their shifts at the same facility as the named physicians for 
comparison. While this resulted in multiple observations per physician per month, it better reflects 
the practice patterns of emergency physicians and accounts for variations among the facilities. By 
controlling for a physician-by-facility fixed effect in the regression models, we essentially treated 
each physician-facility pair as separate for comparisons in outcome measures pre- and post-claim.  
Table 9 Comparison of Treatment and Control Physicians 
Difference (Control - Treatment) 
Variable Mean SD 
Physician Age 0.01 11.75 
Race White (1/0) -0.02 0.45 
Race Black (1/0) 0.00 0.00 
Race Other (1/0) 0.02 0.45 
Gender (1/0) 0.01 0.61 
Board Certified (1/0) -0.02 0.29 
Years Since Residency Completion 0.38 11.89 
PG Score (Months -1 & -2) 3.31 41.13 
RVU/Patient (Months -1 & -2) -0.03 0.88 
LOS Discharged (Months -1 & -2) 0.01 1.04 
Admit Rate (Months -1 & -2) 0.00 0.10 
RVUs/Hour (Months -1 & -2) -0.28 2.57 
Average Number of Patients per Month (Months -1 & -2) -6.73 152.75 
PG Score (Months-3 & -4) 3.72 37.85 
RVUs/Patient (Months-3 & -4) -0.02 0.92 
LOS Discharged (Months-3 & -4) 0.07 0.93 
Admit Rate (Months-3 & -4) 0.00 0.10 
RVU/Hour (Months-3 & -4) -0.30 2.27 
Average Number of Patients per Month (Months-3 & -4) -3.04 143.93 
 
While eight months of data were required for inclusion, we tracked physicians’ practice patterns 
from 12 months preceding the filing date through 23 months following the lawsuit filing date. We 
chose this timeframe because we observe a substantial drop in the number of named physicians 
before and after these time bounds. Table 10 shows sample size by event month. For the four 
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physicians who were named in multiple (two) claims during the study period, we treated each 
claim as a separate event, but we assessed robustness if only the first claim for these physicians 
was studied and found the results were comparable to those reported.  
Table 10 Physician Counts by Month for Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
 All Visits 
Body System/Clinical 
Issue Analysis 
Failure to Diagnose 
Non-Failure to 
Diagnose 
Month 
Number (0 = 
Filing Date) 
Named 
Physicians 
Control 
Physicians 
Named 
Physicians 
Control 
Physicians 
Named 
Physicians 
Control 
Physicians 
Named 
Physicians 
Control 
Physicians 
-12 53 87 51 84 32 52 21 40 
-11 53 89 51 86 33 54 20 40 
-10 53 96 51 93 33 61 20 40 
-9 56 108 54 105 35 72 21 43 
-8 57 113 55 110 36 77 21 43 
-7 62 124 60 120 39 83 23 49 
-6 63 129 61 124 40 86 23 50 
-5 63 128 61 124 41 88 22 48 
-4 65 137 63 132 42 95 23 52 
-3 64 133 62 129 42 94 22 47 
-2 65 131 63 127 42 89 23 52 
-1 65 139 63 134 42 97 23 52 
0 65 137 63 132 42 96 23 51 
1 65 139 63 134 42 97 23 52 
2 65 134 63 128 42 95 23 49 
3 64 131 62 125 41 90 23 51 
4 63 130 61 125 40 91 23 49 
5 63 132 61 127 40 93 23 49 
6 64 127 62 121 41 89 23 48 
7 59 119 57 114 38 82 21 45 
8 59 118 57 113 38 82 21 44 
9 60 111 58 106 38 77 22 43 
10 57 105 55 100 36 72 21 41 
11 57 101 55 96 36 71 21 38 
12 56 95 54 90 35 65 21 38 
13 54 89 52 84 33 59 21 38 
14 54 91 52 86 34 61 20 38 
15 53 89 51 84 34 60 19 36 
16 52 85 50 80 33 57 19 35 
17 50 80 48 76 32 53 18 32 
18 48 78 46 74 30 52 18 31 
19 48 79 46 75 30 51 18 32 
20 47 73 45 69 30 50 17 27 
21 45 68 43 64 29 50 16 22 
22 43 64 41 60 28 46 15 22 
23 45 67 43 62 29 43 16 27 
24 15 23 15 23 9 17 6 7 
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All periods are measured in event time, relative to the lawsuit filing date, except as specified 
below for Press Ganey.  For each claim, the 30 days prior and the filing date are treated as month 
0 and the 90 days prior and the filing date are treated as quarter 0.  For example, if the filing date 
was June 26, 2013, month zero for that physician would begin on May 27, 2013 and end on June 
26, 2013, and quarter 0 would run from March 28, 2013 through June 26, 2013.  
4.2.2 Summary Statistics  
A total of 1,674,734 ED visits involving 205 emergency physicians (65 named in 69 malpractice 
claims and 140 matched controls) at 59 EDs in 11 US states from 2010 to 2015 met inclusion 
criteria (Fig. 8). Table 11 shows that the most prevalent claims related to a neurologic condition 
(n=17, 24.6%), the majority alleged a failure to diagnose (n=46, 66.7%), and the most common 
filing state was California (n=21, 30.4%). Of 69 claims, 47 resulted in voluntary dismissal of the 
named emergency physician by the plaintiff, 17 were settled, and five were tried, with two plaintiff 
victories. Named and control emergency physicians were balanced on pre-exposure demographic 
and operational factors after propensity-score matching (Table 9). We did not observe differential 
dropping out from the sample of named physicians after their being named in a malpractice claim. 
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Table 11 Summary Statistics for Physician and Facility Characteristics 
 All Physicians 
Named Physicians  
(N=65) 
Matched Control 
Physicians  
(N=140) 
Standardized 
difference in 
two groups 
(95% CI) 
Physician Characteristics 
Mean Age at First Included 
Physician-Month 
44.3 (9.6) 45.4 (9.5) 43.7 (9.7) 
0.18  
(-0.12,0.47) 
Mean Years since Residency 
Completion at First Included 
Physician-Month 
11.4 (9.4) 12.5 (9.6) 10.9 (9.4) 
0.18 
(-0.12, 0.47) 
% Male 143 (69.8%) 49 (75.4%) 94 (67.1%) 
0.18 
(-0.11, 0.48) 
% Board Certified in Emergency 
Medicine 
192 (93.7%) 61 (93.8%) 131 (93.6%) 
0.01 
(-0.28, 0.31) 
Operational Characteristics (for included months under study) 
Total ED Visits as Attending 
Physician of Record 
1,674,734 565,823 1,108,911  
Per-physician Mean Monthly ED 
Visits as Attending Physician of 
Record 
289.6 (153.5) 292.5 (131.7) 288.4 (162.2) 
0.03 
(-0.02,0.08) 
Total Physician-Months 6,168 2,074 4,094  
Mean Number of Physician-
Months Per Physician 
30.1 (10.4) 31.9 (7.4) 29.2 (11.4) 
0.28 
(-0.02, 0.57) 
ED Characteristics (same for named and control physicians, by construction) 
ED Mean Annual Visit Volume 43,220 (20,540) 
Mean Annual ED Admission 
Rate 
16.4% (7.1%) 
Percentage with Trauma 
Designation (Level 1-4) 
17 (28.8%) 
Percentage in Academic 
Hospitals 
9 (15.3%) 
Percentage with Emergency 
Medicine Residency Program 
8 (13.6%) 
Malpractice Claim Characteristics (n=69) 
Primary Body System/Clinical Issue of Malpractice Claim (%) # 
Blood/Lymphatic 1 (1.4%) 
Cardiovascular 8 (11.6%) 
ENT 1 (1.4%) 
Endocrine 2 (2.9%) 
Eye 1 (1.4%) 
Gastrointestinal 9 (13.0%) 
Genitourinary 3 (4.3%) 
Skin/Wound 5 (7.2%) 
Neurologic 17 (24.6%) 
OB-GYN 5 (7.2%) 
Orthopedic 7 (10.1%) 
Psychiatric 3 (4.3%) 
Respiratory 6 (8.7%) 
Non-Organ-System Based 
Clinical Issue (Medical Battery) 
1 (1.4%) 
Malpractice Claim Allegation (%) # 
Failure to Diagnose 46 (66.7%) 
Non-Failure to Diagnose 23 (33.3%) 
Claim Disposition (%) 
Physician Voluntarily Dismissed 
from Claim 
47 (68.1%) 
Out-of-Court Settlement 17 (24.6%) 
Trial - Defense Verdict 3 (4.3%) 
Trial - Plaintiff Verdict 2 (2.9%) 
State (%) 
CA 21 (30.4%) 
CT 5 (7.2%) 
HI 2 (2.9%) 
IL 5 (7.2%) 
NC 7 (10.1%) 
NV 6 (8.7%) 
NY 2 (2.9%) 
OH 15 (21.7%) 
OK 2 (2.9%) 
PA 2 (2.9%) 
WV 2 (2.9%) 
# Based on the internal classification by the risk management department of this national emergency physician group 
and review by collaborating physicians. 
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4.2.3 Outcome Measures 
For each outcome measure, we studied all visits within the same ED with the named and control 
physicians as the attending physician of record. We used only within-ED comparisons because 
emergency medical practice is constrained by the capabilities of the ED and affiliated hospital 
(e.g., trauma center, stroke center, available consultation services). Because treated physicians 
often worked at more than one facility in the same month (greater than 20% of clinical hours at a 
second ED in 22% of physician-months in our sample), we included data from all facilities where 
a treated physician worked. If a named physician worked at multiple facilities in a single month, 
we matched the named physician’s visits and shifts at facility 1 to control physicians’ shifts and 
visits at facility 1 and matched the named physician’s visits and shifts at facility 2 to control 
physicians’ shifts and visits at facility 2, etc. Although this resulted in multiple observations per 
physician per month, we thought it better reflected the practice patterns of emergency physicians 
and accounted for variations among the facilities. We used physician-by-facility fixed effects in 
all regression models, allowing us to evaluate changes in practice patterns for the same physician 
in the same facility. Because previous work has not shown an association between working at 
multiple facilities and the likelihood of being named in a malpractice claim, we did not separately 
study named physicians who worked in multiple facilities (Carlson et al. 2018). 
Since many malpractice claims against emergency physicians involve issues related to failure 
to diagnose and initiate treatment (Daniels et al. 2017, Colaco et al. 2015, DePasse et al. 2017), 
we also separately studied claims alleging failure to diagnose (46 claims) and other allegations (23 
claims). We conducted this secondary analysis because of the focal importance in emergency 
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medicine of early diagnosis and intervention for acute conditions and the judgment of the 
emergency physicians on the research team that a failure-to-diagnose claim might affect physician 
behavior more significantly than other claims. We also studied post-claim visits involving the same 
body system or clinical condition as the relevant malpractice claim as a secondary analysis. This 
was based on the potential that knowledge of the previous claim could affect behavior for these 
types of future visits more strongly than others. For the body system and clinical condition 
analysis, per-shift outcomes (RVUs/hour and Press Ganey percentile rank) were not applicable. 
We selected outcome measures that were observable in our data and could plausibly be affected 
by practice changes after a malpractice claim. Specifically, we studied five outcome measures, 
including two measures of care intensity (hospital admission rate [%] and RVUs per visit), two 
measures of care speed (RVUs per hour and length of stay in hours for discharged patients), and 
one measure of subjective patient experience (monthly physician Press Ganey percentile rank). 
The first four operational measures were computed from visit- and shift-level data. Press Ganey 
percentile ranks were reported monthly. We lagged physician monthly Press Ganey percentile 
ranks by two months, according to empirical analysis of the average time needed for survey return 
and processing. That is, the Press Ganey percentile rank that we matched to month 0 in our data 
set was recorded in month 2 in the raw data. For example, if the filing date for a named physician 
was June 26, 2013, we used the Press Ganey percentile rank that the ED group received in August 
2013 for month 0 and the rank for September 2013 for month 1, so that the Press Ganey rank from 
a given month would correspond more closely to visits from month 0. 
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4.3 Methods and Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Methods 
We used several graphical and regression approaches to determine whether named physicians’ 
practice behavior changed after they were sued for malpractice. These include “simple difference-
in-differences” regressions, which assume a onetime change in outcome, occurring immediately 
after the shock. Additionally, distributed lag regressions allow for the gradual emergence of a 
treatment effect. We conduct all analyses in event time relative to the filing date for each named 
physician.  
First, we performed simple difference in difference (DiD) regressions that assume the effect of 
being named in a malpractice claim occurs immediately following the filing date. This DiD model 
is specified in Eq. (11). For simplicity, one equation is shown, but we run five separate regressions, 
one for each of the outcome variables discussed in the previous section. 
𝑌𝑖𝑓𝑡1  =  𝛽01 + 𝛽11  Named𝑖  +  𝛽21  AfterClaim𝑖𝑓𝑡  + 𝛽31  (Named𝑖 × AfterClaim𝑖𝑓𝑡 )   (11) 
+  𝛽41(𝑖 × 𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖𝑓𝑡1 
Here Y is the outcome, i indexes physicians (for physicians who received two claims each, these 
are treated as separate events), f indexes facilities, and t indexes month relative to the filing date. 
Therefore, 𝑌𝑖𝑓𝑡1 represents the outcome measure for physician i at facility f in month t. Namedi is 
a dummy variable which indicates whether physician i was been named in a malpractice claim 
during the study period.  AfterClaimift is a dummy variable which indicates if time t is after the 
relevant filing date. Therefore, 𝛽31, the coefficient for the Named𝑖 × AfterClaim𝑖𝑓𝑡 interaction, s the 
DiD estimate that represents the change in the outcome variable after being named in a malpractice 
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claim relative to control physicians. We include the interaction between physician and facility 
fixed effects (i*f) to control for unobserved, time-constant factors specific to a physician-facility 
pair, and standard errors were clustered on facility. This regression model does not include patient 
covariates (e.g., age, gender, insurance type) because there should not be systematic differences in 
the characteristics of patients treated by named versus control physicians within the same facility 
at the same time, given the nature of emergency department care, where providers have no ability 
to predict or select which patients to see and by law and clinical practice must see any patient who 
presents to the ED. We similarly did not include physician-level covariates in the regression 
equations because named and control physicians were matched on these covariates in the pre-
treatment period and also based on previous work suggesting no likely impact in this regard 
(Carlson et al. 2018).  
We also plot leads and lags graphs showing pre- and post-treatment trends by quarter. These 
graphs provide evidence on whether the pre-treatment trends are parallel as well as evidence on 
when any apparent treatment effect appears, relative to the lawsuit filing date. While the parallel 
trends assumption cannot be directly tested, plausibility can be assessed during the pre-shock 
period with leads-and-lags graphs, which provide estimates of the treatment effect in each period, 
both before the shock (when there should be no treatment effect) and afterward. The graphs are 
evaluated visually for evidence of nonparallel trends. 
To investigate whether pre-treatment trends differ between treatment and control physicians, 
we use a leads and lags model in event time, treating the 90 days prior and the filing date as time 
zero for each named physician, and track forward up to 23 months and backward up to 12 months 
in the same manner. As we included data for months 22 and 23, we averaged the data over these 
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months to determine the data for quarter 8, and the data for quarter -4 was determined by month -
12. The monthly records were assigned to the appropriate quarter as follows: 
Month -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Quarter 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Despite the uneven quarter lengths at the extremes of our study period, we compared the quarterly 
leads and lags graphs to monthly graphs (not shown) and found that they yield equivalent results. 
Again, we include a physician-by-facility fixed effect and use cluster-robust standard errors, 
clustered on facility. Eq. (12) specifies the model used for quarterly leads and lags models. 
𝑌𝑖𝑓𝑡2  =  𝛽02 + 𝛽12 Named𝑖  +  ∑ [β22
k  𝑘 + β32
k (Named
𝑖
× 𝑘)]8𝑘=−4  +   𝛽42(𝑖 × 𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖𝑓𝑡2 (12) 
Here, k indexes “event time” relative to the filing date (quarterly). We include 4 leads (one 
year) and 8 lags (23 months) in our specification. Time zero is treated as the reference category, 
and each β22
k  estimates the quarter k effect within the control group relative to time zero. Each β32
k  
coefficient estimates the DiD for quarter k relative to time zero (plotted in Fig. 9 for the analysis 
which includes all visits). Again, this equation is used for each of the five outcome measures. 
Finally, we use distributed lags to test for changes in emergency physician practice patterns 
after a malpractice claim. While the leads-and-lags models estimate quarterly (or monthly) 
coefficients, relative to a base year, the distributed lag model estimates quarterly incremental 
changes relative to a pre-claim mean. Eq. (13) specifies the distributed lags model with six 
quarterly lags.  
𝑌𝑖𝑓𝑡3  =  𝛽03 + 𝛽13 Named𝑖  +  ∑ [β23
k  𝑘 + β33
k (Named
𝑖
× lag
𝑘
)]6𝑘=0  +   𝛽43(𝑖 × 𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖𝑓𝑡3 (13) 
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Here the first treatment lag (lag1) equals 1 in the quarter of the malpractice claim and subsequent 
quarters; lagk turns on in the k
th quarter after the claim and stays on. Thus, the coefficient on 
Named𝑖 × lag1 (i.e., β33
1 ) estimates the effect of the lawsuit in the claim quarter, and the 
coefficients β33
k  (𝑘 =  2,3, … ,6) estimate the additional effect in each subsequent quarter. The 
overall treatment effect is thus the sum of these coefficients.  
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
We chose the aforementioned outcome measures because they are commonly used, aggregate 
measures of emergency physician performance, which we considered likely to be influenced by a 
change in clinical practice resulting from being named in a malpractice claim. For example, a 
natural response might be to slow down and practice more deliberately, which should be detectable 
as fewer RVUs per hour and longer discharge length of stay. Emergency physicians may decrease 
their threshold for ordering diagnostic tests after being named in a claim, and ordering more tests 
should lead to increased RVUs per visit. Providers also may be more cautious in deciding which 
patients to admit, resulting in higher hospital admission rates. These practices correspond to 
practicing more defensively after a malpractice claim and lead us to the following hypotheses: 
H3. Physicians practice more defensively after being named in a malpractice claim. That is,  
a. 𝛽31 < 0 when Y measures RVUs per hour. 
b. 𝛽31 > 0 when Y measures length of stay for discharged patients. 
c. 𝛽31 > 0 when Y measures admission rate. 
d. 𝛽31 > 0 when Y measures RVUs per visit. 
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In addition, emergency physicians may change the ways in which they interact with patients, 
according to assumptions about malpractice risk, which could affect patients’ rating of their 
experiences. For instance, physicians may alter the ways in which they interact with patients if 
they feel that a communication issue contributed to being named in a malpractice claim. Improving 
communication (either the content or the delivery of that content) might be seen as a way to reduce 
the risk of a lawsuit. While we cannot directly test for changes in physicians’ soft skills or bedside 
manner, we believe that such changes would be reflected in patient experience scores. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that patient experience scores will increase after a physician is 
named in a malpractice claim. 
H4. Physicians improve communication with patients after being named in a malpractice 
claim, and thus patient experience scores increase. 𝛽31 > 0 when Y measures patient 
experience. 
These hypotheses are tested in the following section. 
 
4.4 Analyses and Results 
According to the leads and lags graphs (see Fig. 9), pretreatment trends were reasonably parallel 
for named versus control physicians for all outcomes, which supports the appropriateness of the 
core difference-in-differences assumption of parallel trends. The results of the simple DiD 
regressions suggest that after being named in a malpractice claim, emergency physicians had 
improved patient experience scores relative to control physicians, which supports hypothesis H4. 
Specifically, the average monthly physician Press Ganey percentile rank increased by 6.52 (95% 
confidence interval [CI] 0.67 to 12.38). Mean monthly Press Ganey percentile ranks increased for 
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named physicians in the first quarter after the filing date and remained elevated during the two-
year treatment period (Fig. 9).  
Outcomes for care intensity and care speed showed no significant change for named versus 
control physicians: RVUs per visit (–0.02; 95% CI –0.10 to 0.05), RVUs per hour (–0.07; 95% CI 
–0.59 to 0.46), visit length of stay for discharged patients (–0.01; 95% CI –0.10 to 0.09), and 
hospital admission rate (–0.008; 95% CI –0.018 to 0.002).  That is, consistent changes in these 
outcomes were not observed, and we do not find support for hypotheses H3(a)-(d). Complete 
results are detailed in Table 12 (Panel A) and Fig. 9. 
We then perform secondary analyses on subsets of the data. First, we consider the claims 
alleging failure to diagnose (46 claims) and other allegations (23 claims) separately to assess 
whether a failure-to-diagnose claim might affect physician behavior more significantly than other 
claims. The increase in average monthly Press Ganey percentile ranks for named physicians in the 
subset of 46 failure-to-diagnose claims, relative to controls, was 10.52 percentile ranks (95% CI 
3.72 to 17.32). This increase in scores began shortly after filing (Fig. 10) and continued to increase 
in the post-claim period. This was confirmed in the distributed lag analyses (Table 13 [Panel A]). 
As with the all-visits analysis, other outcomes within the subset of failure-to-diagnose claims were 
similar between named and control physicians (Fig. 10, Table 12 [Panel B] and Table 13 [Panel 
B]). For the 23 non-failure-to-diagnose malpractice claims, there was no evidence of a change in 
either monthly Press Ganey percentile ranks or other outcomes (Fig. 11, Table 12 [Panel C] and 
Table 13 [Panel C]). 
We then study post-claim visits involving only the same body system or clinical condition as 
the relevant malpractice claim to determine if behaviors for these types of visits are influenced 
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more strongly than others. Note that for the body system and clinical condition analysis, per-shift 
outcomes (RVUs/hour and Press Ganey percentile rank) were not applicable. Prior to study 
analysis, collaborating emergency physicians classified ICD-9 codes into body system and clinical 
condition groups using diagnosis codes within the major disease categories of the ICD-9 Tabular 
Index (for visits from January 2010 through September 2015).  Emergency medical practice also 
often involves ruling out acute conditions rather than definitive diagnosis. Therefore, we treated 
ICD-9 diagnosis codes within symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions (780-799) and injury 
and poisoning (800-999) as non- exclusive – these codes could be placed in more than one body 
system/clinical condition category based on physician authors consensus. ICD-10 codes came into 
application in October 2015.  Only three named physicians had visits during the ICD-10 time 
period (October-December 2015). For these named physicians, the physician authors reviewed 
their visits’ primary ICD-10 codes and classified into body system or clinical condition. The 
classification of ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes is shown in Appendix Table 6. 
The EPMN which provided the data for this study classifies malpractice claims by body system 
or clinical issue involved as well as by malpractice allegation (failure-to-diagnose and non-failure-
to-diagnose categories). Prior to study analysis, the physician authors reviewed the ED group’s 
body system/clinical issue classification for each malpractice claim and re-adjusted three claims, 
for which there was physician authors consensus that the presenting condition of the patient was 
clearly in another body system, based on the malpractice claim details:  one claim was moved from 
Neurologic to Psychiatric; one from OB-GYN to Integument/Wounds; and one from Neurologic 
to Cardiovascular.   
When analyzed within the same body system or clinical condition as the malpractice claim (Fig. 
12, Table 12 [Panel D] and Table 13 [Panel D]), outcomes were similar between named and control 
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physicians: RVUs per visit (0.03; 95% CI –0.08 to 0.14), visit length (–0.02; 95% CI –0.14 to 
0.10), and hospital admission rate (–0.011; 95% CI –0.027 to 0.006). In this secondary analysis, 
we could not assess changes in RVUs per hour or monthly Press Ganey percentile ranks as those 
outcomes rely on all of a physician’s visits. 
Based on the primary and secondary analyses, we do not find any evidence that physicians 
practice more defensively after a malpractice claim with regard to RVUs per hour, discharge length 
of stay, RVUs per visit, or admission rates. That is, there is no support for hypotheses H3(a)-(d). 
However, the data suggest that patient experience scores do increase after a physician is named in 
a malpractice claim, supporting hypothesis H4. While we cannot prove the reason for the increase 
in patient experience scores (e.g., changes in communication or demeanor), these results suggest 
a difference in patients’ perceptions of the physicians. 
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(a) RVUs/visit 
 
(b) RVUs/hour 
 
(c) Visit Length of Stay (LOS) for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(d) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
 
(e) Physician Press Ganey Percentile Rank 
Figure 9 Leads and Lags Figures for Outcome Measures:  All Visits 
  72 
 
Table 12 Difference-in-differences (DiD) Analysis:  Named versus Control Physicians 
Panel A.  All Visits 
 Named Physicians (N=65) Control Physicians (N=140) Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE Outcome Measure 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Relative Value Units 
(RVUs)/Visit 
3.68 
(0.81) 
3.72 
(0.85) 
3.65 
(0.77) 
3.73 
(0.79) 
0.01 
(-0.11, 0.14) 
-0.02 
(-0.10, 0.05) 
SE = 0.04 
RVUs/Hour 
10.03 
(3.62) 
10.07 
(5.18) 
9.56 
(2.70) 
9.52 
(2.77) 
0.52 
(-0.20, 1.24) 
-0.07 
(-0.59, 0.46) 
SE = 0.26 
Visit Length (hrs.) 
2.67 
(1.18) 
2.73 
(1.19) 
2.62 
(1.08) 
2.67 
(1.11) 
0.06 
(-0.12, 0.23) 
-0.01 
(-0.10, 0.09) 
SE = 0.05 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.188 
(0.109) 
0.182 
(0.116) 
0.186 
(0.093) 
0.191 
(0.097) 
-0.005 
(-0.02, 0.01) 
-0.008 
(-0.018, 0.002) 
SE = 0.005 
Monthly Physician 
Press Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
51.61 
(36.88) 
57.97 
(36.13) 
54.91 
(37.05) 
55.42 
(37.35) 
0.37 
(-3.53, 4.27) 
6.52 
(0.67, 12.38) 
SE = 2.92 
Physician months 731 1,379 1,602 2,704   
Visits 207,502 358,321 428,846 680,065   
 
Panel B.  Failure to Diagnose Claims: All Visits 
 Named Physicians (N=42) Control Physicians (N=98) 
Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE Outcome Measure 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 
3.60 
(0.70) 
3.71 
(0.79) 
3.60 
(0.69) 
3.70 
(0.74) 
0.004 
(-0.10, 0.11) 
0.01 
(-0.07, 0.08) 
SE = 0.04 
RVUs/Hour 
9.88 
(3.02) 
9.49 
(2.87) 
9.84 
(2.88) 
9.67 
(2.87) 
-0.10 
(-0.64, 0.44) 
-0.39 
(-0.88, 0.11) 
SE = 0.25 
Visit Length (hrs.) 
2.58 
(0.91) 
2.69 
(0.98) 
2.69 
(0.99) 
2.73 
(1.03) 
-0.07 
(-0.20, 0.06) 
0.07 
(-0.02, 0.15) 
SE = 0.04 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in Hospital 
Admission 
0.179 
(0.099) 
0.179 
(0.109) 
0.188 
(0.090) 
0.193 
(0.095) 
-0.012 
(-0.026, 0.002) 
-0.002 
(-0.013, 
0.009) 
SE = 0.006 
Monthly Physician 
Press Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
49.36 
(36.42) 
60.22 
(34.97) 
51.40 
(37.78) 
52.98 
(38.05) 
3.87 
(-1.49, 9.22) 
10.52 
(3.72, 17.32) 
SE = 3.37 
Physician months 470 896 1,069 1,846   
Visits 141,685 230,895 294,428 462,536   
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Panel C.  Non-Failure to Diagnose Claims: All Visits 
 Named Physicians (N=23) Control Physicians (N=52) 
Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE Outcome Measure 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 
3.85 
(0.97) 
3.76 
(0.96) 
3.77 
(0.87) 
3.77 
(0.84) 
0.02 
(-0.24, 0.28) 
-0.03 
(-0.21, 0.14) 
SE = 0.08 
RVUs/Hour 
10.32 
(4.57) 
11.21 
(7.83) 
9.39 
(2.28) 
9.51 
(2.51) 
1.43 
(-0.35, 3.22) 
0.54 
(-0.64, 1.73) 
SE = 0.57 
Visit Length (hrs.) 
2.83 
(1.57) 
2.82 
(1.51) 
2.64 
(1.16) 
2.68 
(1.19) 
0.16 
(-0.26, 0.58) 
-0.12 
(-0.38, 0.13) 
SE = 0.12 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in Hospital 
Admission 
0.207 
(0.123) 
0.189 
(0.130) 
0.184 
(0.091) 
0.190 
(0.094) 
0.008 
(-0.16, 0.21) 
-0.018 
(-0.037, 
0.0001) 
SE = 0.009 
Monthly Physician 
Press Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
55.84 
(37.43) 
53.35 
(38.02) 
60.34 
(34.99) 
58.80 
(35.15) 
-5.14 
(-12.41, 2.13) 
-0.27 
(-8.80, 8.27) 
SE = 4.00 
Physician months 261 483 571 968   
Visits 65,817 127,426 142,055 238,914   
 
Panel D.  Visits Involving Same Body System/Clinical Issue as Malpractice Claim 
 Named Physicians (N=63)+ Control Physicians(N=135) Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE Outcome Measure 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 
3.72 
(0.98) 
3.83 
(1.00) 
3.74 
(0.97) 
3.88 
(0.99) 
-0.03 
(-0.18, 0.11) 
0.03 
(-0.08, 0.14) 
SE = 0.05 
Visit Length (hrs.) 
3.05 
(1.99) 
3.10 
(1.70) 
3.03 
(1.52) 
3.09 
(1.62) 
0.01 
(-0.17, 0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.14, 0.10) 
SE = 0.06 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in Hospital 
Admission 
0.179 
(0.177) 
0.177 
(0.175) 
0.176 
(0.177) 
0.198 
(0.190) 
-0.01 
(-0.04, 0.02) 
-0.011 
(-0.027, 0.006) 
SE = 0.008 
Physician months 712 1,341 1,562 2,616   
Visits 202,503 347,133 412,249 649,967   
+Two named physicians were excluded from this sub-analysis, one because the malpractice claim was for a non-body 
system-based issue (medical battery), and one who had no subsequent visits corresponding to the body system or 
clinical issue of the malpractice claim. 
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Table 13 Distributed Lags Analysis 
Panel A. Distributed Lags for All Visits (Quarterly) 
  
Relative Value 
Units 
(RVUs)/Visit 
RVUs/Hour 
Discharge 
Visit Length 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
Physician Press 
Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
Malpractice 
Claim Month and 
After 
-0.07 -0.04 0.09 -0.008 -0.66 
[0.07] [0.24] [0.07] [0.007] [3.98] 
Quarter 1 and 
After 
-0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.005 7.44 
[0.07] [0.19] [0.07] [0.008] [4.47] 
Quarter 2 and 
After 
0.08 0.18 0.04 0.008 -2.47 
[0.05] [0.28] [0.06] [0.007] [3.86] 
Quarter 3 and 
After 
-0.05 -0.16 -0.08 -0.012 1.63 
[0.06] [0.29] [0.05] [0.006] [4.15] 
Quarter 4 and 
After 
0.01 -0.19 0.05 0.011 3.95 
[0.05] [0.23] [0.07] [0.006] [4.47] 
Quarter 5 and 
After 
0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.003 -0.16 
[0.06] [0.18] [0.07] [0.006] [3.77] 
Quarter 6 and 
After 
-0.06 0.18 0.08 0.003 -2.59 
[0.07] [0.36] [0.05] [0.007] [4.37] 
Sum 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.001 7.13 
[0.07] [0.53] [0.08] [0.009] [5.39] 
Observations 
(months) 
9,186 9,186 9,186 9,186 7,610 
Named Physician 
months 
2,937 2,937 2,937 2,937 2,309 
Control Physician 
months 
6,249 6,249 6,249 6,249 5,301 
Named Physicians 65 65 65 65 64 
Control 
Physicians 
140 140 140 140 138 
R2 0.23 0.30 0.49 0.36 0.21 
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Panel B. Distributed Lags for 46 Failure to Diagnose Claims: All Visits (Quarterly) 
  
Relative Value 
Units 
(RVUs)/Visit 
RVUs/Hour 
Discharge 
Visit Length 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
Physician Press 
Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
Malpractice 
Claim Month and 
After 
-0.01 -0.25 0.03 -0.010 3.06 
[0.09] [0.21] [0.08] [0.009] [5.19] 
Quarter 1 and 
After 
-0.05 0.14 -0.04 -0.001 6.77 
[0.08] [0.23] [0.08] [0.007] [5.98] 
Quarter 2 and 
After 
0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.009 -0.34 
[0.07] [0.25] [0.07] [0.008] [4.61] 
Quarter 3 and 
After 
0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.018 -0.13 
[0.08] [0.21] [0.07] [0.009] [4.60] 
Quarter 4 and 
After 
-0.04 -0.63 -0.01 0.016 3.72 
[0.06] [0.29] [0.09] [0.007] [6.41] 
Quarter 5 and 
After 
0.17 0.03 0.00 0.014 -7.54 
[0.10] [0.24] [0.07] [0.008] [6.50] 
Quarter 6 and 
After 
-0.09 0.14 0.15 0.004 11.03 
[0.10] [0.23] [0.08] [0.01] [4.45] 
Sum 
0.04 -0.57 0.18 0.013 16.57 
[0.06] [0.41] [0.07] [0.010] [5.56] 
Observations 
(months) 
6,382 6,382 6,382 6,382 5,381 
Named Physician 
months 
1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,536 
Control Physician 
months 
4,436 4,436 4,436 4,436 3,845 
Named Physicians 42 42 42 42 42 
Control 
Physicians 
98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.27 0.35 0.54 0.41 0.20 
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Panel C. Distributed Lags for Visits Involving Same Body System or Clinical Issue as Malpractice Claim 
(Quarterly) 
  
Relative Value Units 
(RVUs)/Visit 
Discharge Visit 
Length 
Proportion of Visits Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
Malpractice Claim Month 
and After 
0.03 0.04 0.007 
[0.08] [0.12] [0.016] 
Quarter 1 and After 
-0.02 0.00 -0.014 
[0.10] [0.16] [0.019] 
Quarter 2 and After 
0.05 -0.11 -0.019 
[0.08] [0.14] [0.011] 
Quarter 3 and After 
-0.10 -0.07 -0.003 
[0.07] [0.13] [0.013] 
Quarter 4 and After 
0.16 0.19 0.032 
[0.09] [0.13] [0.017] 
Quarter 5 and After 
-0.07 -0.06 -0.003 
[0.08] [0.14] [0.019] 
Quarter 6 and After 
-0.08 -0.01 -0.015 
[0.08] [0.12] [0.017] 
Sum 
-0.03 -0.02 -0.014 
[0.09] [0.11] [0.013] 
Observations (months) 9,139 9,035 9,139 
Named Physician months 2,683 2,648 2,683 
Control Physician months 6,456 6,387 6,456 
Named Physicians 63 63 63 
Control Physicians 135 135 135 
R2 0.44 0.45 0.52 
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Panel D. Distributed Lags for 23 Non-Failure to Diagnose Claims: All Visits (Quarterly) 
  
Relative Value 
Units 
(RVUs)/Visit 
RVUs/Hour 
Discharge 
Visit Length 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
Physician Press 
Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
Malpractice 
Claim Month and 
After 
-0.20 0.33 0.30 -0.006 -6.23 
[0.11] [0.62] [0.12] [0.013] [5.45] 
Quarter 1 and 
After 
0.12 -0.41 -0.29 -0.014 6.60 
[0.18] [0.26] [0.14] [0.016] [5.35] 
Quarter 2 and 
After 
0.20 0.69 -0.05 0.012 -7.51 
[0.12] [0.52] [0.10] [0.01] [6.28] 
Quarter 3 and 
After 
-0.17 -0.52 -0.19 -0.008 7.87 
[0.12] [0.80] [0.09] [0.009] [7.23] 
Quarter 4 and 
After 
0.07 0.57 0.19 0.001 8.03 
[0.11] [0.32] [0.12] [0.011] [6.52] 
Quarter 5 and 
After 
-0.03 -0.08 -0.22 -0.011 9.73 
[0.10] [0.33] [0.19] [0.008] [5.33] 
Quarter 6 and 
After 
-0.07 0.57 -0.10 -0.001 -29.93 
[0.13] [0.92] [0.07] [0.009] [7.80] 
Sum 
-0.08 1.15 -0.35 -0.026 -11.45 
[0.17] [1.30] [0.19] [0.018] [8.18] 
Observations 
(months) 
3,587 3,587 3,587 3,587 2,988 
Named Physician 
months 
991 991 991 991 773 
Control Physician 
months 
2,596 2,596 2,596 2,596 2,215 
Named Physicians 23 23 23 23 22 
Control 
Physicians 
52 52 52 52 50 
R2 0.17 0.28 0.42 0.28 0.25 
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(a) RVUs/visit 
 
(b) RVUs/hour 
 
(c) Visit Length of Stay for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(d) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
 
(e) Physician Press Ganey Percentile Rank 
Figure 10 Leads and Lags Comparing Named Physicians in 46 Failure to Diagnose Claims Versus Their 
Control Physicians for Outcome Measures in All Included ED Visits. 
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(a) RVUs/visit  
 
(b) RVUs/hour  
 
(c) Visit Length of Stay for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(d) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
 
(a) Physician Press Ganey Percentile Rank 
Figure 11 Leads and Lags Comparing Named Physicians in 23 Non-Failure to Diagnose Claims Versus Their 
Control Physicians for Outcome Measures in All Included ED Visits 
  80 
 
(a) RVUs/visit 
 
(b) Visit Length of Stay (LOS) for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(c) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
Figure 12 Leads and Lags for Outcome Measures:  Body System/Clinical Issue Specific Visits 
 
4.4.1 Robustness Checks 
We performed three additional sensitivity analyses. First, three states in the data set have pre-
notification laws, in which the provider is notified of an impending lawsuit before the lawsuit filing 
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date (Hawaii: indirect process, no specific period (Hawaii Revised Statutes § 671); California: 
notice required three months before filing (California Code of Civil Procedure § 364); and West 
Virginia, notice required one month before filing (West Virginia Code § 55-7B)). In all other 
states in this sample, the date the ED group received notice of the claim corresponded to the claim 
filing date. We performed a sensitivity analysis to account for these laws, by removing two claims 
from Hawaii and adjusting the event date to three months earlier for California and one month 
earlier for West Virginia. The results after this adjustment were also unchanged from those 
reported. We report results from this robustness check in Appendix Table 7.  
An additional sensitivity analysis was performed in which all visits by all potential control 
physicians were included, without propensity-score matching. Control physicians in this analysis 
were those not named in a malpractice claim during the entire study period and who were working 
in the same EDs as named physicians regardless of matching on pre-claim characteristics. Control 
physicians were matched to named physicians on a monthly basis (using the same start and end 
dates as the control physicians) and required to have at least four months of data prior to the 
comparison month, but without any specification on post-monthly comparison presence in the 
dataset. Similar to the main analysis, separate records were used for each facility worked during a 
given month such that named physicians in a given month were analyzed against controls from 
each facility at which they worked during that month. The broader inclusion criteria allowed a 
larger sample in this analysis (Appendix Tables 8 – 9 and Appendix Fig. 3 – 5). The results show 
similar trends to the main analysis with propensity-score matched controls.  
 Finally, we studied the possibility of difference by gender (Appendix Table 10). Our data hint 
that there may be baseline differences in PG scores by emergency physician gender, although the 
results are not statistically significant.  However, the power for this comparison was limited 
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because there were only 16 named female physicians. Given the limited number of female 
physicians involved in a lawsuit in our dataset, additional study will be required to better 
understand the relationship between provider gender and practice changes after being named in a 
malpractice suit. 
4.5 Conclusions  
4.5.1 Limitations 
Our work has several limitations. Although we were able to assess aggregate measures of 
clinical practice (RVUs/visit, RVUs/hour, discharge visit length of stay, hospital admission 
percentage, and physician Press Ganey percentile rank), we lacked more granular data and 
therefore could not examine specific clinical actions that may have changed after a claim, such as 
ordering specific laboratory or advanced imaging tests. However, greater overall testing should 
result in higher RVUs per visit, which was not observed (Medical Decision Making and the 
Marshfield Clinic Scoring Tool FAQ). There may be other measures of practice that may change 
after a malpractice claim (e.g., the number of consultations, number of referrals, or changes in 
documentation and communication style) and may be more difficult to observe and require further 
study. 
It may be that many emergency physicians at baseline practice a high level of defensive 
medicine. This could make it more challenging to observe differences in practice patterns, even 
with a larger sample size. Although Press Ganey scores by emergency physician gender did not 
reach significance, our data hint that there may be baseline differences. Given the limited number 
of female physicians involved in a lawsuit in our data set, additional study will be required to better 
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understand the relationship between provider gender and practice changes after a physician is 
named in a malpractice lawsuit. 
We studied only physicians who were ED attending physicians of record. How other members 
of the health care team, such as advanced practice providers or trainees, were affected by a 
malpractice claim was not measured. In any observational study, there could be unmeasured 
differences between treating and control persons, although our use of a difference-in-differences 
analysis, with facility×physician fixed effects, combined with propensity-score matching and an 
exact match on facility, should address many potential differences. We obtained similar results 
without matching, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be sensitive to our choice of a 
particular matching approach. 
Our finding of a significant post-lawsuit relative increase in Press Ganey percentiles should be 
evaluated, taking into account the limitations of the Press Ganey metric, including month-to-month 
variability for individual physicians (Pines et al. 2018). However, despite these limitations, Press 
Ganey is a commonly used measure. We also did not study changes in patient outcomes, such as 
rates of missed diagnoses or ED revisits. The assessment of practice changes for future visits 
involving the same body system or clinical condition was limited by the smaller number of future 
visits involving specific conditions. A key aspect of ED practice is a focus on ruling out acute 
conditions rather than making definitive diagnoses. Therefore, our results may not generalize to 
other specialties. 
Our sample of greater than 1.6 million ED visits is large and leads to reasonably tight confidence 
bounds, but our sample of claims was small and from a single ED group, which employs 
principally board-certified emergency physicians (ie, those with maximum qualifications). Based 
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on a .05 significance level, our analyses had sufficient power to detect changes of approximately 
0.08 RVUs per visit (a 2% change from baseline), 0.5 RVUs per hour (a 5% change from baseline), 
0.10-hour visit length for discharged patients (a 2% change from baseline), a 1.2% change in 
hospital admission rate (a 6% change from baseline), and 5.7 Press Ganey percentile ranks. Thus, 
despite the limited number of malpractice claims, our study was sufficiently powered to find 
differences we would consider clinically meaningful. 
This ED group employs predominantly board-certified emergency physicians. How these 
results generalize to non–board-certified emergency physicians or to physicians with different 
baseline practice patterns will require additional study. Although some emergency physician 
groups may mandate care bundles to lower risk in how providers manage specific common 
complaints (e.g., chest pain, headache), none were used across the EPMN during the study period. 
How use of mandated care bundles may influence behavior surrounding a malpractice claim is 
unknown and deserving of further investigation. Few claims went to trial, limiting the ability to 
study these separately. We also do not know the claim history of emergency physicians included 
in this study before the study period or joining this emergency medicine group. 
4.5.2 Discussion 
In this study, we found evidence of improved assessed patient experience after emergency 
physicians were named in a malpractice claim, but no significant changes in aggregate measures 
of care intensity and speed of care. Patient experience ratings increased for named physicians 
promptly after the malpractice claim filing date and were most prominent in cases in which the 
malpractice claim alleged a failure to diagnose. Failure-to-diagnose claims (e.g., a missed 
diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction, stroke, or meningitis) are different from other claims for 
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emergency physicians; for example, adverse effects of treatment (e.g., allergic reaction to 
administered medication). Failure-to-diagnose claims tend to occur according to the cognitive 
decision making of a single emergency physician: despite the emergency physician’s having 
evaluated the patient to rule out serious conditions (it is hoped), the contention of the claim is often 
that the physician “missed” something. 
Being accused of missing something might engender self-doubt about personal competence and 
introspection about whether one’s clinical practice approach may need to change. However, 
although we observed improvements in assessed patient experience, potentially related to 
improved communication as perceived by the patient, there was no evidence of a change toward 
more defensive practice, such as admitting more patients or performing more tests (which likely 
would have been evident in RVUs/visit or ED length of stay). There is an association between 
patient complaints and perceived lack of physician empathy and malpractice claim risk (Hickson 
et al. 1994, Hickson et al. 2002, Cydulka et al. 2011). Emergency physicians may be aware of this 
association and alter their approach to interacting with patients after a malpractice claim, perhaps 
through improved communication, which may involve providing patients with a better 
understanding of risks and benefits in testing or other clinical decisions. In an environment in 
which many physicians perceive themselves to be time pressured (Nugus et al. 2011), Press Ganey 
score changes could reflect that physicians are attempting to improve patient experience through 
communication. However, the degree of change on average was moderate (6.5 Press Ganey 
percentile ranks overall and 10.5 for failure-to-diagnose claims). The association between Press 
Ganey ranks and other measures of care quality is unknown, and previous work has suggested that 
the Press Ganey scores of individual physicians can fluctuate (Pines et al. 2018). Further study is 
needed to address whether these changes are clinically meaningful to patients and physicians. In 
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addition, future studies may examine changes in specific behaviors such as bedside 
communication, education, or other factors that might have led to the observed improvement in 
assessed patient experience after a malpractice claim. 
These findings suggest that efforts to reduce the number of malpractice claims may not 
meaningfully affect defensive medical practices among emergency physicians. This is consistent 
with literature finding little change in ED practice for clinical decisions attributable to defensive 
medicine after tort reform (Waxman et al. 2014). However, our findings that malpractice claims 
led to improved patient experience may be relevant for efforts to support open patient-physician 
communication, such as apology statutes. Apology statutes might allow improved communication 
to take place before and perhaps without costly litigation, if coupled with direct patient 
compensation for preventable adverse events. 
In conclusion, emergency physicians named in a malpractice claim have higher assessed patient 
experience post-claim relative to matched control physicians, but care intensity and speed did not 
significantly change. 
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5.0 Balancing Emergency Physicians and Advanced Practice Providers to Meet Patient 
Demand 
5.1 Motivation 
Consider a local emergency department (ED). In the early morning hours, (3am to 7am), only 
one physician and one advanced practice provider (APP) were scheduled to work, but the ED 
experienced higher patient volumes than usual. This created a backlog of patients waiting for care. 
During the 7am to 11am shift, the ED is staffed with three physicians and two physician assistants. 
An elderly female patient arrives at 10am complaining of abdominal pain. The patient overhears 
that some patients have already been waiting for more than two hours. Furthermore, she knows 
from previous experiences that arriving patients with more urgent needs will be treated first. With 
no other options for care, the patient will wait almost three hours before she is eventually seen by 
a physician, or she may choose to leave the ED before being treatment.  
Unfortunately, this situation is not unique, and long ED waiting times continue to be a problem. 
The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) cites four reasons for long ED waiting 
times: (1) long boarding times, (2) waiting for specialists, (3) mass casualty events, natural 
disasters, and local disease outbreaks, and (4) staffing (ACEP 2009). Boarding time refers to the 
time between the decision to admit a patient to the hospital (as inpatient) and the patient’s departure 
from the ED area, and reducing boarding times involves operational changes at the hospital level. 
Similarly, the additional waiting time attributed to specialist consultations cannot be addressed 
within the ED alone. Mass casualty events, natural disasters, and local disease outbreaks are largely 
  88 
unpredictable, but EDs typically have disaster plans for such events. For these reasons, we focus 
on addressing changes in ED provider staffing as a method to reduce patient waiting times.  
Traditionally, emergency physicians diagnose and treat patients within the ED, but many EDs 
also employ APPs such as physician assistants and nurse practitioners. This has become common 
practice as the current shortage of emergency physicians continues (Reiter et al. 2016). These 
APPs are licensed to diagnose and treat patients, prescribe medications, and order tests, but there 
are limitations to the conditions they can treat without a physician’s involvement. For example, 
APPs are less likely to perform invasive procedures, such as inserting chest tubes (Nyberg et al. 
2010). APPs are commonly required to practice under a physician’s supervision and thus, are not 
perfect substitutes for physicians. However, many of their responsibilities overlap. While APPs 
hold advanced degrees (master’s or doctorate) and obtain professional licensure and certification 
for the states in which they practice, their education time is shorter than that of physicians, and 
APPs do not require residency training after graduation as physicians do. While Kraus et al. (2018) 
report that formal postgraduate training programs to provide emergency medicine physician 
assistants with the skills and knowledge to work in an ED do exist, the qualifications for physician 
assistant licensure are (1) graduation from an accredited physician assistant program and (2) 
passage of the Physician Assistant National Certification Examination (Cawley & Hooker 2013). 
Once licensed, the scope of practice may vary according to training, experience, facility policy, 
and state law, but physician assistants have the authority to prescribe medications in all states 
(Cawley & Hooker 2013). For these reasons, physician assistant and nurse practitioner programs 
are viewed as attractive alternatives for students interested in medicine, and, consequently, the 
number of licensed APPs has been increasing in recent years (Gaudio & Borensztein 2018, Fraher 
et al. 2016, Hooker et al. 2016). Furthermore, APPs are much less costly to employ than physicians, 
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with national averages indicating that emergency physician salaries can be more than three times 
that of APPs working in emergency departments (Katz 2017, AANP 2018, AAPA 2018). Still, our 
analyses of a national physician-owned emergency medicine group suggest that EDs vary in the 
ways they staff and utilize APPs. 
Given the shortage of emergency physicians, an increase in the number of APPs, the ability of 
APPs to treat some ED patients, and the lower cost of APPs, we surmise that APPs may be 
instrumental in reducing patient waiting times in the ED. Carter and Chochinov (2007) previously 
suggested that APPs could reduce waiting times and called for the medical community to explore 
the use of APPs in EDs, but Larkin and Hooker (2010) later indicated that ED patients prefer to 
see a physician. Similarly, Dill et al. (2013) found that half of the patients they surveyed prefer 
that their primary care providers are physicians. However, when these patients were presented 
scenarios in which they could see an APP sooner than a physician, the majority of respondents 
indicated that they would choose to see an APP instead of waiting (Dill et al. 2013). Similarly, 
Doan et al. (2012) found that patients tended to favor a physician assistant in a number of scenarios 
in which the waiting time for a physician was longer for a physician than for a physician assistant. 
Furthermore, the proportion of patients preferring to see a physician assistant slightly decreased as 
the difference in waiting times between the two types of providers decreased (Doan et al. 2012). 
Thus, there is evidence suggesting that patients may adjust their provider preferences in favor of 
shorter waiting times. Additionally, studies have shown no differences between physicians and 
APPs with regard to diagnostic accuracy (van der Linden et al. 2010) or patient satisfaction 
(Vallejo et al. 2015, Jeanmonod et al. 2013), suggesting that these providers are highly capable 
and that the patients who do end up seeing an APP are just as satisfied with their care. Additionally, 
our data suggest that at least 50% of patients arriving in any ED are classified as levels 3 through 
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5 on the Emergency Severity Index (ESI) scale, which typically indicates non-life-threatening or 
lower risk symptoms. APP involvement varies widely by facility, with some facilities that do not 
employ APPs to treat ED patients and others that rely on APPs to treat over half of ED patients. 
Thus, it is apparent that APPs have the necessary training and qualifications to treat many ED 
patients. 
While it seems clear that APPs have the potential to affect ED waiting times, there is not a 
standard practice for staffing APPs in EDs. In fact, ACEP (2013) provides guidelines regarding 
the roles of APPs in EDs, but those guidelines indicate that both the scope of practice and degree 
of supervision may vary based on state laws and regulations, guidelines developed by ED medical 
directors, and supervising physicians. We have observed various staffing patterns among EDs with 
similar characteristics and comparable annual patient volumes. Published case studies such as 
Sturmann et al. (1990) are not generalizable to other facilities, and other proposed scheduling tools 
(Myers et al. 2014) focus specifically on Level 1 trauma centers, the hospitals which, according to 
the American Trauma Society (ATS, 2019), are “capable of providing total care for every aspect 
of injury – from prevention through rehabilitation.” Such hospitals often have additional providers 
such as medical students and residents, which makes their situation different from smaller non-
academic facilities with fewer capabilities. For this reason, we have chosen to focus our research 
on medium-sized facilities (40,000 to 60,000 patient visits per year) which do not have a Level 1 
trauma designation. These facilities tend to have fewer resources, yet they must still be prepared 
to treat any patient that arrives in the ED. 
In this research, we propose a systematic data-driven approach to determine the number of 
APPs and physicians to staff in order to reduce patient waiting times and length of stay. Our 
approach incorporates a variety of methodologies, including data mining, simulation, statistics, 
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and machine learning. Our proposed methods take into account the realities of EDs such as known 
trends in ED arrival rates, the stochastic nature of arrivals, and staffing limitations.  
Next, we discuss the existing literature related to our problem. We then outline our research 
framework. Our proposed models are presented, and the data are described. We detail our analyses 
and results. Finally, we discuss our conclusions, including managerial insights and directions for 
future work.  
5.2 Related Literature 
Initially, APPs were introduced to EDs in order to meet the growing demand for emergency 
care, and the proportion of APPs treating patients has continued to rise in recent years (Brown et 
al. 2012). For example, Barata et al (2015) called for the use of nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants in lower-acuity settings during peak hours to improve the flow and care of patients in a 
pediatric ED. Another study showed that adding a physician assistant as a triage liaison provider, 
who assesses the patient before an ED treatment room is available, is beneficial with regard to both 
median length of stay and the proportion of patients who leave without treatment (Nestler et al. 
2012). While the medical community tends to agree that APPs play an important role in improving 
ED operations, the specific roles of APPs can vary. We first examine the literature to find 
commonalities in the ways in which APPs are utilized in EDs. 
Generally, patients seen by APPs are of lower acuity (Brown et al. 2012), and research has 
indicated that APPs treat more low acuity patients per hour and generate more relative value units 
(RVUs) per hour than those generated by emergency medicine resident physicians, while patient 
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satisfaction scores remain similar for the two types of providers (Jeanmonnod et al. 2013). RVUs 
reflect the time and supplies/devices needed from the healthcare workers/facility to care for the 
patient. In a high acuity setting, APPs tend to treat more patients per hour than emergency medicine 
(EM) residents, but they generate fewer RVUs per patient (Hamden et al. 2014).  This indicates 
either that APPs do not document as thoroughly or that APPs tend to treat less sick patients. 
Silberman et al. (2012) found that APPs treated more patients per hour and generated more RVUs 
per hour when staffing a low acuity area compared to a high acuity area. Regardless of the setting, 
it seems clear that APPs typically treat lower acuity patients than their physician counterparts.  
However, hospital characteristics and location may also affect how APPs work. For example, 
Sawyer and Ginde (2014) found that physician assistants who practiced in rural areas tended to 
report a broader scope of practice, greater autonomy, and lower access to physician supervision 
than their urban counterparts. Additionally, Nelson et al. (2016) studied rural EDs in Washington 
state and found that the EDs located in more remote areas were more likely to staff APPs as the 
sole providers, with physicians providing backup. These differences suggest that rural emergency 
departments should be treated differently than those in urban or suburban areas. 
While Jeanmonnod et al. (2013) noted similarities in patient satisfaction scores, Pavlik et al 
(2017) used 72-hour recidivism as an outcome measure and concluded that physician assistants 
and emergency physicians are similar in their management of pediatric patients 6 years or younger. 
Such studies reflect the ability of APPs to treat patients while also maintaining quality of care. 
Furthermore, Horowitz et al. (2009) studied hospital-level performance on ED wait time and visit 
length and found that less than half of hospitals consistently achieved recommended wait times 
and visit length, potentially contributing to an increase in adverse events and an reduction in the 
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quality of care. These results highlight the potential for improvements in ED operations, especially 
with regard to providers. 
Next, we present our research framework, which combines multiple data mining methods and 
simulation to describe the current state of an ED, to predict the effects of changes to the current 
system, and to prescribe an optimal staffing policy for ED providers.  
5.3 Research Framework 
Before addressing our research questions, we must fully understand the current state of EDs. 
We use data from a national EM management network to understand how EDs utilize both 
physicians and APPs. We consider the observed staffing levels of both provider types, differences 
in the types of patient they treat, and differences in operational measures between the two types of 
providers (e.g., patients per hour, patient wait times, patient length of stay, and the proportion of 
patients admitted to the hospital). We use descriptive statistics and data visualization to gain 
insights about ED providers and the patients they treat as well as how they have changed over 
time. The descriptive analyses demonstrate that there is no standard way in which APPs have been 
utilized, and even changes over time have been inconsistent. Most of these analyses are based on 
eight EDs for which complete data for 2014 through 2017 are available. We then use data from 
these eight EDs to predict ED patient arrivals, the assignment of patients to ED providers, and the 
length of stay for discharged patients. The results from the data-driven predictive analyses are 
incorporated into a simulation model for an ED in a medium-sized metropolitan area. After 
replicating the current state of the ED, we use a Taguchi L-27 experimental design (Krishnaiah & 
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Shahabudeen 2012) to simulate both controllable and uncontrollable changes to the ED. Taguchi 
designs are a special case of fractional factorial designs which are used to identify the optimum 
process parameters, and the L-27 design allows us to include up to 13 three-level factors in a 27-
run experiment with an orthogonal design matrix. Using patient LOS as an outcome measure, we 
analyze the experimental results to identify the optimal staffing levels for physicians and APPs in 
the ED. This framework is depicted in Fig. 13.  
 
Figure 13 Research Framework 
 
Figure 13 lists the three dependent variables for which we fit the predictive models. First, we 
consider how the use of APPs affects the time that patients spend in the ED. We specifically 
consider the length of stay for discharged patients because the length of stay for admitted patients 
is influenced by factors beyond the ED’s control such as the availability of inpatient beds. We 
utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test hypotheses regarding the use of APPs in 
  95 
EDs.  The dependent variable is log-transformed discharge visit length (i.e., LOS). Independent 
variables include an APP indicator variable (1 if provider is an APP, 0 otherwise), the number of 
physicians working at a patient’s arrival time, the number of APPs working at a patient’s arrival 
time, and the patient’s ESI Level. We also control for the patient’s age, gender, and insurance 
(payer) as well as the ED census, arrival time (categorized by four-hour half-shifts), and the facility 
in which they arrive. This allows us to estimate the difference in the length of stay for discharged 
patients between patients treated by physicians and those treated by APPs, while controlling for 
patient and facility factors. We can also estimate the effects of adding the two different types of 
providers. In our first specification, we group ESI levels into three groups as previously discussed: 
levels 1 and 2, level 3, or levels 4 and 5. An alternate specification excluded levels 1 and 2 since 
those patients are unlikely to be treated by an APP alone. The model is specified in Eq. (12). 
ln(𝐿𝑂𝑆) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 APP Indicator + 𝛽2 Physician Count + β3 APP Count                                          (12)
+ 𝛽4 Physician Count × APP Indicator + β5 APP Count × APP Indicator
+ ∑ 𝛽6𝑘  ESI Levelk 
3
𝑘=2
 + ∑ 𝛽7𝑘  ESI Levelk × APP Indicator
3
𝑘=2
+ ∑ 𝛽8𝑘  ESI Levelk × Physician Count 
3
𝑘=2
+ ∑ 𝛽9𝑘  ESI Levelk × APP Count 
3
𝑘=2
 
+  ∑ 𝛽10𝑘  Age Groupk 
11
𝑘=2
+ 𝛽11 Male + ∑𝛽12𝑘  Payerk 
5
𝑘=2
+ 𝛽13 ED Census
+ ∑ 𝛽14𝑘  Half Shiftk 
6
𝑘=2
+ ∑ 𝛽15𝑘  Half Shiftk × APP Indicator 
6
𝑘=2
+ ∑ 𝛽16𝑘  Half Shiftk × Physician Count 
6
𝑘=2
+ ∑ 𝛽17𝑘  Half Shiftk × APP Count 
6
𝑘=2
+ ∑ 𝛽18𝑘  Facilityk 
8
𝑘=2
+ 𝜀 
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APPs generally treat lower acuity patients in EDs. Thus, we expect patients treated by APPs to 
require fewer resources in the ED and have a shorter length of stay than those treated by physicians. 
APPs tend to have fewer responsibilities than physicians and treat fewer patients per hour than 
physicians. One possible reason for this may be that APPs experience fewer interruptions while 
treating a patient. Thus, we hypothesize that after controlling for patient characteristics and the 
current state of the ED, the discharge visit length for visits treated by APPs will be shorter than for 
visits treated by physicians: 
H5. The average discharge visit length for visits treated by APPs will be shorter than the 
average discharge length for visits treated by physicians. That is, 𝛽1 < 0. 
It is logical that the length of stay should decrease when more providers are available (either 
physicians or APPs). Thus, we hypothesize that as the number of physicians increases, the average 
discharge visit length will decrease, holding all else constant. Similarly, the average discharge visit 
length will decrease as the number of APPs increases while controlling for other factors. APPs 
who treat lower acuity patients enable physicians to focus their skills on higher acuity patients as 
well as other responsibilities. This should result in a reduction in the average length of stay for all 
discharged patients, regardless of the provider type. However, due to known differences in training 
between physicians and APPs, we expect that adding a physician will have a greater impact on the 
length of stay for discharged patients compared to adding an APP. 
H6. There exists a negative relationship between the number of providers and the length of 
stay (LOS) for discharged visits, and the effect of adding a physician will be greater in 
magnitude than that of adding an APP. Namely, 
a. There exists a negative relationship between the number of physicians and the length 
of stay (LOS) for discharged visits. That is, 𝛽2 < 0. 
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b. There exists a negative relationship between the number of APPs and the LOS for 
discharged visits. That is, 𝛽3 < 0. 
c. The relationship between the number of physicians and the LOS for discharged visits 
will be stronger (i.e., more negative) than that between APPs and LOS. That is, 𝛽2 <
𝛽3 < 0. 
We expect that with more physicians working, all patients will benefit because each additional 
physician increases the ED’s capacity. Consequently, we expect that the gap in length of stay 
between patients treated by physicians and patients treated by APPs will narrow if more physicians 
are working. That is, the interaction terms, APP Indicator × Physician Count will be positive.  
H7. As the number of physicians increases, the average effect of being treated by an APP on 
discharge LOS will be smaller in magnitude (i.e., less negative). That is, while the coefficient 
for APP Indicator is negative (𝛽1 < 0), the coefficient for the interaction term APP Indicator 
× Physician Count will be positive (𝛽4 > 0). 
Furthermore, while we expect an overall negative effect of the APP count on discharge visit length, 
we anticipate that this effect will be most negative for the lowest acuity patients. Since EDs 
prioritize the most severe (or highest acuity) patients, lower acuity patients are most likely to 
experience long wait times and thus longer lengths of stay when waiting to see a physician. The 
availability of APPs to treat lower acuity patients should result in shorter visit lengths. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that the APP Count × ESI Level interaction term will be most 
negative for the ESI level 4 and 5 group: 
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H8. The negative relationship between the APPs count and the length of stay (LOS) for 
discharged visits will become stronger as ESI Level increases (patient’s condition is less 
severe). That is, 𝛽8𝑘 < 0 for all k, and 𝛽8𝑘 decreases as k increases. 
Finally, we expect that the effects of both adding APPs and being treated by an APP will differ by 
time of day. In particular, EDs experience a different patient population during the night shifts. 
For example, fewer patients typically arrive during the night shifts, and the patients tend to be 
sicker. In that case, there should be less need for APPs if patients that arrive during those hours 
and APPs may not be equipped to handle many of the more severe conditions.  Therefore, we 
suspect that the effect of adding an APP will be smaller during the night (11pm to 3am and 3am 
to 7am) compared to the reference shift (7am to 11am), and we hypothesize that the 
APP Count × Shift 11pm to 3am (and the APP Count × Shift 3am to 7am) interaction term will 
be positive: 
H9. The negative relationship between the APPs count and the LOS for discharged visits will 
become weaker (i.e., less negative) for patients arriving during the night shifts. That is, the 
coefficients for the corresponding 𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 × 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 interaction terms will be positive: 
 𝛽17𝑘 > 0 for k=5 and k=6. 
We utilize the insights derived from the descriptive and predictive analyses to design a 
simulated experiment for a single ED. To better inform the experimental settings, we estimate the 
number of hourly visits using a vector generalized linear model. Visits are categorized based on 
Emergency Severity Index (ESI) level, requiring the use of multivariate methods to simultaneously 
estimate the number of hourly visits of each level, and in this case, the dependent variables are 
modeled as a multivariate Poisson distribution. Independent variables include the facility, month 
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of the year, day of the week, time of day (represented by four hour half-shift increments), indicators 
for holidays and the day after a holiday, and the normal high and low temperatures for each given 
date and facility location. We decided to include federal holidays in which most businesses are closed 
as well as the day after each of those holidays after discussions with clinicians. Physicians have observed 
that patient volumes and patient characteristics differ on those days.  Similar to weekends, holidays 
represent time off, and patients will typically put off going to the ED until the following day if possible. 
Then, the day after a holiday is similar to a Monday, and higher patient volumes are observed. For the 
purposes of this analysis, we identified New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor 
Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas as holidays. The model specification is provided in Eq. (13), 
where 𝜼𝒊 = (𝜂1(𝑖) 𝜂2(𝑖) 𝜂3(𝑖))
𝑇 denotes the number of hourly arrivals during time period 𝑖 
which are classified as ESI level 1 or 2, ESI level 3, and ESI level 4 or 5, respectively. We chose 
to group ESI levels in this way after discussion with clinicians suggested that both ESI levels 1 
and 5 are rare. Additionally, it would be highly unusual for an APP to treat an ESI level 1 or 2 
patient without a physician as those represent the highest acuity patients, and many hospitals 
operate with a “Fast Track” and route ESI level 4 and 5 patients, the lowest acuity patients, to an 
APP.  Each coefficient 𝜷𝒌 is a column vector, and dummy variables are used to signify month of the year, 
day of the week, and half shifts (7am – 11am, 11am – 3pm, 3pm – 7pm, 7pm – 11pm, 11pm – 3am, and 
3am – 7am). Additionally, we include dummy variables to indicate federal holidays in which most 
businesses are closed, as well as the day after each of those holidays. Finally, we took into account 
normal weather conditions for a given date since both health conditions and accidental injuries 
may be triggered by weather conditions, such as extreme heat or cold, and associated seasonal 
activities. Specifically, we utilize daily minimum and maximum temperature data collected by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Centers for Environmental 
Information (NCEI).  The arrival rate for category i severity can be expressed as 
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𝜼𝒊  =  𝜷𝟏Facility𝑖  + ∑ 𝜷𝒋
𝟏𝟐
𝒋=𝟐
Month𝑖 + ∑ 𝜷𝒋
𝟏𝟖
𝒋=𝟏𝟑
Day𝑖 + 𝜷𝟏𝟗Holiday𝑖                                                 (13) 
+𝜷𝟐𝟎Day After Holiday𝑖 + ∑ 𝜷𝒋
𝟐𝟓
𝒋=𝟐𝟏
Half Shift𝑖 + 𝜷𝟐𝟔MinTemp𝑖  + 𝜷𝟐𝟕MaxTemp𝑖  
An ED may be able to make better staffing decisions regarding the total number of providers if 
reasonable predictions are available for the number of patients of each severity type that will arrive 
during a given four-hour period of time (or half-shift). However, additional information is 
necessary to better decide on provider type. If patient classes (or ESI levels) and other visit 
characteristics could be used to predict which visits require a physician and which could be treated 
by an APP, management could improve decision-making. We implement various machine learning 
methods to classify visits by required provider type and assess these models. Independent variables 
include patient characteristics (ESI level, patient age group, patient gender, and payer information 
[e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance provider, etc.]) as well as the current state of the ED 
(ED census at the patient’s arrival time, average ESI level of other patients in ED upon the patient’s 
arrival, and the ratio of APPs to physicians working in ED upon a patient’s arrival), the half shift 
in which a patient arrived (i.e., one of the six four-hour time blocks previously described; first half 
shift is 7am to 11am), and the facility. We include the half shift in which a patient arrives in order 
to further account for both different patient characteristics and different staffing patterns 
throughout the day. While a number of models were tested, the logistic regression model is 
specified in Eq. 14, where 𝜋 is the probability that a patient is assigned to an APP.  
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ln (
𝜋
1 − 𝜋
) =  𝛽0 + ∑𝛽1𝑘  ESI Levelk 
3
𝑘=2
 + ∑𝛽2𝑘  Age Groupk 
11
𝑘=2
+ 𝛽3 Male + ∑ 𝛽4𝑘  Payerk 
5
𝑘=2
(14)
+ 𝛽5 ED Census + 𝛽6 Average Severity of Other Patients
+ 𝛽6 APP to Physician Ratio + ∑ 𝛽7𝑘  Half Shiftk 
6
𝑘=2
+ ∑𝛽8𝑘  Facilityk 
8
𝑘=2
+ 𝜀 
By adjusting both controllable and uncontrollable factors in a simulated experiment for a single 
ED, we estimate the effects of changes on visit length. Controllable factors include staffing 
decisions and the assignment of providers to patients, while uncontrollable factors include the 
number of ED visits and patient characteristics. In the next section, we detail these analyses and 
results. 
5.4  Data and Analysis 
Recall that our data are from a large physician-owned emergency medicine management 
organization. This company contracts with hospitals and healthcare systems across the United 
States to manage emergency departments and staff emergency medicine providers. The initial 
database contained detailed data corresponding to over 11.5 million ED visits at 125 EDs between 
August 2011 and December 2017. We excluded all EDs that terminated their relationship with the 
organization before 2017, and further excluded EDs with a large number of missing data fields as 
they didn’t collect the necessary data during the study period. For each year in which an ED is 
included in our sample, we include the following fields: emergency severity index (ESI) of visits, 
the primary provider’s type (physician or APP), and time stamps for the ED arrival times, times 
patients are first seen by a provider, and ED departure times. The resulting database for our analysis 
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is comprised of 4,870,794 ED visits at 49 EDs between 2014 and 2017, with the number of EDs 
varying by year. 
5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 14 shows how the sample of hospitals evolved over time.  
Table 14 Description of ED Sample by Year 
    Year 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 
Yearly Hospital Counts 8 19 33 49 
by Annual Visits 
<20,000 visits 1 2 4 6 
20,000-39,999 visits 3 6 12 20 
40,000-59,999 visits 2 5 9 12 
60,000-79,999 visits 2 6 8 10 
80,0000+ visits 0 0 0 1 
by EM Residency 
Yes 1 4 4 4 
No 7 15 29 45 
by Teaching Hospital 
Yes 2 6 7 7 
No 6 13 26 42 
by Trauma Level 
1 0 1 1 1 
2 1 2 3 3 
3 1 2 2 2 
4 0 0 1 1 
None 6 14 26 42 
by State 
CA 1 1 1 1 
CT 1 1 1 2 
FL 0 0 0 8 
HI 1 2 2 2 
IL 2 2 2 2 
KY 0 0 1 1 
MD 0 0 0 4 
NC 0 1 6 7 
NH 0 1 1 1 
NY 1 1 2 2 
OH 2 4 7 9 
OK 0 2 2 2 
PA 0 4 8 8 
 
Due to the nature of emergency medicine, the characteristics of patient visits vary. Table 15 
describes the visit data. In total, 1,476 emergency medicine providers (894 physicians and 582 
APPs) treated the patients in the sample.  
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Table 16 shows a comparison of visit characteristics between patients treated by a physician 
and patients treated by an APP. Overall, APPs are most likely to treat visits classified as ESI level 
4 and 5; at least 67% (e.g., 61.9% + 5.9% = 67.8% in 2017) of visits treated by APPs each year 
are classified as ESI level 4 or 5 (Table 16). Physicians are most likely to treat visits classified as 
ESI level 3 with at least 50% of visits assigned to physicians classified as ESI level 3 each year 
(Table 16).  The majority of patients are eventually discharged from the ED, regardless of provider 
type, but the admission rate among APPs is significantly lower than the admission rate among 
physicians (difference in proportions = 0.19, p-value < 2.2 × 10−16). Furthermore, the observed 
median LOS among discharged patients treated by APPs is about one hour shorter than discharged 
patients treated by physicians in the same facility during the same year (median difference in LOS 
discharged = 0.98 hours, p-value < 2.2 × 10−16). These data indicate that APPs play an important 
role in treating non-life-threatening conditions and lower risk patients who arrive in an ED.   
We also consider how the staffing of APPs and the work assigned to APPs differs by ED and 
how these have changed over time. Fig. 14 depicts the proportion of visits treated by APPs each 
year from 2014 to 2017 for eight EDs in which we have four continuous years of data. It is evident 
that APP usage varies by both ED and year. For example, some EDs have increased APP usage 
each year, while others have opted not to utilize APPs to treat patients independently of physicians. 
When we take into account the visit’s ESI level, it becomes clear that when EDs do assign APPs 
to patients, the visits assigned to their care are typically classified as ESI levels 4 or 5 (Fig. 14). 
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Table 15 Description of ED Visits by Year 
    Year   
  2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Number of Visits 
                   
381,858  
                
901,048  
            
1,458,409  
            
2,129,479  
   
4,870,794  
% of Yearly Visits 
by ESI Level 
1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 
2 11.6 13.7 13.8 15.7 14.4 
3 44.7 45.7 46.1 49.1 47.2 
4 36.3 34.4 34.8 31.3 33.3 
5 6.6 5.3 4.5 3.0 4.2 
Not Specified 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% of Visits by 
Gender 
Male 44.5 43.8 43.4 43.6 43.7 
Female 55.5 56.2 56.6 56.3 56.3 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% of Visits by 
Disposition 
Admitted 15.6 18.4 17.2 19.5 18.3 
Discharged 80.4 77.8 78.6 76.2 77.5 
Against 
Medical 
Advice 
1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 
Left Without 
Treatment 
0.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Transferred 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 
ED Death 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
DOA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
% of Visits by 
Provider Type 
Physician  86.5 80.2 77.4 69.0 74.9 
APP 11.0 17.9 21.2 28.3 22.9 
Both 2.4 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.4 
None 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.8 
Median Patient Age 39.0 38.0 39.0 41.0 40.0 
Median Patient Waiting Time 
(hours) 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(hours) 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(Admitted) 5.8 4.9 4.6 4.8 4.8 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(Discharged) 
2.5 
2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 
Median Patient RVUs 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
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Table 16 Description of ED Visits by Year and Provider Type 
    Year     
  2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
 Provider Type P A P A P A P A P A 
Number of Visits 330,225  42,028  722,476  161,557  1,128,627  308,599  1,468,376  602,637  3,649,704  1,114,821  
% of 
Yearly 
Visits by 
ESI Level 
1 0.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 
2 13.2 0.5 16.8 0.5 17.5 0.8 20.5 3.9 18.2 2.4 
3 50.3 6.4 54.7 7.5 56.0 10.5 57.7 28.2 55.9 19.5 
4 29.4 82.3 23.9 78.9 22.7 78.1 18.9 61.9 22.0 69.6 
5 6.1 10.8 3.5 13.0 2.9 10.5 1.9 5.9 2.9 8.4 
Not Specified 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% of Visits 
by Gender 
Male 43.9 46.1 43.2 45.5 42.8 44.7 43.5 43.7 43.3 44.3 
Female 56.1 53.9 56.8 54.5 57.2 55.3 56.5 56.3 56.7 55.7 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% of Visits 
by 
Disposition 
Admitted 17.9 0.7 22.5 0.8 21.7 1.4 25.1 6.0 22.9 3.8 
Discharged 77.6 98.6 73.0 98.0 73.3 97.4 69.5 92.2 72.1 94.7 
Against Medical 
Advice 
1.1 0.5 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.7 
Left Without Treatment 0.9 0.1 1.4 0.4 1.7 0.3 1.9 0.5 1.6 0.4 
Transferred 2.2 0.1 1.6 0.1 1.9 0.2 1.9 0.2 1.9 0.2 
ED Death 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 
DOA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Median Patient Age 41 30 41 30 43 30 46 32 44 31 
Median Patient Waiting Time 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.22 
Median Patient Length of Stay (hours) 3.1 2.0 3.3 1.8 3.2 1.9 3.5 2.1 3.3 2.0 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(Admitted) 
5.8 5.5 4.9 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.1 4.8 5.0 
Median Patient Length of Stay 
(Discharged) 
2.6 2.0 2.8 1.8 2.9 1.8 3.0 2.0 2.9 1.9 
Median Patient RVUs 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.3 4.9 3.3 3.6 3.3 
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Figure 14 APP Usage by ESI Level in Eight EDs 
 
  107 
Fig. 15 shows the distribution of APP usage by both ESI level and year for the entire sample. 
Because the sample size is increasing with each year, the variability in the proportion of visits 
assigned to APPs tends to increase over time, but we also see that the median level of APP usage 
also tends to increase over time. Furthermore, we see that ESI levels 4 and 5 are most likely to be 
treated by APPs.  
 
Figure 15 APP Usage by ESI Level and Year 
We suspected that the change in the proportion of visits assigned to APPs was partially due to 
changes in staffing decisions over time. Fig. 16 plots the median staffing levels of physicians and 
APPs by the hour of the week (Sunday 12am = hour 0) for each year for a single non-academic 
ED which sees 40,000 to 60,000 visits annually. Over time, this ED has made some changes to its 
staffing patterns with respect to both physicians and APPs. For example, the median number of 
physicians working on Mondays at 4pm has decreased from four to two, a 50% reduction in the 
number of physicians. At the same time, the median number of APPs working on Mondays at 4pm 
has increased from two to three. After examining this graph, we considered the proportion of hours 
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during each year in which this ED staffed more physicians than APPs. Fig. 17 shows that this 
proportion decreased each year between 2014 (95.8%) and 2017 (31.7%), and the proportion of 
visits treated by physicians also steadily declined during the same period. Furthermore, we 
examined the minimum, median, and maximum number of patient arrivals by hour of the week 
(Fig. 18) and ESI level (Fig. 19) to determine if the patient population was changing from year to 
year, but found that the arrival patterns remained consistent over time. Plotting the proportion of 
ED arrivals classified as ESI levels 4 and 5 and the proportion of ED visits treated by APPs in Fig. 
20, we can see that the proportion of visits assigned to APPs has increased since 2014, while the 
proportion of visits classified as ESI levels 4 and 5 has remained relatively stable.  
 
Figure 16 Median Physician and APP Staffing in an ED by Hour of Week (2014-2017) 
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Figure 17 Physician and APP Staffing Trends (2014-2017) 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Number of ED Patient Arrivals by Hour of Week 
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Figure 19 Number of ED Patient Arrivals by ESI Level and Hour of Week 
 
  
Figure 20 Characteristics of ED Patient Arrivals by Hour of Week 
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It is clear that this ED’s staffing patterns and scheduling practices have evolved over time, but 
we have not yet examined how this may affect operational characteristics such as waiting times 
and patient length of stay (LOS) for discharged patients. Before controlling for visit level factors, 
we find that average and median LOS for discharged patients were both significantly lower in 
2014 compared to each of the subsequent years. Similarly, the average and median waiting times 
for discharged patients were lowest in 2014. This observation may be due to a number of reasons 
including changes in the patient population, changes to provider staffing, or unobservable changes 
to the way the facility operates (e.g. nursing staff or policy changes). We consider both median 
LOS and median wait times for discharged patients by hour of the week in Fig. 21 and 22. In 
addition to the overall median LOS, we consider the medians for ESI level 3 visits and ESI level 
4 visits separately as these two groups cover over 80% of the discharged patients treated each year. 
The graphs indicate that there are time trends in both LOS and wait times. First, we notice that 
within each day, the median LOS is typically highest for patients arriving overnight (specifically, 
between 1am and 4am), with some variability by year. We do note that this result could be due to 
a lack of resources to safely discharge patients until the morning. Then, we observe that the median 
waiting times tend to be higher during afternoons and evenings, and the variability in waiting times 
appears to have increased between 2014 and 2017. This is especially true for ESI level 3 visits, 
which, we previously observed, are predominantly treated by physicians. To investigate these time 
trends, we separated the ESI level 3 visits by provider, but since there are hours when APPs are 
not present in the ED and thus not treating patients, we limited the sample further to visits between 
noon and midnight. 
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Figure 21 Median Visit Length for Discharged ED Patients by Hour of Week 
 
 
 
Figure 22 Median Waiting Time for Discharged ED Patients by Hour of Week 
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After controlling for patient characteristics (age, gender, and ESI level), temporal factors (day 
of the week and hour of the day), and the operational state of the ED during the hour of arrival 
(number of new arrivals, the average ESI level of new arrivals, the number of patients who arrived 
in previous periods, the average ESI level of patients arriving in previous periods, and the total 
number of providers working), we still find that the average LOS and average waiting times for 
discharged patients were lowest in 2014. However, we do find that, after controlling for these same 
factors, patients treated by physicians who are eventually discharged only wait slightly longer than 
those treated by APPs on average (difference in means = 0.01 hours, p-value =6.77 × 10−8), but 
their LOS is 0.97 hours longer on average (p-value < 2.2 × 10−16). We acknowledge that this 
result may be caused by underlying patient comorbidities that are not captured by the ESI Level 
alone.  
While we have shown one ED which has made staffing and scheduling changes over time, other 
EDs have maintained similar scheduling practices throughout the study period. For example, one 
non-academic ED, which treats 60,000 to 80,000 visits annually and is a Level 2 trauma center, 
has continued to utilize only physicians to treat patients. Another ED that sees 20,000 to 40,000 
visits per year has consistently relied on similar numbers of physicians (1 to 2) and APPs (0 to 2) 
to treat patients during each of the four years observed, but this ED also has an emergency medicine 
residency program, which likely provides additional resources. While we note differences in the 
characteristics of the observed facilities, these observations demonstrate that there is not a standard 
way in which EDs utilize APPs to treat patients. In fact, ACEP (2013) acknowledges that multiple 
staffing models that utilize APPs exist and states that ED medical directors are responsible for 
choosing “the most appropriate staffing model to achieve operational efficiency, while maintaining 
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clinical quality.” Thus, we aim to provide a framework to systematically determine a more 
effective staffing pattern.  
5.4.2 Predictive Analysis 
In order to better inform decisions, we consider predictive models to predict visit characteristics 
based on patient, physician, facility, and temporal factors. We utilize emergency severity index 
(ESI) levels to differentiate visits into three categories. The highest acuity patients are assigned to 
ESI levels 1 or 2, while the lowest acuity patients are assigned to ESI levels 4 or 5.  For each of 
the following predictive models, data from 2014 through 2016 are used to train the model, and the 
test set consists of the 2017 data. 
We first use visit characteristics as well as provider type and the current state of the ED to 
predict the length of stay for discharged patients. We limit this analysis to discharged patients 
because the length of stay for admitted is influenced by factors beyond the ED’s control such as 
the availability of inpatient beds. Table 17 summarizes the results of six regression models, and 
Table 18 reports the results when ESI Levels 1 and 2 are excluded since it is rare for an APP to 
treat those patients. In all twelve cases, we observe a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for Provider Type APP, suggesting that visit length is shorter for visits treated by APPs 
when compared to those treated by physicians when controlling for patient and ED related factors. 
This provides strong supports for H5. Namely, the coefficient from the initial model in Table 17 
(Model A) suggests that discharged patients who are treated by APPs have shorter ED stays than 
those treated by physicians on average (𝛽1 = −0.0767). Exponentiating this value, we estimate 
that the average LOS for discharged patients treated by APPs is 0.93 times the LOS for discharged 
patients treated by physicians, after controlling for both patient and ED factors. When we limit the 
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analysis to ESI Levels 1 through 3, the result is equivalent (𝛽1 = −0.0774, exp(β1) = 0.9255). 
While we note that this observation may result from unobserved differences in the patients between 
the two provider types (e.g., APPs may be assigned to “easier” within each ESI level), we have 
controlled for differences in patient demographics, severity, time of arrival, and the current ED 
conditions. 
Next, we test our hypothesis H6 which considers the effects of adding providers. In each of the 
six models reported in Table 17, the coefficients for Physician Count and APP Count are both 
negative and statistically significant. This suggests support for H6 (a) and (b). All six models 
reported in Table 18, also show that the coefficient for APP Count is negative and statistically 
significant, further supporting H6 (b). However, the full model reported in Table 18 (Model F) 
suggests that after controlling for patient characteristics, time of day, and current ED conditions, 
the Physician Count coefficient is not significantly different from zero. That is, adding a physician 
may not effectively reduce the LOS for an ESI level 3 patient who arrives between 7am and 11am 
and is treated by a physician (our base case), but significant interaction terms suggest the effects 
of adding a physician are dependent on patient severity and time of arrival. Thus, our models 
largely support H6 (a) and (b) and suggest that adding a provider (either a physician or APP) is 
associated with shorter LOS for discharged patients. The estimates provided in column A of Table 
17 suggest that the average LOS is reduced by a factor of 0.93 [= exp (𝛽2) = exp (−0.0721)] for 
each additional physician, holding all else constant, while the average LOS is reduced by a factor 
of 0.98 [= exp (𝛽3) = exp (−0.0244)] for each additional APP. This result is similar when the 
analysis is limited to lower acuity patients (Table 18: 𝛽2 = −0.0762 and 𝛽3 = −0.0762). 
Additionally, the 95% confidence intervals for 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 suggest that the effect of adding a 
physician is stronger than the effect of adding an APP. Thus, we also find support for H6 (c). 
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In the second model (Table 17, Model B), we test how the effect of being treated by an APP 
may change with additional providers. The interactions, APP Indicator × Physician Count and APP 
Indicator × APP Count are both positive and statistically significant (𝛽4 = 0.0049 and 𝛽5 =
0.0393). This supports the idea that the effect of being treated by an APP diminishes as the number 
of providers increases, our hypothesis, H7. Alternatively, these positive interaction terms mean 
that the marginal effect on LOS of adding a provider (either an APP or a physician) is greater in 
magnitude (i.e., more negative) for patients who are treated by physicians compared to those 
treated by APPs. These results also hold when the analysis is limited lower acuity patients (Table 
18, Model B: 𝛽4 = 0.0056 and 𝛽5 = 0.0376).  
The third and fourth models (Table 17, Models C and D) test whether or not our previous results 
differ based on patient severity (ESI Level). In Model C, we see that the effect of being treated by 
an APP is lower in magnitude for ESI Level 4 and 5 patients compared to ESI Level 1 and 2 
patients (𝛽73 = 0.2129), but we know from the descriptive analysis that it’s rare for an APP to treat 
an ESI Level 1 or 2 patient. Thus, we refer to Table 18 for the comparison between Level 3 and 
Level 4 or 5 and find that the effect of being treated by an APP is actually stronger (i.e., more 
negative) among ESI Level 4 and 5 patients (𝛽73 = 0.1723). In the previous section, we presented 
descriptive statistics that indicated that several EDs have been increasing their usage of APPs in 
the past several years, especially with regard to ESI Level 4 and 5 patients, and this result confirms 
that such policy changes are associated with shorter discharge LOS.  
We further consider how the number of providers impacts different patients in Model D. First 
we consider the interaction between Physician Count and ESI Level. The positive and significant 
coefficient for Physician Count × ESI Level 3 (𝛽82 = 0.0443) suggests that the impact of adding a 
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physician is greater for ESI Level 1 and 2 patients than for ESI Level 3 patients. That is, ESI Level 
1 and 2 patients will see a larger reduction in discharged LOS, after controlling for the patient’s 
age, gender, and insurance, the number of APPs working, the ED census, the half-shift of arrival, 
and the facility. The negative and significant coefficient for Physician Count × ESI Level 4 or 5 
(𝛽83 =-0.0522) suggests that the lowest acuity patients see the greatest benefit from additional 
physicians. When we limit the analysis to ESI Levels 3 through 5, it is clear that ESI Level 4 and 
5 patients experience a greater reduction in LOS when a physician is added in comparison to Level 
3 patients (𝛽83 = −0.0966).  
We next consider the interaction between APP Count and ESI Level. The coefficient for APP 
Count × ESI Level 3 is not significantly different from zero (𝛽93 = 0.0003), which indicates the 
effect of adding an APP is similar for ESI Level 1 and 2 patients and ESI Level 3 patients. The 
positive and significant coefficient for APP Count × ESI Level 4 or 5 (𝛽93 = 0.0413) suggests that 
the lowest acuity patients see the least benefit from additional APPs. This result holds when co 
ESI Levels 3 through 5 (𝛽93 = 0.0410), and thus we do not find support for H8.  
Finally, we consider differences based on a patient’s arrival time. We observe that the difference 
in average discharge LOS between patients treated by APPs and patients treated by physicians was 
greatest between the hours of 11pm and 3am (𝛽155 = −0.1296). The smallest difference between 
the two groups was observed between 3am and 7am (𝛽156 = 0.2969), with all four-hour time 
periods differing significantly from the reference group (7am to 11am). Similar results are seen in 
Table 18 when the most acute patients are excluded from the analysis. We also observe that the 
effects of adding providers differ by time of day. Namely, adding a physician is associated with 
significantly shorter LOS between the hours of 11am and 11pm when compared to the reference 
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group (7am to 11am), while the most beneficial times to add an APP are between 7am and 11am 
or 7pm and 11pm. The results are similar when limited to lower acuity patients. However, the 
results do not fully support H9 as the negative relationship between the APP count and the LOS 
for discharged visits becomes weaker for patients arriving between 11pm and 3am (𝛽175 = 0.0322), 
but the coefficient for the 3am to 7am time period (𝛽176 = 0.0015) is not statistically significant. 
This is also true of the results presented in Table 18 ( 𝛽175 = 0.0356 and  𝛽176 = −0.0114).  
These results highlight that ED staffing decisions should depend on the time of day as well as 
the expected patient population. If visit lengths are too long and management is considering adding 
a provider, physicians will generally be more effective than APPs. However, physicians are also a 
more costly resource, so management should carefully consider the costs and benefits.  
Furthermore, the benefits of adding providers vary by both patient severity and time of day. For 
instance, our analyses indicate that physicians will have the biggest impact on LOS between 11am 
and 11pm, while APPs have the greatest potential between 7am and 11am and 7pm and 11pm. 
This suggests that it makes most sense to add a physician between the hours of 11am and 7pm, 
one of the busiest time periods of the day for most EDs, but the decision is less clear for other time 
periods.   
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Table 17 Predicting Discharge Visit Length 
Dependent Variable: ln(LOS) (Discharge Visits Only)  
   A  B  C  D  E  F 
 Variable Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std 
Error   Error   Error   Error   Error   Error 
 (Constant) 1.1890 *** 0.0041  1.2100 *** 0.0042 
 1.1930 *** 0.0041  1.1956 *** 0.0066  1.1550 *** 0.0061 
 1.1500 *** 0.0080 
 APP Indicator -0.0767 *** 0.0018  -0.1480 *** 0.0044 
 -0.2653 *** 0.0213  -0.0670 *** 0.0018  -0.1236 *** 0.0038 
 -0.4636 *** 0.0217 
 Physician Count -0.0721 *** 0.0010  -0.0730 *** 0.0011 
 -0.0720 *** 0.0010  -0.0637 *** 0.0023  -0.0465 *** 0.0025 
 -0.0338 *** 0.0032 
 APP Count -0.0244 *** 0.0009  -0.0373 *** 0.0010 
 -0.0241 *** 0.0009  -0.0458 *** 0.0018  -0.0345 *** 0.0027 
 -0.0486 *** 0.0031 
 APP Indicator × Physician Count     0.0049 ** 0.0015 
 
    
 
      
 0.0623 *** 0.0019 
 APP Indicator × APP Count     0.0393 *** 0.0011             
 0.0196 *** 0.0015                        
 ESI Level 1 or 2 (reference)                        
 ESI Level 3 -0.2258 *** 0.0024  -0.2265 *** 0.0024  -0.2231 *** 0.0024  -0.3292 *** 0.0063  -0.2253 *** 0.0024 
 -0.3102 *** 0.0063 
 ESI Level 4 or 5 -0.8207 *** 0.0025  -0.8231 *** 0.0025  -0.8333 *** 0.0025  -0.7494 *** 0.0063  -0.8208 *** 0.0025 
 -0.6796 *** 0.0065                          
 APP Indicator × ESI Level 3         0.0395  0.0218         
 0.0485 * 0.0217 
 APP Indicator × ESI Level 4 or 5         0.2129 *** 0.0213         
 0.2209 *** 0.0213                          
 Physician Count × ESI Level 3             0.0443 *** 0.0024     
 0.0388 *** 0.0024 
 Physician Count × ESI Level 4 or 5             -0.0522 *** 0.0023     
 -0.0812 *** 0.0025                          
 APP Count × ESI Level 3             0.0003  0.0018     
 -0.0002  0.0018 
 APP Count × ESI Level 4 or 5             0.0413 *** 0.0018      0.0259 *** 0.0020                          
 APP Indicator × Shift 11am-3pm                 0.0722 *** 0.0047 
 0.0432 *** 0.0050 
 APP Indicator × Shift 3pm-7pm                 0.0845 *** 0.0046 
 0.0435 *** 0.0051 
 APP Indicator × Shift 7pm-11pm                 0.0578 *** 0.0049 
 0.0192 *** 0.0053 
 APP Indicator × Shift 11pm-3am                 -0.1296 *** 0.0072 
 -0.1439 *** 0.0072 
 APP Indicator × Shift 3am-7am         
 
       0.2969 *** 0.0188 
 0.3239 *** 0.0188                          
 Physician Count × Shift 11am-3pm         
 
   
 
   -0.0329 *** 0.0027 
 -0.0377 *** 0.0027 
 Physician Count × Shift 3pm-7pm         
 
   
 
   -0.0358 *** 0.0026 
 -0.0388 *** 0.0026 
 Physician Count × Shift 7pm-11pm         
 
   
 
   -0.0312 *** 0.0026 
 -0.0364 *** 0.0026 
 Physician Count × Shift 11pm-3am         
 
   
 
   0.0004  0.0036 
 -0.0002  0.0035 
 Physician Count × Shift 3am-7am         
 
   
 
   0.1020 *** 0.0055 
 0.1077 *** 0.0054                          
 APP Count × Shift 11am-3pm         
 
   
 
   0.0105 *** 0.0027 
 0.0064 * 0.0027 
 APP Count × Shift 3pm-7pm         
 
   
 
   0.0169 *** 0.0026 
 0.0118 *** 0.0026 
 APP Count × Shift 7pm-11pm         
 
   
 
   -0.0006  0.0027 
 -0.0048 . 0.0027 
 APP Count × Shift 11pm-3am         
 
   
 
   0.0322 *** 0.0035 
 0.0335 *** 0.0035 
 APP Count × Shift 3am-7am         
 
 
 
 
 
   0.0015  0.0154 
 0.0081  0.0153                        
 0 to 3 months -0.0961 *** 0.0049  -0.0953 *** 0.0049  -0.0943 *** 0.0049 
 -0.0993 *** 0.0049  -0.0965 *** 0.0049  -0.0962 *** 0.0049 
 4 to 36 months -0.0961 *** 0.0036  -0.0963 *** 0.0036  -0.0949 *** 0.0036  -0.0980 *** 0.0036  -0.0963 *** 0.0036 
 -0.0964 *** 0.0036 
 3 to 8 years -0.0971 *** 0.0028  -0.0970 *** 0.0028  -0.0965 *** 0.0028  -0.0982 *** 0.0028  -0.0973 *** 0.0028 
 -0.0975 *** 0.0028 
 9 to 17 years -0.0348 *** 0.0024  -0.0345 *** 0.0024  -0.0349 *** 0.0024  -0.0334 *** 0.0024  -0.0354 *** 0.0024 
 -0.0335 *** 0.0024 
 18 to 34 years (reference)                        
 35 to 44 years 0.0505 *** 0.0019  0.0504 *** 0.0019  0.0501 *** 0.0019  0.0506 *** 0.0019  0.0505 *** 0.0019 
 0.0500 *** 0.0019 
 45 to 54 years 0.0881 *** 0.0020  0.0880 *** 0.0020  0.0873 *** 0.0020  0.0881 *** 0.0020  0.0880 *** 0.0020 
 0.0870 *** 0.0019 
 55 to 64 years 0.1061 *** 0.0022  0.1061 *** 0.0022  0.1051 *** 0.0022  0.1061 *** 0.0022  0.1060 *** 0.0022 
 0.1046 *** 0.0022 
 65 to 74 years 0.0965 *** 0.0032  0.0962 *** 0.0032  0.0954 *** 0.0032  0.0968 *** 0.0032  0.0966 *** 0.0032 
 0.0954 *** 0.0032 
 75 to 84 years 0.1296 *** 0.0037  0.1293 *** 0.0037  0.1282 *** 0.0037  0.1300 *** 0.0037  0.1300 *** 0.0037 
 0.1284 *** 0.0037 
 85 years plus 0.1825 *** 0.0043  0.1818 *** 0.0043  0.1809 *** 0.0043  0.1815 *** 0.0042  0.1828 *** 0.0043 
 0.1793 *** 0.0042                          
 Male Indicator -0.0372 *** 0.0012  -0.0377 *** 0.0012  -0.0375 *** 0.0012  -0.0377 *** 0.0012  -0.0374 *** 0.0012 
 -0.0383 *** 0.0012                          
 Commercial Insurance (reference)     
 
   
 
   
 
          
 Medicaid 0.0016  0.0016  0.0019  0.0016  0.0017  0.0016  0.0002  0.0016  0.0017  0.0016 
 0.0010  0.0016 
 Medicare 0.0648 *** 0.0025  0.0650 *** 0.0025  0.0645 *** 0.0025  0.0635 *** 0.0025  0.0649 *** 0.0025 
 0.0635 *** 0.0024 
 Self-Pay -0.0215 *** 0.0025  -0.0038  0.0022  -0.0031  0.0022  -0.0054 * 0.0022  -0.0036  0.0022 
 -0.0053 * 0.0022 
 Other -0.0033  0.0022  -0.0212 *** 0.0025  -0.0214 *** 0.0025  -0.0180 *** 0.0025  -0.0224 *** 0.0025 
 -0.0192 *** 0.0025                          
 ED Census 0.0133 *** 0.0001  0.0133 *** 0.0001 
 0.0133 *** 0.0001  0.0134 *** 0.0001  0.0136 *** 0.0001 
 0.0136 *** 0.0001                          
 Shift 7am-11am (reference)     
  
 
 
    
 
   
 
   
 
  
 Shift 11am-3pm 0.0351 *** 0.0022  0.0381 *** 0.0022 
 0.0345 *** 0.0022  0.0332 *** 0.0022  0.0747 *** 0.0060  0.0925 *** 0.0060 
 Shift 3pm-7pm 0.0506 *** 0.0024  0.0539 *** 0.0024  0.0495 *** 0.0024 
 0.0486 *** 0.0024  0.0843 *** 0.0059  0.1007 *** 0.0059 
 Shift 7pm-11pm 0.1010 *** 0.0023  0.1022 *** 0.0023 
 0.0991 *** 0.0023  0.0981 *** 0.0023  0.1556 *** 0.0058  0.1716 *** 0.0058 
 Shift 11pm-3am 0.1152 *** 0.0024  0.1126 *** 0.0024 
 0.1147 *** 0.0024  0.1159 *** 0.0024  0.1044 *** 0.0068  0.1041 *** 0.0068 
 Shift 3am-7am 0.0708 *** 0.0030  0.0583 *** 0.0030 
 0.0712 *** 0.0030  0.0743 *** 0.0030  -0.0795 *** 0.0086  -0.0886 *** 0.0086                          
 Facility 1 (reference)      
   
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
 Facility 2 -0.1631 *** 0.0025  -0.1693 *** 0.0025  -0.1605 *** 0.0025  -0.1605 *** 0.0025  -0.1592 *** 0.0025 
 -0.1629 *** 0.0025 
 Facility 3 0.1137 *** 0.0030  0.1102 *** 0.0030  0.1147 *** 0.0030  0.1154 *** 0.0030  0.1123 *** 0.0030 
 0.1144 *** 0.0030 
 Facility 4 0.0371 *** 0.0029  0.0315 *** 0.0029  0.0400 *** 0.0029  0.0441 *** 0.0029  0.0434 *** 0.0029 
 0.0442 *** 0.0029 
 Facility 5 -0.0493 *** 0.0029  -0.0516 *** 0.0029  -0.0463 *** 0.0029  -0.0418 *** 0.0029  -0.0436 *** 0.0029 
 -0.0421 *** 0.0029 
 Facility 6 -0.3245 *** 0.0031  -0.3269 *** 0.0031  -0.3268 *** 0.0031  -0.3283 *** 0.0031  -0.3332 *** 0.0032 
 -0.3412 *** 0.0032 
 Facility 7 -0.0205 *** 0.0041  -0.0344 *** 0.0041  -0.0175 *** 0.0041  -0.0255 *** 0.0041  -0.0187 *** 0.0041 
 -0.0463 *** 0.0042 
 Facility 8 0.0517 *** 0.0022  0.0471 *** 0.0022  0.0469 *** 0.0022  0.0503 *** 0.0022  0.0455 *** 0.0023 
 0.0299 *** 0.0023                          
  R2 35.63%   35.73%   35.73%   36.08%   35.82%   36.50% 
  Adjusted R2 35.63%   35.73%   35.73%   36.08%   35.82%   36.50% 
 ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; two-tailed tests         
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Table 18 Predicting Discharge Visit Length (ESI Levels 1 and 2 Excluded) 
Dependent Variable: ln(LOS) (Discharge Visits Only)  
   A  B  C  D  E  F 
 Variable Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std  
Coeff 
Std 
Error   Error   Error   Error   Error   Error 
 (Constant) 0.9435 *** 0.0037  0.9650 *** 0.0039  0.9498 *** 0.0037  0.8465 *** 0.0040  0.9066 *** 0.0059  0.8159 *** 0.0060 
 APP Indicator -0.0774 *** 0.0018  -0.1473 *** 0.0044  -0.2267 *** 0.0046  -0.0665 *** 0.0018  -0.1223 *** 0.0038  -0.4159 *** 0.0066 
 Physician Count -0.0762 *** 0.0011  -0.0773 *** 0.0012  -0.0762 *** 0.0011  -0.0225 *** 0.0013  -0.0491 *** 0.0025  0.0036  0.0026 
 APP Count -0.0262 *** 0.0009  -0.0396 *** 0.0010  -0.0259 *** 0.0009  -0.0494 *** 0.0011  -0.0352 *** 0.0027  -0.0505 *** 0.0028 
 APP Indicator × Physician Count     0.0056 *** 0.0015              0.0637 *** 0.0019 
 APP Indicator × APP Count     0.0376 *** 0.0011              0.0191 *** 0.0014 
 ESI Level 3 (reference)                        
 ESI Level 4 or 5 -0.5933 *** 0.0014  -0.5952 *** 0.0014  -0.6081 *** 0.0015  -0.4187 *** 0.0032  -0.5940 *** 0.0014  -0.3674 *** 0.0034 
 APP Indicator × ESI Level 4 or 5         0.1722 *** 0.0049          0.1708 *** 0.0050 
 Physician Count × ESI Level 4 or 5             -0.0966 *** 0.0013      -0.1204 *** 0.0015 
 APP Count × ESI Level 4 or 5             0.0410 *** 0.0011      0.0267 *** 0.0013 
 APP Indicator × Shift 11am-3pm                 0.0693 *** 0.0047  0.0401 *** 0.0050 
 APP Indicator × Shift 3pm-7pm                 0.0827 *** 0.0047  0.0417 *** 0.0051 
 APP Indicator × Shift 7pm-11pm                 0.0556 *** 0.0049  0.0180 *** 0.0053 
 APP Indicator × Shift 11pm-3am                 -0.1291 *** 0.0072  -0.1434 *** 0.0072 
 APP Indicator × Shift 3am-7am                 0.3028 *** 0.0187  0.3298 *** 0.0186 
 Physician Count × Shift 11am-3pm                 -0.0342 *** 0.0027  -0.0395 *** 0.0027 
 Physician Count × Shift 3pm-7pm                 -0.0383 *** 0.0027  -0.0416 *** 0.0027 
 Physician Count × Shift 7pm-11pm                 -0.0328 *** 0.0027  -0.0385 *** 0.0027 
 Physician Count × Shift 11pm-3am                 -0.0002  0.0037  -0.0009  0.0037 
 Physician Count × Shift 3am-7am                 0.1063 *** 0.0057  0.1127 *** 0.0056 
 APP Count × Shift 11am-3pm                 0.0093 *** 0.0028  0.0045  0.0028 
 APP Count × Shift 3pm-7pm                 0.0159 *** 0.0027  0.0098 *** 0.0027 
 APP Count × Shift 7pm-11pm                 -0.0014  0.0028  -0.0065 * 0.0028 
 APP Count × Shift 11pm-3am                 0.0356 *** 0.0037  0.0366 *** 0.0036 
 APP Count × Shift 3am-7am                 -0.0114  0.0159  -0.0046  0.0158 
 0 to 3 months -0.0828 *** 0.0049  -0.0819 *** 0.0049  -0.0811 *** 0.0049  -0.0859 *** 0.0049  -0.0832 *** 0.0049  -0.0828 *** 0.0049 
 4 to 36 months -0.0826 *** 0.0036  -0.0828 *** 0.0036  -0.0815 *** 0.0036  -0.0844 *** 0.0036  -0.0828 *** 0.0036  -0.0829 *** 0.0036 
 3 to 8 years -0.0877 *** 0.0028  -0.0877 *** 0.0028  -0.0873 *** 0.0028  -0.0889 *** 0.0028  -0.0879 *** 0.0028  -0.0882 *** 0.0028 
 9 to 17 years -0.0362 *** 0.0024  -0.0360 *** 0.0024  -0.0363 *** 0.0024  -0.0350 *** 0.0024  -0.0368 *** 0.0024  -0.0350 *** 0.0024 
 18 to 34 years (reference)                        
 35 to 44 years 0.0523 *** 0.0020  0.0521 *** 0.0020  0.0518 *** 0.0020  0.0523 *** 0.0020  0.0523 *** 0.0020  0.0516 *** 0.0019 
 45 to 54 years 0.0890 *** 0.0020  0.0888 *** 0.0020  0.0882 *** 0.0020  0.0889 *** 0.0020  0.0890 *** 0.0020  0.0878 *** 0.0020 
 55 to 64 years 0.1104 *** 0.0023  0.1103 *** 0.0023  0.1093 *** 0.0023  0.1101 *** 0.0023  0.1103 *** 0.0023  0.1086 *** 0.0023 
 65 to 74 years 0.1125 *** 0.0034  0.1121 *** 0.0034  0.1112 *** 0.0034  0.1127 *** 0.0033  0.1126 *** 0.0033  0.1113 *** 0.0033 
 75 to 84 years 0.1515 *** 0.0039  0.1512 *** 0.0039  0.1500  0.0039  0.1520 *** 0.0039  0.1521 *** 0.0039  0.1504 *** 0.0039 
 85 years plus 0.2046 *** 0.0045  0.2040 *** 0.0045  0.2028 *** 0.0045  0.2036 *** 0.0044  0.2051 *** 0.0045  0.2013 *** 0.0044 
 Male Indicator -0.0416 *** 0.0012  -0.0421 *** 0.0012  -0.0419 *** 0.0012  -0.0422 *** 0.0012  -0.0419 *** 0.0012  -0.0428 *** 0.0012 
 Commercial Insurance (reference)                        
 Medicaid -0.0090 *** 0.0017  -0.0087 *** 0.0017  -0.0088 *** 0.0017  -0.0105 *** 0.0016  -0.0089 *** 0.0017  -0.0096 *** 0.0016 
 Medicare 0.0546 *** 0.0026  0.0547 *** 0.0026  0.0544 *** 0.0026  0.0529 *** 0.0026  0.0547 *** 0.0026  0.0528 *** 0.0026 
 Self-Pay -0.0106 *** 0.0023  -0.0110 *** 0.0023  -0.0103 *** 0.0023  -0.0128 *** 0.0023  -0.0108 *** 0.0023  -0.0125 *** 0.0023 
 Other -0.0233 *** 0.0025  -0.0232 *** 0.0025  -0.0233 *** 0.0025  -0.0198 *** 0.0025  -0.0243 *** 0.0025  -0.0212 *** 0.0025 
 ED Census 0.0141 *** 0.0001  0.0141 *** 0.0001  0.0141 *** 0.0001  0.0141 *** 0.0001  0.0143 *** 0.0001  0.0144 *** 0.0001 
 Shift 7am-11am (reference)                        
 Shift 11am-3pm 0.0368 *** 0.0023  0.0401 *** 0.0023  0.0364 *** 0.0023  0.0348 *** 0.0023  0.0785 *** 0.0061  0.0980 *** 0.0061 
 Shift 3pm-7pm 0.0512 *** 0.0024  0.0546 *** 0.0024  0.0501 *** 0.0024  0.0490 *** 0.0024  0.0894 *** 0.0060  0.1075 *** 0.0061 
 Shift 7pm-11pm 0.1029 *** 0.0023  0.1042 *** 0.0023  0.1011 *** 0.0023  0.0998 *** 0.0023  0.1596 *** 0.0059  0.1775 *** 0.0060 
 Shift 11pm-3am 0.1154 *** 0.0025  0.1128 *** 0.0025  0.1149 *** 0.0025  0.1164 *** 0.0025  0.1046 *** 0.0070  0.1046 *** 0.0069 
 Shift 3am-7am 0.0700 *** 0.0031  0.0570 *** 0.0031  0.0705 *** 0.0031  0.0742 *** 0.0030  -0.0836 *** 0.0089  -0.0935 *** 0.0088 
 Facility 1 (reference)                        
 Facility 2 0.0020  0.0042  -0.0128 * 0.0042  0.0047  0.0042  -0.0032  0.0041  0.0043  0.0042  -0.0246 *** 0.0042 
 Facility 3 0.0692 *** 0.0023  0.0641 *** 0.0023  0.0643 *** 0.0023  0.0678 *** 0.0023  0.0624 *** 0.0024  0.0456 *** 0.0024 
 Facility 4 -0.1499 *** 0.0025  -0.1564 *** 0.0025  -0.1476 *** 0.0025  -0.1469 *** 0.0025  -0.1456 *** 0.0025  -0.1499 *** 0.0025 
 Facility 5 0.1433 *** 0.0031  0.1396 *** 0.0031  0.1444 *** 0.0031  0.1454 *** 0.0031  0.1422 *** 0.0031  0.1447 *** 0.0031 
 Facility 6 0.0646 *** 0.0030  0.0587 *** 0.0030  0.0675 *** 0.0030  0.0728 *** 0.0030  0.0715 *** 0.0031  0.0722 *** 0.0031 
 Facility 7 -0.0356 *** 0.0029  -0.0383 *** 0.0030  -0.0328 *** 0.0029  -0.0270 *** 0.0029  -0.0295 *** 0.0030  -0.0277 *** 0.0030 
 Facility 8 -0.3382 *** 0.0033  -0.3404 *** 0.0033  -0.3405 *** 0.0033  -0.3414 *** 0.0033  -0.3461 *** 0.0033  -0.3537 *** 0.0033                          
  R2 33.52%   33.62%   33.62%   34.02%   33.73%   34.49% 
  Adjusted R2 33.52%   33.62%   33.62%   34.02%   33.73%   34.49% 
 ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; two-tailed tests         
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Next, we fit a model to predict the numbers of arrivals of each ESI level during a given time 
period. Due to our previous observations and the low probability of Level 1 and Level 5 patients, 
we grouped ESI levels 1 and 2 together, and we also combined ESI Levels 4 and 5. In order to 
simultaneously estimate the number of hourly visits of each level, we use a vector generalized 
linear model (Eq. (13)). Since the number of arrivals during a given hour is a count, we model 
these counts using a Poisson distribution. Control variables include the facility, month of the year, 
day of the week, time of day (half-shift), indicators for holidays and the day after a holiday, and 
the normal high and low temperatures for each given date and facility location. The mean absolute 
deviation (MAD) and mean squared error (MSE) are comparable for the training and test sets 
(Table 19). The test set performance suggests that the predictions made using historic data are off 
by about one patient on average. Furthermore, we find that 61.42% of predicted values (across all 
three severity levels) are off by less than one patient arrival, and only 5.02% of predicted values 
are off by more than three patient arrivals. Thus, that historic data provides a reasonable estimate 
of the number of hourly arrivals of each type during a given half-shift. By combining this historic 
information about patient severity and predictions regarding the appropriate type of provider, 
management can make more informed decisions regarding provider staffing. 
Finally, we develop a model to classify visits based on the type of provider that each visit will 
require. For this analysis, we limit the sample to patients who arrive when at least one physician 
and at least one APP are working. This ensures that either provider type was an option when the 
patient was assigned to a provider. We predict the provider type based on the patient’s age, gender, 
ESI level, and payer information (e.g. Medicare or a commercial insurance provider). We control 
for the facility, the average ESI level of patients currently in the ED as well as the ratio of APPs 
to physicians to get a sense of the ED’s current state. Several machine learning approaches were 
tested to determine the method that most accurately classifies visits by provider type. Table 20 
summarizes the performance of eight classification models. We trained each model using data 
from 2014 through 2016 (the training set) and implemented 10-fold cross validation. Summary 
statistics corresponding to the reported accuracy (proportion of correct predictions) of each model 
are shown. Several of these models perform similarly, suggesting that there are clear patterns in 
the ways in which patients are assigned to the two provider types.  
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Table 19 Predicting Number of Patients per Hour by ESI Level 
   ESI Level 
  1 & 2 3 4 & 5 
 (Constant) -0.2047 0.7900 0.8636 
     
Month of Year 
January 0.0904 0.1061 0.1165 
February 0.0465 0.0896 0.1100 
March 0.0785 0.1109 0.0937 
April 0.0567 0.0646 0.0587 
May 0.0172 0.0449 0.0572 
June -0.0136 0.0149 0.0245 
August 0.0067 0.0173 -0.0173 
September 0.0339 0.0291 0.0020 
October 0.0481 -0.0057 -0.0400 
November 0.0286 0.0175 -0.0463 
December 0.0911 0.0605 0.0047 
     
Day of Week 
Monday 0.1312 0.1246 0.0555 
Tuesday 0.0877 0.0842 -0.0183 
Wednesday 0.0755 0.0623 -0.0327 
Thursday 0.0478 0.0357 -0.0697 
Friday 0.0223 0.0379 -0.1101 
Saturday -0.0582 -0.0228 -0.0659 
     
 Holiday -0.1124 -0.1112 -0.0113 
 Day After Holiday 0.0128 0.0798 0.1134 
     
Half Shift 
Shift 11am-3pm 0.3524 0.2836 0.2975 
Shift 3pm-7pm 0.2971 0.2424 0.3359 
Shift 7pm-11pm 0.0837 0.0634 0.2186 
Shift 11pm-3am -0.5520 -0.6222 -0.7272 
Shift 3am-7am -0.9111 -0.9855 -1.3491 
     
 Minimum Temperature 
(normal, based on historic data) 0.0009 0.0007 0.0016 
 Maximum Temperature 
(normal, based on historic data) 0.0022 0.0015 0.0012 
     
Facility 
Facility 2 -1.7717 0.0961 0.0496 
Facility 3 -0.8301 -0.4572 -0.6840 
Facility 4 -0.2143 -0.1652 -0.7270 
Facility 5 -1.4861 -0.0554 -0.5191 
Facility 6 0.3538 0.3326 0.1783 
Facility 7 -1.9719 -1.1857 -0.9150 
Facility 8 0.2988 0.3582 0.3385 
Training Set (2014 – 2016) 
Mean Squared Error (MSE) 1.0468 5.0395 5.5270 
Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) 0.7187 1.7397 1.7947 
Test Set (2017) 
Mean Squared Error (MSE) 1.1525 4.5651 4.4106 
Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) 0.7561 1.6571 1.6377 
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Table 20 Predicting Provider Type 
Method Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max 
Linear Discriminant Analysis 83.13% 83.24% 83.31% 83.31% 83.35% 83.51% 
Logistic Regression 82.97% 83.27% 83.34% 83.31% 83.41% 83.52% 
K Nearest Neighbor 81.38% 81.69% 81.92% 81.91% 82.17% 82.39% 
Naïve Bayes 80.49% 82.23% 83.03% 82.74% 83.48% 84.03% 
Cart 82.88% 83.07% 83.42% 83.47% 83.93% 84.05% 
C-5.0 83.85% 84.03% 84.15% 84.21% 84.37% 84.83% 
Bagged Cart 78.44% 78.57% 78.77% 78.74% 78.84% 79.08% 
Stochastic Gradient Boosting 83.73% 84.00% 84.17% 84.18% 84.39% 84.60% 
For ease of interpretability, the results of the logistic regression model are provided here (Table 
21 and Fig. 23). These results confirm previous observations about the likelihood of ESI Level 4 
and 5 patients being treated by APPs. While the odds of being treated by an APP increase with 
ESI Level, the odds of an ESI Level 4 or 5 patient being treated by an APP are more than 150 
times the odds of an ESI Level 1 or 2 patient being treated by an APP. As the average ESI Level 
within the ED increases, it indicates less sick patients on average. Consequently, the logistic 
regression model suggests that the odds of being treated by an APP increase as the average ESI 
level increases (i.e., for lower acuity patients). This may be due to an increased availability of 
physicians to treat all patients. Additionally, as more APPs are working, the APP ratio will 
increase, and thus the odds of a patient being treated by an APP increase.  
Together, these models provide insights about ED visits, assignments of the patients to different 
provider types, and the factors that affect the length of stay for discharged patients. Specifically, 
we find that the number and severity of visits remains relatively stable over time, validating 
management’s use of historic trends in staffing physicians and APPs. As expected, the assignment 
of providers to these visits is strongly related to patient characteristics, including ESI level. We 
controlled for patient characteristics, patient arrival times, and the ED conditions upon arrival to 
assess how the use of APPs impacts LOS for discharged patients. We noted that patients treated 
  124 
by APPs experienced shorter LOS and that adding providers (either physicians or APPs) were 
associated with shorter LOS. Additionally, the benefit of adding a physician was greater than 
adding an APP as evidenced by larger reductions in LOS. In either case, the patients treated by 
physicians saw a greater impact when an additional provider was added. Furthermore, patients 
classified as ESI Level 4 or 5 benefitted most from being treated by APPs and also profited most 
from the addition of a physician. However, this group of low acuity patients observed minimal 
benefit from the addition of an APP. Time of day is important in predicting LOS, and differences 
throughout the day affect how beneficial APPs are. Next, we incorporate these insights into a 
simulation model to replicate the current operations of an ED and then run a simulated experiment 
in which we assess how changes to both controllable and uncontrollable factors affect visit lengths. 
 
 
Figure 23 ROC Curve: Logistic Regression Model for Provider Type (APP = 1 or Physician = 0) 
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Table 21 Predicting Provider Type: Logistic Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Prob(Provider Type = APP) 
 
Variable exp(Coefficient) Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 (Constant) 0.0036 -5.6133 *** 0.0519 
      
ESI Level 
ESI Level 1 or 2 Reference Group 
ESI Level 3 4.9982 1.6091 *** 0.0344 
ESI Level 4 or 5 109.9395 4.6999 *** 0.0337 
      
Age 
0 to 3 months 0.5624 -0.5756 *** 0.0305 
4 to 36 months 0.9700 -0.0305  0.0217 
3 to 8 years 1.0290 0.0286  0.0165 
9 to 17 years 1.0976 0.0932 *** 0.0148 
18 to 34 years Reference Group 
35 to 44 years 0.9364 -0.0658 *** 0.0128 
45 to 54 years 0.8458 -0.1675 *** 0.0136 
55 to 64 years 0.7427 -0.2974 *** 0.0161 
65 to 74 years 0.6510 -0.4292 *** 0.0247 
75 to 84 years 0.4739 -0.7469 *** 0.0314 
85 years plus 0.3696 -0.9953 *** 0.0397 
      
Gender Male Indicator 1.0053 0.0053  0.0082 
      
Payer 
Commercial Insurance Reference Group 
Medicaid 0.9186 -0.0849 *** 0.0115 
Medicare 0.8099 -0.2109 *** 0.0184 
Self-Pay 0.9170 -0.0867 *** 0.0148 
Other 1.5598 0.4445 *** 0.0163 
      
 ED Census 0.9956 -0.0045 *** 0.0005 
 Average Severity of Other Patients 1.2634 0.2338 *** 0.0090 
 APP to Physician Ratio 2.2704 0.8200 *** 0.0107 
      
Half Shift 
Shift 7am-11am Reference Group 
Shift 11am-3pm 0.8782 -0.1298 *** 0.0143 
Shift 3pm-7pm 0.7775 -0.2517 *** 0.0148 
Shift 7pm-11pm 0.6390 -0.4479 *** 0.0150 
Shift 11pm-3am 0.3215 -1.1348 *** 0.0200 
Shift 3am-7am 0.0489 -3.0179 *** 0.2194 
      
Facility* 
Facility 1 Reference Group 
Facility 2 0.0034 -5.6881 *** 0.0870 
Facility 3 2.5217 0.9249 *** 0.0176 
Facility 4 0.4393 -0.8225 *** 0.0179 
Facility 5 0.3919 -0.9367 *** 0.0196 
Facility 7 1.5979 0.4687 *** 0.0353 
Facility 8 1.9998 0.6930 *** 0.0115 
*Note that Facility 6 is excluded because no visits were attributed to APPs working independently 
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5.4.3 Prescriptive Analysis 
In order to prescribe rules for making staffing decisions, we design a simulated experiment. We 
begin by simulating the current state of one ED in our sample. After replicating the ED’s current 
state, we utilize a Taguchi L-27 design to study the effects of changes to the ED’s current staffing 
practices, which are controllable, as well as uncontrollable changes to the patient population.  
Staffing variables include the number of physicians working during each shift (day, afternoon, and 
night), the APP to physician ratio during each shift, and the rules for assigning providers to 
patients. The uncontrollable patient variables include patient complexity (expected value of ESI 
level), the proportion of patients requiring labs, testing, and both labs and testing, and the 
proportion of patients who are admitted to the hospital. Table 22 details the levels for each of the 
variables in our experiment, and Table 23 lists each of the 27 experimental runs. For each variable, 
the medium (or M) setting represents the observed data or baseline setting. These settings were 
largely identified through the previously presented descriptive analysis. Patients arriving in the ED 
are assigned to one of the five ESI levels using a discrete probability distribution that reflects the 
actual data. Six different distributions are used and dependent on the time of arrival. As with 
previous analyses, we use four-hour blocks of time, or half-shifts. The three rules used for 
assignment of patients to providers are as follows:  
(1) ESI Level 1, 2, and 3 always assigned to physicians, ESI Levels 4 and 5 assigned to first 
available provider. 
(2) ESI Levels 1 and 2 always assigned to physicians, all others assigned to first available provider. 
(3) ESI Levels 1 and 2 always assigned to physicians, ESI Levels 4 and 5 always assigned to APPs, 
ESI Level 3 assigned to first available provider. 
Rule 2 is viewed as the base case because many emergency departments already operate in this 
way. APPs typically do not have the necessary training and expertise to independently treat Level 
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1 or 2 patients, so those cases are always assigned to physicians, but other patients may be assigned 
to either provider type. Rule 1 uses the same idea but assumes that Level 3 patients should only be 
seen by physicians. Finally, Rule 3 represents an ED with a “Fast Track” which immediately routes 
the lowest acuity patients to APPs in an attempt to reduce wait times and ED crowding. In each of 
these cases, the highest priority patient (i.e. the patient with the lowest ESI level) is always served 
first, and patients within the same ESI level are treated on a first come first serve (FCFS) basis. 
The simulation model also accounts for the possibility that a more severe patient who arrives in an 
ED may take precedence over the provider’s current patient. That is, a physician may temporarily 
leave a lower acuity patient to treat a new high acuity patient. Additionally, an APP may call on a 
physician for assistance and vice versa, resulting in patients treated by both provider types. 
Resource requirements (e.g., testing or labs) for each visit are based on the historic data, and 
service times are randomly assigned based on both patient and ED factors.  
The results of the experimental runs are described in Table 24. Using these simulated results, 
we construct a model to determine directions for improvement. For each factor, we code the High, 
Medium, and Low settings as 1, 0, and -1, respectively. These results (Table 25) suggest that 
increasing the number of physicians during the day shift (7am to 3pm) is associated with 
significantly fewer patients in the ED on average and a lower utilization rate for physicians. 
Furthermore, increasing the number of physicians during the afternoon shift (3pm to 11pm) is 
associated with shorter visit lengths and fewer patients in the ED on average as well as a lower 
utilization rate for physicians. While the goal is not to have idle physicians, a small reduction in 
utilization could free up physicians for other responsibilities or allow them to spend more time 
interacting with patients. Adding physicians during the night shift did not produce statistically 
significant differences from the baseline. On the other hand, increasing the number of APPs 
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working per physician (or APP ratio) during a shift resulted in significantly shorter visit lengths 
on average, but minimal changes were observed with respect to the number of patients in the ED 
and the physician utilization rate. These results further emphasize that adding physicians will have 
a greater influence than adding APPs. However, increasing the number of APPs is still shown to 
be beneficial, so further analysis will be necessary to determine the exact tradeoff between a 
physician and an APP for a specific ED. While these regression results suggest potential directions 
for improvements, further experimentation is recommended on a facility basis to determine the 
specific settings that result in improved ED operations while also meeting the facility’s financial 
and personnel constraints.  
 
Table 22 Description of Factor Levels for Simulated Experiment 
Controllable Factors Levels 
Number of Physicians day 
1 2 3 Number of Physicians afternoon 
Number of Physicians night 
APP to Physician Ratio day 
L 
(ratio ≤ 0.5) 
M 
(0.67 ≤ ratio ≤ 1.33) 
H 
(1.5 ≤ ratio ≤ 2.5) 
APP to Physician Ratio afternoon 
APP to Physician Ratio night 
Assignment Rule (Patients to Providers) Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 
     
Uncontrollable Factors Levels 
Patient Complexity (Expected Value for ESI Level) L = 3.11 M = 3.15 H = 3.19 
Proportion of Patients Requiring Labs (No testing) L = 0.39 M = 0.43 H = 0.47 
Proportion of Patients Requiring Testing (No labs) L = 0.01 M = 0.02 H = 0.03 
Proportion of Patients Requiring Both Labs & Testing L = 0.14 M = 0.16 H = 0.18 
Proportion of Patients Admitted L = 0.11 M = 0.14 H = 0.17 
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Table 23 Experimental Design for Simulation 
Run 
Physicians 
(D) 
Physicians 
(A) 
Physicians 
(N) 
APP 
Ratio 
(D) 
APP 
Ratio 
(A) 
APP 
Ratio 
(N) 
Assignment 
Rule 
Patient Complexity 
(Expected Value) 
Labs Testing 
Labs + 
Testing 
Admitted 
1 1 2 2 M L L Rule 1 3.15 M M H H 
2 2 3 1 M H L Rule 2 3.15 H L L M 
3 3 2 1 H M L Rule 3 3.19 M L L H 
4 2 2 3 L H L Rule 2 3.11 M H M H 
5 1 2 2 M H H Rule 3 3.11 L L M M 
6 2 2 3 L L M Rule 3 3.15 H L H L 
7 2 1 2 H M H Rule 1 3.15 H L M H 
8 2 1 2 H L M Rule 3 3.11 M H L M 
9 1 1 1 L H H Rule 3 3.19 H H H H 
10 3 1 3 M H M Rule 1 3.19 M L H M 
11 1 2 2 M M M Rule 2 3.19 H H L L 
12 1 1 1 L M M Rule 2 3.15 M M M M 
13 3 1 3 M M L Rule 3 3.15 L H M L 
14 3 3 2 L M L Rule 3 3.11 H M H M 
15 1 1 1 L L L Rule 1 3.11 L L L L 
16 1 3 3 H L L Rule 1 3.19 H H M M 
17 3 3 2 L L H Rule 2 3.19 M L M L 
18 3 2 1 H L H Rule 2 3.15 L H H M 
19 3 1 3 M L H Rule 2 3.11 H M L H 
20 1 3 3 H H H Rule 3 3.15 M M L L 
21 2 1 2 H H L Rule 2 3.19 L M H L 
22 1 3 3 H M M Rule 2 3.11 L L H H 
23 2 3 1 M L M Rule 3 3.19 L M M H 
24 3 3 2 L H M Rule 1 3.15 L H L H 
25 2 3 1 M M H Rule 1 3.11 M H H L 
26 2 2 3 L M H Rule 1 3.19 L M L M 
27 3 2 1 H H M Rule 1 3.11 H M M L 
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Table 24 Results of Simulated Experiment (Average of 10 Runs; Each Run = 52 Weeks) 
Run Patients in ED Time in ED (hours) Utilization of APPs (%) Utilization of Physicians (%) 
1 20.2704 3.6960 21.5992 71.1442 
2 8.5794 1.5591 36.7139 45.8602 
3 11.9494 2.1529 44.4162 70.4786 
4 8.6754 1.5764 34.2779 47.6667 
5 10.1847 1.8505 56.0331 56.4701 
6 59.1205 10.7393 27.2186 93.5016 
7 11.2345 2.0429 27.1698 60.8932 
8 25.6181 4.6551 42.5391 75.4981 
9 11.8892 2.1601 44.4162 70.3158 
10 10.8860 1.9831 26.6400 59.5376 
11 10.5257 1.9165 53.5287 54.4810 
12 60.8423 14.3317 61.9248 99.9552 
13 22.8029 4.1434 36.6944 67.8703 
14 19.1905 3.4839 35.0343 64.5407 
15 144.0000 2.5049 0.7865 99.8234 
16 14.3249 2.5804 17.7152 66.6142 
17 8.2320 1.4918 38.3743 43.7849 
18 8.6903 1.5738 37.1236 46.1110 
19 11.5751 2.1021 26.4259 55.6060 
20 9.7193 1.7692 54.6787 52.5943 
21 18.1689 3.3032 49.4564 82.0670 
22 9.7067 1.7664 50.1257 50.8049 
23 8.5764 1.5603 52.6464 50.6623 
24 8.4910 1.5331 13.4880 51.7366 
25 8.8865 1.6073 21.2448 51.5164 
26 8.2332 1.4859 23.6186 50.0788 
27 9.0661 1.6408 21.3161 51.7605 
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Table 25 Analysis of Simulated Experiment (Average of 10 Runs; Each Run = 52 Weeks) 
  
Variable ln(Visit Length) ln(Patients in ED) Utilization of Physicians 
 (Intercept) 0.8773 *** 2.6612 *** 62.6435 *** 
 Physicians (Day) -0.1318  -0.2464 * -6.1543 * 
 Physicians (Afternoon) -0.2845 * -0.3992 *** -10.7473 ** 
 Physicians (Night) 0.0407  -0.0758  -2.3449  
 APP Ratio (Day) -0.1334  -0.2492 * -3.5879  
 APP Ratio (Afternoon) -0.1927  -0.3234 ** -4.7076  
 APP Ratio (Night) -0.1981  -0.3284 ** -7.1497 * 
 Assignment Rule 0.1880  0.0567  2.157  
 Labs 0.1081  -0.0223  0.4416  
Controls 
Testing -0.0193  -0.1489  -2.7414  
Labs+Testing 0.1456  0.0144  1.8546  
Admitted -0.1279  -0.2581 * -3.7828  
Patient Complexity -0.0445  -0.1742  -0.3148  
R2 58.11% 84.01% 73.79% 
Adjusted R2 22.21% 70.30% 51.32% 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; two-tailed tests       
 
5.5 Conclusions & Managerial Insights 
We analyze historic data to gain a better understanding of how APPs are utilized in EDs and 
the potential benefits of APPs from the ED patient perspective, mainly focusing on the visit length 
for discharged patients since it has been linked to patient satisfaction previously. We apply data 
from eight hospitals over a four-year period (2014-2017) to gain a better understanding of how 
APPs are currently utilized in EDs. Through descriptive analyses and data visualization, we 
observe that current practices vary. While patients arriving in one ED were treated exclusively by 
physicians (as of 2017), low acuity patients arriving in other EDs were likely to be treated by an 
APP, and the number of patients being treated by APPs increased each year during the study 
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period. We then developed predictive models to better understand how providers are assigned to 
patients across these EDs and how that assignment as well as staffing levels relate to visit length.  
In these predictive models, we consider the effects of being treated by an APP and adding more 
APPs to an ED, all else constant. We also compare the addition of an APP to the addition of a 
physician. We note that adding a physician has a larger impact on LOS for discharged patients, 
presumably because emergency physicians have more comprehensive education and training and 
more specialized knowledge. However, we also note the benefits gained from adding an APP after 
accounting for a number of patient and ED-related factors. Namely, with each additional APP, we 
observe a shorter average LOS amongst all discharged patients, regardless of whether or not they 
were treated by an APP. In fact, the difference in LOS was most pronounced among the patients 
that were treated by physicians, suggesting that APPs are freeing up physicians to more quickly 
care for sicker patients. The results of our predictive analyses make a case for the ED “Fast Track” 
in which lower acuity patients are treated as a separate population and almost always see an APP. 
Using the results of the descriptive and predictive analyses, we develop a simulation model to 
experiment with potential process changes within the ED. Additional experimentation on a facility 
basis could help to determine the specific settings that result in improved ED operations while 
taking into account the facility’s financial and personnel constraints.  
While the use of observational data limits our ability to infer causality, we worked to address 
such limitations. Since APPs are typically used during high volume times, we include the current 
ED census and patient arrival time as control variables. We also run our analyses excluding the 
highest acuity patients as they are unlikely to be seen by an APP and may skew the results. Still, 
this is a limitation of the analyses. Additionally, this work has focused on the patient’s perspective, 
and more specifically, on patient length of stay. The provider perspective is also important, and 
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we acknowledge that we haven’t compared provider productivity or actual patient outcomes for 
physicians and APPs. Ideally, further research may also incorporate patient outcomes such as 
patient experience scores or returns to the ED within 72 hours.  
Our findings have practical implications for EDs. While many EDs already utilize APPs, the 
staffing decisions are not made systematically. We have confirmed that APPs provide benefits 
within the ED and simulated an experiment for a single ED to determine directions for 
improvement. Management may opt to simulate a series of experiments which are feasible given 
the available staff, budget, and other constraints, applying response surface methodology to 
continuously find directions for improvement. Once a desirable setting is confirmed through 
simulation, the ED may experiment with adding APPs to shifts. Thus, this proposed research 
framework, comprising the descriptive analyses, data visualization, predictive models, and 
simulated experiments, has provided insights about the usage of APPs in EDs. These insights are 
valuable for increasing patient throughput in EDs and may ultimately be incorporated to improve 
the patient experience and patient outcomes. 
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6.0 Summary & Future Work 
Healthcare operations is a research area that continues to evolve, and the increasing availability of 
data provides opportunities for more informed decision making. In each of these three essays, we 
utilized data corresponding to millions of visits at various EDs staffed by a large national 
emergency physician group. Using these data, we addressed issues related to managing emergency 
physicians and APPs. Future research may expand upon each of these essays. 
For example, we developed metrics to evaluate performance across multiple sites and work to 
understand the relationships between patient flow, patient complexity, and patient experience in 
the first essay. In the future, we may further assess physician productivity by analyzing changes 
within a provider’s shift. For instance, do physicians’ practice patterns differ between the 
beginning, middle, and end of a shift? Do those differences depend on the length of the shift (e.g., 
eight hours versus 10 hours versus 12 hours)? These are important questions that may provide 
insights regarding the optimal shift length in different emergency department settings.  
In the second essay, we investigated what happens when a physician is accused of medical 
malpractice, an event that can be both financially and emotionally taxing. As part of this analysis, 
we examined whether or not a physician’s practice patterns changed specifically when patients 
presented symptoms related to the same body system as the patient in the recent malpractice claim 
against that physician. Future research may center on disease- or symptom-specific research 
questions, comparing how physicians and facilities differ in their treatments for certain conditions. 
Most analyses included within this dissertation utilize all of a providers’ visits within a specified 
time frame. While incorporating all visits is helpful when making generalizations, there is potential 
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for future research related to specific medical conditions, procedures, or treatments. By isolating 
a more focused sample, we may be able to uncover treatment patterns or trends related to a given 
disease or medical condition. Such research would be conducive to better assessing quality of care. 
The final essay builds on a secondary result from the first essay which indicated that the support 
of APPs such as physician assistants has a direct positive impact on patient flow. We took a closer 
look at the relationship between APPs and physicians and ED staffing practices and plan to 
continue to build on this research moving forward. For instance, in this work, we mainly focus on 
when and where APPs could be added, but more work is required to better understand the 
substitutability of APPs and physician and when a physician could be replaced by one or more 
APPs. In addition to using the historic data to make such staffing decisions, there is potential for 
improvements to short-term demand predictions, which could provide ED management with better 
information to improve resource allocation and make short-term scheduling adjustments. For 
example, social media data (e.g., Twitter) may provide insights about the surrounding community 
with posts about accidents, mass-casualty events, and even disease outbreaks. Monitoring such 
data could allow EDs to better inform decisions in real-time. For instance, an ED may be able to 
call in additional providers before an influx of patients. Such improvements in short-term demand 
forecasts are valuable for ED management. 
Research related to managing EDs in terms of either operational metrics (e.g. length of stay, 
RVUs, or admission rates) or quality of care (e.g., patient outcomes or adherence to standards) 
continue to be valuable for healthcare administrators and physicians. Additionally, such research 
has the potential for downstream patient benefits. EDs represent an important facet of the 
healthcare industry, and as the group continues to grow and collect additional data, new research 
questions constantly arise. 
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Appendix A Development of Key Performance Indicators 
This appendix supports the analysis and models presented in Section 3. 
Appendix A.1 Relative Value Units and Press Ganey Scores 
Management in the EPMN under study needs not only to maintain their existing work force and 
retain current physicians, but also to appeal to new physicians by offering attractive 
compensation. Currently, some physicians feel they are disadvantaged due to the types of 
hospitals (with varying demand and capability) where they are assigned to work and the sorts of 
patient these facilities draw.  To mitigate such concerns, management constantly looks for new 
performance metrics to ensure fairness and efficiency in operations. The choice of indices is 
directly motivated by management’s need to focus on these operational outcomes. To focus on 
the operational outcomes, we use the conventional metrics (i.e. productivity and patient 
experience assessment) as references.  
Typically, an emergency physician’s productivity is measured by RVUs per hour, where RVU 
stands for relative value unit, a standard resource-based measure. The RVUs for a visit are assigned 
by trained medical coders. More specifically, RVUs are widely used as a measure for physician 
services billing and determining physician compensation. While the charges and revenues 
associated with a particular patient visit are highly variable based on specific laboratory, diagnostic 
imaging, and treatment modalities used, RVUs provide a standardized measure and indicate the 
amount of effort expended. Readers are referred to Venkat et al. (2015) for more details. 
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Appendix Figure 1 Press Ganey (PG) survey questions 
The “Physician PG score” for each clinician in a facility is calculated using the survey results from 
the previous 30 days of service. The mean score is then ranked and converted to a percentile. 
The organization has formal courses for physicians to improve their performance with respect 
to patients per hour and PG physician percentile rank. Both courses are 2-3 days in length and 
provide practical techniques that physicians can apply in their interactions with individual patients 
and managing the flow of patients in the ED. It is important to note that efficiency and patient 
experience training for emergency physicians and APPs is not simply a matter of remediation. 
Based on site circumstances, the EPMN may offer or mandate such training for all emergency 
physicians and APPs regardless of performance along these metrics. These courses offer 
continuing education to healthcare providers and means of improving operational performance. 
Therefore, currently physicians of varying performance levels are receiving the training. 
Appendix A.2 Additional Tables and Variable Definitions 
Similar to Eqs. (7) – (10), we propose Eq.(A1) to index the proportion of insurance types handled 
by each physician. It reflects whether the physician is treating more or less patients of a certain 
insurance type than peers. Additionally, physician i’s APP Support Ratio is the number of 
combined APP hours during all shifts divided by the total number of physician and APP hours 
during these shifts.  
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𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 =
∑ [
%𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑚 𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 %𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑚𝑗
× 𝑉𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (A.1) 
  
Appendix Table 1 Definitions of Patient Level Variables 
Variable  Definition 
Average Patient Agei = Average age of patients treated by a physician across all visits in all facilities 
Peds Indicatori = 
1, if Average Patient Age𝑘 < 18 years 
0, otherwise
 
Coding Com/Patienti = Average number of communications with physician per patient visit due to unclear or 
potentially missing physician documentation 
Admit Ratioi = Proportion of a physician’s patients that were admitted  
Commercial Insurance Ratioi = Proportion of a physician’s patients with commercial insurance 
Medicare Ratioi = Proportion of a physician’s patients with Medicare 
Medicaid Ratioi = Proportion of a physician’s patients with Medicaid 
Self-Pay Ratioi = Proportion of a physician’s patients without insurance 
Male Ratioi = Proportion of male patients 
ICD-9 Group 1 Ratioi = Proportion of Circulatory, Respiratory, Digestive, and Genitourinary visits (390-629) 
ICD-9 Group 2 Ratioi = Proportion of visits due to Symptoms, Signs & Ill-defined Conditions (780-799) 
ICD-9 Group 3 Ratioi = Proportion of Injury & Poisoning visits (800-999) 
  
Appendix Table 2 Definitions of Physician Level Variables 
 
Variable  Definition 
# Facilities Workedi = Number of facilities in which a physician worked 
Physician Agei = Age of Physician 
Physician Genderi = 
1, if Male 
0, otherwise
 
Physician Racei = 
1, if White 
0, otherwise
 
Efficiency Flagi = 
1, if EPMN-administered Efficiency Training Completed  
0, otherwise
 
Satisfaction Flagi = 
1, if EPMN-administered Patient Satisfaction Training Completed  
0, otherwise
 
6am-3pm Ratioi  = Proportion of a physician’s hours worked between 6am and 3pm 
3pm-12am Ratioi  = Proportion of a physician’s hours worked between 3pm and 12am 
12am-6am Ratioi  = Proportion of a physician’s hours worked between 12am and 6am  
APP Support Ratioi = Proportion of provider hours worked during a physician’s shifts which are attributed to APPs 
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Appendix A.3 Aggregate Measure: An Alternative Index 
In addition to the proposed relative indices presented in the paper, we also considered an 
alternate approach: aggregate measures. The difference is subtle and important. We first describe 
the aggregate measures of physician performance and then discuss why we ultimately choose to 
employ the relative index measures.  
Each physician may be compared to the aggregated average performance of all facilities at 
which he or she works. Therefore, we consider an aggregate measure that accounts for facility-
level differences by comparing a physician’s actual RVUs (or Patients) to his or her expected 
RVUs (or Patients) if he or she performed at the facility average within each facility. Recall that 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄
𝑗
=
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
, and other  facility averages can be computed similarly. 
Subsequently, we compute the physician’s aggregate measures relative to facilities’ averages in 
the EPMN in Eqs. (A.2) – (A.4).  
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑖  =
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗)
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (A.2) 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑖  =
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1 )
 (A.3) 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  =
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁄
𝑗
× 𝑉𝑖,𝑗)
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 (A.4) 
Appendix Table 3 presents a stylized example in which Physician A worked in two facilities 
(Facilities 1 and 2), while Physician B only worked in Facility 2. Facility 1 has higher average 
Patients/hr (4 vs.1) and RVUs/hr (14 vs. 4). Since Physician B only works at one facility, 
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calculating RVUs/hr is straightforward, but facility differences complicate the calculation for 
Physician A.  
First, we examine the absolute measures, which is the ratio of Total RVUs to Total Hours. In 
that case, Physician A [6.0=(9000+3000)/(1200+800)] generates more RVUs/hr than Physician B 
[4.1=9000/2200] as shown in Appendix Table 3(a). Then we compare the physicians based on the 
ratio of actual RVUs earned to expected RVUs earned at all facilities using Eq. (A.2), which yields 
the numbers in Appendix Table 3(b). Note that the aggregate measure captures the net effect of 
facility size and hours worked. Finally, we compare physicians on the relative indices in Appendix 
Table 3(c). By reflecting the relative performance at facilities in which the physician works and 
weighing his or her performance on the time he or she spent or patients he or she saw in each 
facility, the proposed indices  in Appendix Table 3(c) neutralize the scale (facility size) bias. 
Note that the measures in Appendix Tables 3(b) and 3(c) are comparable when we do not 
observe heterogeneity across the facilities in which a physician works, but they give different 
conclusions about Physicians A and B’s performances than Appendix Table 3(a).  
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Appendix Table 3 Comparison of Performance Metrics 
         RVUs/hr Patients/hr RVUs/Patient       
Phys. Fac. RVUs Patients Hours Fac. Phys. Fac. Phys. Fac. Phys. 
RVUs/ 
hr 
Ratio 
Patients/ 
hr Ratio  
RVUs/ 
Patient 
Ratio 
A 1 9000 3600 1200 14.0 7.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 0.54 0.75 0.71 
 2 3000 900 800 4.0 3.8 1.0 1.1 4.0 3.3 0.94 1.13 0.83               
B 2 9,000 2,500 2,200 4.0 4.1 1.0 1.1 4.0 3.6 1.02 1.14 0.90 
 
  (a) Total Physician Absolute Measures 
Physician RVUs/hr Patients/hr RVUs/Patient 
A 6.0 2.3 2.7 
B 4.1 1.1 3.6 
        
  (b) Aggregate Measures based on Facilities 
Physician RVUs/hr Patients/hr RVUs/Patient 
A 60.0% 80.4% 74.1% 
B 102.3% 113.6% 90.0% 
Computed by Eqs. (S.1) – (S.3) 
        
  (c) Proposed Relative Index Measures 
Physician RVUs/hr Patients/hr RVUs/Patient 
A 69.6% 90.0% 73.8% 
B 102.3% 113.6% 90.0% 
Computed by Eqs. (5) – (7) 
 
 
Eqs. (A.2)–(A.3) are better than the absolute measures because they normalize performance 
relative to expected performance at facilities, allowing for comparisons within the network. 
However, we contend that Eqs. (A.2)–(A.3) are inferior to the relative index measures in Eqs. (7)–
(9). Our reasoning follows from the analysis of the two-facility case.  
Recall that the proposed relative index first compares each physician’s performance in a given 
facility to that facility’s average and then weights the relative performance by the ratio of hours 
worked in that facility. In the two-facility case, that becomes: 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 
𝑋 +
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 
(1 − 𝑋), where 𝑋 =  the proportion of hours worked in Facility 1, 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗 = 
the physician’s RVUs/hr in Facility 𝑗, and 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄
𝑗
 = the average RVUs/hr for all 
physicians working in Facility 𝑗. This expression does not reward or penalize physicians for 
specific facility assignments, and thus, we contend that it is appropriate when physicians are 
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assigned to multiple facilities. Alternatively, the aggregate measure simply compares each 
physician’s aggregate performance to his or her expected performance based on all facilities in 
which he or she works. In the two-facility case, that is 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1×𝑋+ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2×(1−𝑋)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1×𝑋+ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2×(1−𝑋) 
. 
The aggregate measure has the potential to inappropriately penalize physicians who work a high 
proportion of hours at higher performing facilities or conversely reward physicians who work 
many hours at low-performing facilities. Thus, we reason that the proposed relative index is more 
suitable when facility assignment is beyond the physicians’ control as is the case in our data. 
In order to fully compare the effects of using each of the two measures discussed, we compare 
the mathematical implications of each for the two-facility case. We differentiate both the aggregate 
and relative index measures with respect to the proportion of hours worked in Facility 1. Recall 
that 𝑋 = the proportion of hours worked in Facility 1, 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟𝑗 = the physician’s RVUs/hr in 
Facility 𝑗, and 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄
𝑗
 = the average RVUs/hr for all physicians working in Facility 
𝑗. 
We first consider the proposed relative index: 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 
𝑋 +
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 
(1 − 𝑋). 
Differentiating with respect to 𝑋, we can determine the reward (or penalty) for working a larger 
proportion of hours at Facility 1 under the assumption that the "effort" at both facilities remains 
constant: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 
𝑋 +
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 
(1 − 𝑋))
=  
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 
−
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 
. 
The derivative is positive if the physician’s relative performance is higher for Facility 1 and 
negative if the physician’s relative performance is higher for Facility 2. This indicates that there is 
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always incentive to work more hours at the facility where relative performance is highest. It should 
also follow that there is more incentive to improve performance at the facility in which the most 
hours are worked. 
We then consider the aggregate measure: 
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1×𝑋+ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2×(1−𝑋)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1×𝑋+ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2×(1−𝑋) 
. Again, 
differentiating with respect to 𝑋, we can determine the reward (or penalty) for working a larger 
proportion of hours at Facility 1 under the assumption that the "effort" at both facilities remains 
constant: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 × 𝑋 + 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 × (1 − 𝑋)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 × 𝑋 +  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 × (1 − 𝑋) 
)
=
(
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 
−  
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 
) × 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 × 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2
[𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 × 𝑋 + 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 × (1 − 𝑋)]2
. 
The numerator will be positive if the relative performance is higher at Facility 1 than at Facility 
2, and it is a function of the difference in "effort" between the two facilities. The denominator is 
always positive, but it is a function of both 𝑋 and the facility averages, so the incentives are not as 
clear. Under the assumption that 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 > 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2, the denominator is 
increasing in 𝑋, but if 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 < 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2, the denominator is decreasing 
in 𝑋. This means that, holding all else constant, the derivative is decreasing in 𝑋 when 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 > 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2 but increasing in 𝑋 when 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟1 <
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟2. 
Consequently, there is always an incentive to work more hours at the facility where the relative 
performance is better (from the numerator), but the incremental reward from increasing the 
proportion of hours at that facility is dependent on both the current proportion of hours worked 
and the difference between the two facilities' averages (from the denominator). We reason that our 
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proposed relative index is preferable to the aggregate measure because these incentives should be 
universal and should not depend on the specific facilities in which a physician works. The very 
fact that the incentive based on the aggregate measure depends on the facility averages poses a 
potential problem. A summary companion of the two indices is given in Appendix Table 4. 
Appendix Table 4 Summary and Contrast of Two Metrics 
Proposed Index 
Eqs. (7) – (9) 
Alternate Index 
Eqs. (A.2) – (A.4) 
Index calculated by first computing physician 
performance relative to a facility and then 
averaging across facilities, weighted by hours 
worked. 
Index calculated by first weighting facility 
averages and physician averages by hours 
worked and then computing a ratio for relative 
performance, i.e., physician average/facility 
average 
Fairer and impartial index (prevents gaming) Incremental gains of physician depend on 
facility average. 
If network administration assigns facilities, 
this measure controls for exogenous facility 
demand and is appropriate. 
If physician self-selects facilities, then 
alternate index is appropriate. It captures yield 
from aggregate demand across facilities. 
Appendix A.4 Mathematical Relationship among Proposed Indices 
Recall the mathematical definitions of each of the proposed indices from Eqs. (7) – (9), and 
consider the product of RVUs/Patient Index (Eq. 8) and Patients/hr Index (Eq. 9). 
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𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁄ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 × 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖        
=
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁄ 𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁄
𝑗
× 𝑉𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
×
∑ [
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄ 𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄
𝑗
× 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
=
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗/𝑉𝑖,𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
× 𝑉𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
×
∑ [
𝑉𝑖,𝑗/𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
× 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
=
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
×
∑ [
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 
If Average Patients/hr is equivalent across all facilities, the above can be reduced to:  
=
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
×
[
∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄
]
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
=
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
× [
1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ℎ𝑟⁄
]
=
∑ [
𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝑉𝑖,𝑗
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1⁄
]
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐹𝑖
𝑗=1
 
 = 𝑅𝑉𝑈𝑠/ℎ𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 
Therefore, this proves that the product of RVUs/Patient Index and Patients/hr Index is equal to 
RVUs/hr Index when all of a physician’s facilities have the same Average Patients/hr. 
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Appendix A.5 Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
We used bootstrapping to resample from the data. Using the bootstrap samples, we recalculate 
the four indices and their standard errors. We have plotted the distributions of the indices and 
indicate the standard error for each index in Appendix Fig. 2.  
 
Appendix Figure 2 Sampling Distributions of Four Indices 
While the bootstrap standard errors suggest overlap among the performance of physicians, such 
performance measures have been studied over time. Carlson et al (2017) suggest that month-to-
month performance stabilizes after four months of practice. The variability among physicians still 
exceeds the variability over time for a single physician.  
Furthermore, we computed the 2SLS second-stage estimates using bootstrapping. The results 
are consistent with the original second-stage results. Differences in significance only relate to four 
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out of 27 control variables. Note that these differences do not affect the hypotheses, and the 
conclusions associated with our hypotheses remain the same. 
Appendix Table 5 Second Stage Regression Estimates (bootstrapped standard errors) 
 
  
Eq. (1):  
ln(RVUs/Patient Index) 
Eq. (2):  
ln(Patients/hr Index) 
Second Stage Regression (Standard Errors based on 800 Bootstrap Samples) 
Level Variable Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
Coefficient 
[Standard 
Error] 
 (Constant) -0.5648  [0.2103] 0.0351  [0.2768] 
Physician 
ln(RVUs/Patient Index)    -0.8224 *** [0.1971] 
ln(Patients/hr Index) 0.1841 ** [0.0705]    
Peds Indicator 0.5384 *** [0.0996]    
(0 = General, 1 = Peds)       
Physician Age    0.0002  [0.0016] 
Physician Male     0.0367 *** [0.0091] 
(0 = Female, 1 = Male)       
Physician White     0.0337 ** [0.0126] 
(0 = Non-white, 1 = White)       
% 12AM - 6AM Hours 0.0839 *** [0.0298] -0.0191  [0.0725] 
% 6AM - 3PM Hours -0.0811 *** [0.0288] 0.2205 *** [0.0609] 
Coding Com/Patient    -0.0457 *** [0.0099] 
APP Support Ratio 0.0170  [0.0222] 0.5794  [0.3225] 
APP Support Ratio*Physician Age    -0.0098 * [0.0073] 
        
Patient 
Average Patient Age 0.0345 *** [0.0064]    
(Average Patient Age)2 -0.0004 *** [0.0001]    
% Male Patients -0.0768  [0.1378]    
Commercial Index 0.0476  [0.0524] -0.2756 * [0.1394] 
Medicaid Index -0.2124 *** [0.0581] -0.0485  [0.0747] 
Medicare Index 0.0564  [0.0762] -0.0650  [0.0368] 
Self-Pay Index -0.2929 *** [0.0591] 0.1876  [0.1507] 
% ICD9 Group 1 0.3697 *** [0.0555]    
% ICD9 Group 2 0.2598 *** [0.0446]    
% ICD9 Group 3 0.0865  [0.0870]    
% Admitted Patients 0.1629 *** [0.0342]       
Independent variables defined in Tables A1 & A2  
  148 
Appendix B Malpractice Claim Analysis: Additional Details and Robustness Checks 
This appendix supports the analysis and models presented in Section 4. 
Appendix Table 6 Body System or Clinical Issue Classification of Primary Diagnosis ICD-9 and ICD-10 
Codes as Relates to Malpractice Claim Subject 
Body System Primary ICD-9 Codes* Primary ICD-10 Codes (if applicable)** 
Neurologic 
320-379 (all inclusive), 720-724 (all 
inclusive), 780 (all inclusive), 781 
(all inclusive), 784.0, 784.3, 784.5, 
784.6, 799.2, 800-801 (all inclusive), 
803-806 (all inclusive), 850-854 (all 
inclusive), 907 (all inclusive), 950-
957 (all inclusive), 986 
G40.909, G44.209, G44.219, G44.319, 
G45.9, G51.9, G56.01, G70.00, G89.4, 
G91.9, G93.9, I62.01, I63.9, M48.02, 
M51.26, M51.36, M54.16, M54.2, M54.41, 
M54.42, M54.5, M54.6, M54.9, M62.830, 
R26.2, R41.0, R42, R44.0, R44.3, R51, 
R53.1, R53.83, R56.00, R56.9, S06.340A, 
S09.90XA, S12.190A, S22.079A, S32.019A 
Gastrointestinal 
520-579 (all inclusive), 783 (all 
inclusive), 787 (all inclusive), 789 
(all inclusive), 793.4, 793.6 
B96.81, C24.9, K02.9, K04.7, K08.8, 
K12.0, K13.0, K21.0, K28.1, K29.00, 
K29.90, K31.84, K35.3, K35.80, K40.21, 
K40.90, K52.9, K56.41, K56.60, K56.69, 
K57.32, K57.92, K57.93, K59.00, K59.8, 
K61.1, K62.5, K62.89, K63.1, K64.8, 
K74.60, K80.20, K80.50, K81.0, K85.8, 
K85.9, K92.0, K92.1, K92.2, K94.23, 
R10.0, R10.10, R10.11, R10.12, R10.13, 
R10.30, R10.31, R10.32, R10.33, R10.84, 
R10.9, R11.0, R11.10, R11.2, R13.10, 
R14.0, R17, R18.8, R19.5, R19.7, R63.4, 
Z20.09, Z43.1, Z43.3 
Cardiovascular 
390-459 (all inclusive), 780.2, 780.4, 
785.0-785.3, 785.9, 786.5 (all 
inclusive), 786.7, 793.2, 796.2, 796.3 
NA 
Obstetrics & Gynecology 
090-099 (all inclusive), 614-616 (all 
inclusive), 617-629 (all inclusive), 
630-679 (all inclusive), 760-779 (all 
inclusive), 789 (all inclusive) 
NA 
Orthopedics 
710-739 (all inclusive), 793.7, 805-
848 (all inclusive), 880-897 (all 
inclusive), 905, 912-917 (all 
inclusive), 923-924 (all inclusive), 
927-928 (all inclusive) 
R25.2, S42.301A, S70.11XA, S16.1XXA, 
M54.5, S63.502A, S14.136A, M79.605, 
S93.602A, S42.002A, S62.631A, S63.501A, 
S32.9XXA, S32.059A, S61.431A, 
M25.462, S83.92XA, S93.402A 
Respiratory 
460-519 (all inclusive), 786 (all 
inclusive except 786.5), 793.1, 793.2, 
794.2 
NA 
Integument/Wounds 
680-709 (all inclusive), 782 (all 
inclusive), 870-897 (all inclusive), 
900-904 (all inclusive), 906 (all 
inclusive), 910-929 (all inclusive), 
940-949 (all inclusive) 
NA 
Genitourinary  
580-629 (all inclusive), 788 (all 
inclusive), 791 (all inclusive), 793.5, 
794.4 
NA 
Otolaryngology 
380-389 (all inclusive), 784.1, 784.2, 
784.4, 784.7-784.9 (all inclusive) 
NA 
Endocrine  
240-259 (all inclusive), 783.0-783.6 
(all inclusive), 794.5-794.7, 794.9 
NA 
Psychiatry 290-316 (all inclusive), 780.1, 780.5 NA 
Blood/Lymphatic 280-289 (all inclusive), 780.7 NA 
Eye 
360-379 (all inclusive), 781.8, 802.6, 
802.7, 802.8, 870-871 (all inclusive) 
NA 
*ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes classified based on major diagnostic code classification (ICD-9) and relationship of 
General Signs and Symptoms category to potential body system of relevance. General Signs and Symptoms 
diagnosis codes could be assigned to more than one body system categories based on potential relationship. 
** Only 3 named physicians had data that extended beyond 10-1-2015 when ICD-10 was implemented. Relevant 
visit ICD-10 codes related to malpractice claim body system were included based on presence within the data set for 
named physicians during this time period.
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Appendix Table 7 Difference-in-differences Adjusted for State Pre-Notification Laws 
Panel A.  Named versus Control Physicians Event Dates Adjusted for State Pre-Notification Laws (HI 
excluded and adjustments for CA and WV): All Included Visits 
 Named Physicians (N=63) Control Physicians (N=135) 
Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.69 
(0.81) 
3.74 
(0.85) 
3.64 
(0.78) 
3.73 
(0.79) 0.02 
(-0.11, 0.15) 
-0.033 
(-0.104,0.038) 
SE = 0.036 
RVUs/Hour 9.99 
(3.59) 
10.13 
(5.20) 
9.56 
(2.65) 
9.52 
(2.79) 0.54 
(-0.19, 1.27) 
0.061 
(-0.422,0.543) 
SE = 0.241 
Visit Length (hrs) 2.68 
(1.20) 
2.75 
(1.18) 
2.62 
(1.10) 
2.70 
(1.12) 0.06 
(-0.12, 0.23) 
-0.036 
(-0.136,0.064) 
SE = 0.050 
Proportion of 
Visits Resulting in 
Hospital 
Admission 
0.191 
(0.110) 
0.184 
(0.117) 
0.188 
(0.094) 
0.192 
(0.097) -0.004 
(-0.018, 0.009) 
-0.010 
(-0.0200,0.0001) 
SE = 0.005 
Physician Press 
Ganey Percentile 
Rank 
51.5 
(36.9) 
57.0 
(36.3) 
55.2 
(36.9) 
54.5 
(37.6) 0.23 
(-3.69, 4.15) 
6.747 
(0.512,12.983) 
SE = 3.103 
Physician months 706 1,381 685 1,306   
Visits 196,897  358,862  405,516  680,353    
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Panel B.  Named versus Control Physicians Event Dates Adjusted for State Pre-Notification Laws (HI 
excluded and adjustments for CA and WV): Failure to Diagnose Claims 
 Named Physicians (N=41) Control Physicians (N=93) 
Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.80 
(0.82) 
3.82 
(0.89) 
3.69 
(0.78) 
3.74 
(0.81) 0.09 
(-0.10, 0.27) 
-0.017 
(-0.089,0.056) 
SE = 0.036 
RVUs/Hour 10.10 
(4.09) 
10.01 
(5.35) 
9.69 
(2.65) 
9.83 
(2.66) 0.26 
(-0.80, 1.32) 
-0.399 
(-0.912,-0.115) 
SE = 0.255 
Visit Length (hrs) 2.80 
(1.35) 
2.88 
(1.32) 
2.69 
(1.12) 
2.79 
(1.143) 0.10 
(-0.12, 0.31) 
-0.041 
(-0.149,0.068) 
SE = 0.054 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.200 
(0.115) 
0.198 
(0.123) 
0.194 
(0.092) 
0.198 
(0.092) 0.002 
(-0.017, 0.021) 
-0.006 
(-0.017,0.004) 
SE = 0.005 
Physician Press 
Ganey Percentile 
Rank 
45.6 
(37.1) 
51.4 
(36.6) 
51.9 
(37.1) 
52.0 
(38.0) -2.80 
(8.21, 2.60) 
6.566 
(-1.787,14.920) 
SE = 4.133 
Physician months 458 850 445 784   
Visits 124,228 203,619 268,562 426,702   
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Panel C.  Named versus Control Physicians Event Dates Adjusted for State Pre-Notification Laws (HI 
excluded and adjustments for CA and WV): Visits Involving Same Body System or Clinical Issue as 
Malpractice Claim 
 Named Physicians (N=61)# Control Physicians(N=130) Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.75 
(1.00) 
3.85 
(1.02) 
3.78 
(1.03) 
3.87 
(0.99) -0.02 
(-0.14, 0.10) 
0.028 
(-0.080,0.137) 
SE = 0.054 
Visit Length (hrs) 3.06 
(2.00) 
3.11 
(1.71) 
2.94 
(1.52) 
3.00 
(1.63) 0.11 
(-0.07, 0.30) 
-0.030 
(-0.151,0.091) 
SE = 0.061 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.188 
(0.194) 
0.186 
(0.190) 
0.189 
(0.193) 
0.199 
(0.198) -0.009 
(-0.026, 0.008) 
-0.011 
(-0.027,0.005) 
SE = 0.008 
Physician months 704 1,353 686 1,265   
Visits 198,536 337,356 403,247 631,129   
#One named physician was excluded from this sub-analysis related to their malpractice claim being focused on a 
non-body system-based issue, and one named physician was excluded due to a lack of subsequent visits 
corresponding to the body system or clinical issue of the malpractice claim (Table 1) in addition to the two named 
physicians excluded from HI. This also leads to fewer control physicians in this analysis. 
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Panel D.  Named versus Control Physicians Event Dates Adjusted for State Pre-Notification Laws (HI 
excluded and adjustments for CA and WV): Non-Failure to Diagnose Claims 
 Named Physicians (N=23) Control Physicians (N=59) 
pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
 
Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.49 
(0.75) 
3.59 
(0.78) 
3.55 
(0.75) 
3.71 
(0.77) -0.10 
(-0.24, 0.04) 
-0.027 
(-0.146,0.093) 
SE = 0.059 
RVUs/Hour 9.78 
(2.35) 
10.32 
(4.95) 
9.31 
(2.64) 
9.05 
(2.92) 1.02 
(0.17, 1.86) 
0.727 
(-0.110,1.565) 
SE = 0.414 
Discharge Visit 
Length 
2.45 
(0.79) 
2.54 
(0.88) 
2.46 
(1.07) 
2.55 
(1.08) -0.01 
(-0.26, 0.24) 
0.004 
(-0.149,0.158) 
SE = 0.076 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.172 
(0.095) 
0.163 
(0.102) 
0.176 
(0.097) 
0.184 
(0.104) -0.015 
(-0.036, 0.005) 
-0.013 
(-0.029,0.003) 
SE = 0.008 
Physician Press 
Ganey Percentile 
Rank 
63.2 
(33.9) 
66.1 
(37.9) 
62.4 
(35.4) 
58.7 
(36.4) 5.14 
(-2.89, 13.17) 
5.859 
(-2.180,13.898) 
SE = 3.931 
Physician months 248 531 240 522   
Visits 73,153 157,236 158,519 294,866   
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Appendix Table 8 Summary Statistics without Propensity-Score Matching 
 
All Physicians 
(985) 
Physicians with 
Malpractice 
Claims (72) 
Physicians without 
Claims (913) 
Standardized 
difference in 
two groups 
(95% CI) 
Physician characteristics 
Mean Age at First Included 
Physician-Month 
40.9 (9.8) 44.6 (9.1) 40.6 (9.8) 
0.42 
(0.18, 0.66) 
Mean Years since Residency 
Completion at First Included 
Physician-Month 
8.3 (9.1) 12.1 (9.1) 8.0 (9.1) 
0.44 
(0.20, 0.69) 
% Male 68.1% 72.2% 67.8% 
0.10 
(-0.14, 0.34) 
% Board Certified in Emergency 
Medicine 
78.0% 94.4% 76.7% 
0.52 
(0.28, 0.76) 
Operational characteristics 
Total ED Visits as Attending 
Physician of Record 
6,009,646 669,819 5,339,827  
Per-physician Mean Monthly ED 
Visits as Attending Physician of 
Record 
255.0 (161.5) 294.1 (130.6) 252.4 (163.1) 
0.28 
(0.24, 0.32) 
Total Physician-Months 21,160 2,238 18,922  
Mean Number of Physician-
Months Per Physician 
21.5 (17.0) 31.1 (8.3) 20.7 (17.2) 
0.77 
(0.52, 1.01) 
ED Characteristics (same for named and control physicians, by construction) 
ED Mean Annual Visit Volume 35,900 
Mean Annual ED Admission 
Rate 
16.2% (7.5%) 
Percentage with Trauma 
Designation (Level 1-4) 
27.9% 
Percentage in Academic 
Hospitals 
14.8% 
Percentage with Emergency 
Medicine Residency Program 
13.1% 
Malpractice Claim Characteristics (n=77) 
Primary Body System/Clinical Issue of Malpractice Claim (%) # 
Blood/Lymphatic 1 (1.3%) 
Cardiovascular 9 (11.7%) 
ENT 1 (1.3%) 
Endocrine 2 (2.6%) 
Eye 1 (1.3%) 
Gastrointestinal 11 (14.3%) 
Genitourinary 4 (5.2%) 
Skin/Wound 6 (7.8%) 
Neurologic 18 (23.4%) 
OB-GYN 6 (7.8%) 
Orthopedic 7 (9.1%) 
Psychiatric 3 (3.9%) 
Respiratory 7 (9.1%) 
Non-Organ-System Based 
Clinical Issue (Medical Battery) 
1 (1.3%) 
Malpractice Claim Allegation (%) # 
Failure to Diagnose 50 (64.9%) 
Non-Failure to Diagnose 27 (35.1%) 
Claim Disposition (%) 
Physician Voluntarily Dismissed 
from Claim 
52 (67.5%) 
Out-of-Court Settlement 19 (24.7%) 
Trial - Defense Verdict 4 (5.2%) 
Trial - Plaintiff Verdict 2 (2.6%) 
State (%) 
CA 23 (29.9%) 
CT 5 (6.5%) 
HI 2 (2.6%) 
IL 5 (6.5%) 
NC 8 (10.4%) 
NV 9 (11.7%) 
NY 3 (3.9%) 
OH 16 (20.8%) 
OK 2 (2.6%) 
PA 2 (2.6%) 
WV 2 (2.6%) 
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Appendix Table 9 Difference-in-differences Analysis without Propensity-Score Matching:  Named versus 
Control Physicians 
Panel A.  All Visits 
 Named Physicians 
(N=72) 
Control Physicians 
(N=913) 
Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Relative Value 
Units (RVUs)/Visit 
3.71 
(0.81) 
3.73 
(0.83) 
3.76 
(0.82) 
3.81 
(0.82) 
-0.07 
(-0.16, 0.03) 
-0.0004  
(-0.08, 0.08) 
SE = 0.04 
RVUs/Hour 10.08 
(3.49) 
10.09 
(4.98) 
9.50 
(2.62) 
9.55 
(3.47) 
0.55 
(-0.06, 1.17) 
-0.24 
(-0.757, 0.268) 
SE = 0.26 
Visit Length (hrs.) 2.64 
(1.17) 
2.77 
(1.23) 
2.65 
(1.22) 
2.83 
(1.29) 
-0.04 
(-0.23, 0.14) 
0.12 
(-0.02, 0.25) 
SE = 0.07 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.192 
(0.107) 
0.185 
(0.116) 
0.210 
(0.109) 
0.203 
(0.112) 
-0.017 
(-0.029, -0.006) 
-0.002 
(-0.013, 0.008) 
SE = 0.005 
Monthly Physician 
Press Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
53.3 
(37.1) 
56.6 
(36.9) 
55.9 
(38.1) 
52.8 
(38.8) 
1.44 
(-3.07, 5.96) 
5.01 
(-0.32, 10.35) 
SE = 2.67 
Physician months 790 1,429 5,911 11,922   
Visits 238,519  431,300  1,900,439  3,439,388    
 
Panel B.  Failure to Diagnose Claims: All Visits 
 Named Physicians (N=45) Control Physicians (N=827) Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.66 
(0.74) 
3.72 
(0.79) 
3.67 
(0.81) 
3.73 
(0.80) 
-0.01 
(-0.10, 0.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.10,0.09) 
SE = 0.05 
RVUs/Hour 9.96 
(2.91) 
9.57 
(2.93) 
9.72 
(2.78) 
9.78 
(3.83) 
-0.05 
(-0.49, 0.40) 
-0.56 
(-1.01,-0.11) 
SE = 0.23 
Visit Length (hrs.) 2.58 
(0.90) 
2.79 
(1.07) 
2.62 
(1.08) 
2.86 
(1.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.21, 0.09) 
0.13 
(-0.07,0.33) 
SE = 0.10 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.183 
(0.100) 
0.180 
(0.108) 
0.197 
(0.110) 
0.189 
(0.114) 
-0.010 
(-0.025, 0.004) 
-0.002 
(-0.014,0.011) 
SE = 0.006 
Monthly Physician 
Press Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
49.5 
(36.3) 
57.7 
(36.4) 
55.6 
(38.5) 
52.4 
(39.0) 
1.19 
(-4.11, 6.50) 
8.92 
(2.38,15.46) 
SE = 3.26 
Physician months 492 836 4,746 8,992   
Visits 146,277  264,389  1,560,149  2,785,431    
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Panel C.  Visits Involving Same Body System/Clinical Issue as Malpractice Claim 
 Named Physicians (N=70)+ Control Physicians 
(N=891) 
Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.76 
(0.98) 
3.82 
(0.98) 
3.83 
(1.03) 
3.81 
(1.00) 
-0.02 
(-0.11, 0.08) 
0.13 
(-0.0004, 0.26) 
SE = 0.07 
Visit Length (hrs.) 3.05 
(1.94) 
3.11 
(1.73) 
2.87 
(1.61) 
3.03 
(1.68) 
0.12 
(-0.10, 0.34) 
0.12 
(-0.06, 0.30) 
SE = 0.09 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.182 
(0.177) 
0.177 
(0.175) 
0.202 
(0.189) 
0.188 
(0.185) 
-0.014 
(-0.029, 0.001) 
0.019 
(-0.012, 0.051) 
SE = 0.016 
Physician months 765 1,356 5,812 11,543   
Visits 33,499  58,469   356,430  622,089    
+One named physician was excluded from this sub-analysis because the malpractice claim was for a non-body 
system-based issue (medical battery), and one named physician was excluded due to a lack of subsequent visits 
corresponding to the body system or clinical issue of the malpractice claim. 
 
Panel D.  Non-Failure to Diagnose Claims: All Visits 
 Named Physicians (N=27) Control Physicians (N=397) Pre-claim 
difference in 
means (95% 
CI) 
DiD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
Outcome Measure Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Pre-Claim 
Mean (SD)  
Post-Claim 
Mean (SD) 
RVUs/Visit 3.81 
(0.94) 
3.75 
(0.92) 
3.91 
(0.83) 
3.94 
(0.84) 
-0.16 
(-0.37, 0.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.12,0.11) 
SE = 0.06 
RVUs/Hour 10.29 
(4.38) 
11.07 
(7.36) 
9.13 
(2.28) 
9.17 
(2.77) 
1.63 
(-0.02, 3.28) 
0.29 
(-0.67,1.24) 
SE = 0.46 
Visit Length (hrs.) 2.76 
(1.55) 
2.74 
(1.50) 
2.71 
(1.43) 
2.79 
(1.51) 
-0.02 
(-0.31, 0.28) 
0.02 
(-0.08,0.12) 
SE = 0.05 
Proportion of Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital Admission 
0.210 
(0.117) 
0.195 
(0.129) 
0.233 
(0.102) 
0.225 
(0.104) 
-0.027 
(-0.046, -
0.008) 
-0.0002 
(-0.012,0.012) 
SE = 0.006 
Monthly Physician 
Press Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
59.9 
(37.5) 
54.5 
(37.9) 
56.3 
(37.7) 
53.4 
(38.4) 
2.00 
(-5.82, 9.82) 
-2.19 
(-8.25,3.87) 
SE = 2.90 
Physician months 298 532 2,565 4,538   
Visits 92,233  166,920    656,949  1,215,936    
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(a)  RVUs/visit 
 
(b) RVUs/hour 
 
(c) Visit Length of Stay (LOS) for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(d) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
 
(e) Physician Press Ganey Percentile Rank 
Appendix Figure 3 Leads and Lags for Outcome Measures without Propensity-Score Matching:  All Visits 
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(a) RVUs/visit 
 
(b) RVUs/hour 
 
(c) Visit Length of Stay (LOS) for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(d) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
 
(e) Physician Press Ganey Percentile Rank 
Appendix Figure 4 Leads and Lags Comparing Named Physicians in 50 Failure to Diagnose Claims Versus 
Their Control Physicians without Propensity-Score Matching for Outcome Measures in All Included ED Visits 
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(a) RVUs/visit 
 
(b) Visit Length of Stay (LOS) for Discharged Patients (hours) 
 
(c) Proportion of Visits Resulting in Hospital Admission 
Appendix Figure 5 Leads and Lags for Outcome Measures without Propensity-Score Matching:  Body 
System/Clinical Issue Specific Visits 
  
  159 
Appendix Table 10 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Analysis:  Named versus Control Physicians by 
Gender 
 Named Physicians (N=65) Control Physicians (N=140) 
DDD Estimate 
(95% CI), SE 
 
Male Physicians 
(N=49) 
Female Physicians 
(N=16) 
Male Physicians 
(N=94) 
Female Physicians 
(N=46) 
Outcome 
Measure 
Pre-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Post-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Pre-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Post-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Pre-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Post-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Pre-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Post-
Claim 
Mean 
(SD) 
Relative Value 
Units 
(RVUs)/Visit 
3.67 
(0.76) 
3.74 
(0.84) 
3.71 
(0.90) 
3.69 
(0.86) 
3.68 
(0.78) 
3.79 
(0.77) 
3.55 
(0.74) 
3.57 
(0.82) 
0.04 
(-0.16, 0.24) 
SE = 0.10 
RVUs/Hour 
10.24 
(4.07) 
10.10 
(5.44) 
9.53 
(2.19) 
10.01 
(4.00) 
9.64 
(2.75) 
9.54 
(2.94) 
9.33 
(2.52) 
9.49 
(2.26) 
0.39 
(-0.99, 1.76) 
SE = 0.69 
Visit Length 
(hrs.) 
2.71 
(1.28) 
2.82 
(1.29) 
2.56 
(0.90) 
2.55 
(0.91) 
2.59 
(1.06) 
2.69 
(1.13) 
2.70 
(1.12) 
2.64 
(1.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.22, 0.22) 
SE = 0.11 
Proportion of 
Visits 
Resulting in 
Hospital 
Admission* 
0.182 
(0.104) 
0.178 
(0.115) 
0.202 
(0.117) 
0.193 
(0.118) 
0.191 
(0.091) 
0.199 
(0.096) 
0.172 
(0.095) 
0.170 
(0.097) 
-0.007 
(-0.017, 0.031) 
SE = 0.012 
Monthly 
Physician Press 
Ganey 
Percentile Rank 
48.77 
(36.87) 
52.82 
(36.82) 
58.35 
(36.08) 
68.19 
(32.41) 
54.13 
(37.62) 
53.52 
(38.16) 
56.97 
(35.45) 
60.09 
(34.87) 
4.42 
(-9,08, 17.91) 
SE = 6.72 
Physician 
months 
531 974 200 405 1,138 1,926 464 778  
Visits 156,580 256,616 50,922 101,705 300,487 477,669 128,359 202,396  
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